T he 20th International AIDS Conference in Melbourne (20–25 July 2014), was a remarkable experience that set the bar high in terms of science, the prioritising of a focus on key affected populations and showing accountable leadership.

In two years’ time this event will take place in Durban, South Africa, marking its return to the country after 16 years. The 13th International AIDS Conference, Breaking the silence, was the first to be held in a developing country and was addressed by our beloved Nelson Mandela. This conference forever changed the HIV response in Africa.

But how far have we really come? What have we learnt? And what do we expect of Durban 2016?

Firstly, the good news. The extraordinary shift in the global response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa over the past 15 years has been one of humanity’s shining achievements in recent times. The enormity of the scale of the implementation of treatment on the ground across the continent has undoubtedly been a global health milestone.

The rollout of antiretroviral therapy (ART) has saved an estimated nine million life-years in sub-Saharan Africa. Some 56% of eligible people on the continent were receiving ART in 2011 – higher than the global average of 54%. As encouraging as this figure is, it is still nowhere near where we want it to be.

ART has dramatically driven down both new infections and AIDS-related deaths: new HIV infections declined by 25% in the decade to 2011 and between 2005 and 2011, and AIDS mortality declined by 32%, a trend that finally began in the mid-2000s, due in large part to the availability of ARVs.

Now for the bad news. We are at a critical juncture in the sub-Saharan HIV/AIDS epidemic. Sub-Saharan Africa, despite all the impressive gains previously listed, still shoulders a vastly disproportionate burden of the epidemic with high prevalence and mortality.

Some 12 million people on the continent (a third of the global number of people living with HIV), are still unable to access ART, which is an extraordinary impediment to ending AIDS across the continent.

While so much has changed, too much has stayed the same. Gender inequality continues to see females share the burden of the epidemic; 58% of people living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa are females. The risk factors for females – physiological vulnerability; social and economic inequities; unequal access to education and employment; gender violence, and difficulty negotiating sex and condom use – all continue to fuel the epidemic.

Stigma and discrimination, as they do in so many countries dealing with HIV/AIDS epidemics, continue to hinder the implementation of science on the ground. In recent years, much has been made of the punitive anti-homosexuality laws that exist in some 35 African countries, and more recently the severe amendments made to them in countries such as Uganda and Nigeria.

Science tells us that HIV/AIDS sub-epidemics exist among people who inject drugs. Despite this, some international forums do not draw the link between HIV and drug use.
The past three decades of HIV/AIDS have taught us the disease doesn’t discriminate, people and governments do. A renewed engagement with decision-makers across the continent on the issue of human rights will be unavoidable if we are to build on the huge gains made over the past 15 years and move towards ending AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa.

It is my hope that the Durban 2016 International AIDS Conference will drive momentum towards invigorating the HIV/AIDS response in Africa. It’s about political leadership and accountability, but also leadership in other parts of society. The private sector could, for example, do much more as part of the global response, and there are several best practices in South Africa that we will share in two years’ time!

My ultimate hope is that in the very near future, we will see an Africa free from AIDS. I hope to see you in Durban.

Professor Olive Shisana, CEO, HSRC

This is an extract from a presentation delivered at the closing session of the 20th International AIDS Conference (IAC) in Melbourne, Australia from 20–25 July 2014. Professor Shisana is the co-chair of IAC 2016 with Professor Chris Beyrer, the AIDS 2016 International Chair.

SCIENTISTS CALL FOR BAN ON UNSTERILE TRADITIONAL MALE CIRCUMCISION

A group of eminent scientists in the HIV and AIDS field of research has called for the abolishment of ‘unsterile traditional male circumcision surgical practices with immediate effect’.

In an open letter to the editor in the August edition of the South African Medical Journal, the scientists pointed to the ‘now familiar tale’ of initiates undergoing traditional male circumcision who have been permanently disabled or died ‘for taking part in cultural practices that have outlived their value in today’s South Africa’.

The full letter reads as follows:

‘While we respect the rights of people to engage in culturally important initiation practices, it is unacceptable that every year during the winter months a large number of initiates continue to die or be maimed for life. The SAMJ alluded to the ‘astonishing indifference to deaths due to botched ritual circumcision’ fully a decade ago, and yet this year is seeing a repeat of the now familiar tale – the suffering of innocent young men and boys in order to become men. It was announced on Thursday 3 July 2014 that there had been already 23 initiation fatalities (19 in the Eastern Cape, three in Mpumalanga and one in the Western Cape) during this initiation season, which started in July. This is in spite of the supposed ‘zero tolerance to initiation fatalities’ campaign led by the Department of Traditional Affairs together with various stakeholders such as the National House of Traditional Leaders, the Department of Health, the South African Police Services, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities and the Congress of Traditional Leaders. Sadly, by the time of submission of this letter a fortnight later, more deaths had occurred. Every year we have been promised action, and every year more young men die or are maimed for life.

We the undersigned concerned scientists and parents call for immediate action by our government to stop the unacceptable deaths and penile amputations among young initiates undergoing traditional male circumcision by abolishing unsterile traditional male circumcision surgical practices with immediate effect. Our nation cannot afford this annual ritual of unwarranted slaughter and maiming of its sons to continue unabated. The time has come to show leadership in dealing with this major public health issue, which is a cause of great concern and embarrassment to all our citizens. We believe that decisive action cannot be postponed any longer. Even one more death or penile amputation of an initiate is one too many to accept.

We call on all traditional leaders from the various communities that engage in traditional male circumcision, and on politicians, to speak out publicly against this practice and follow King Goodwill Zwelithini’s historic and successful call in 2010 for Zulu initiates to be medically circumcised. Let us remember, culture is created, and it can lead to harmful or safe cultural practices. It is in our hands to change this situation once and for all.’

Signed by Professors Leickness Simbayi, head of the HIV/AIDS, STIs and TB (HAST) programme, HSRC; Olive Shisana, CEO, HSRC; Geoffrey Setswe, HAST, HSRC; Glenda Gray, president of the Medical Research Council; Francois Venter, head of the Wits Reproductive Health and HIV Institute, Johannesburg; Daniel J Ncayiyana, emeritus professor, UCT; emeritus editor, SAMJ; Thomas Rehle, HAST, HSRC.
AIDS JOURNAL
BRINGS NEW
STRATEGIC INSIGHTS INTO
CHILDREN AFFECTED BY HIV AND AIDS

Professor Linda Richter at the launch of the special edition of the AIDS journal during the symposium ‘Children and HIV: Start Early, Start Now’, with Ed Cain, vice-president of programmes at the Conrad N Hilton Foundation (left) and John Miller, coalition director, Coalition for Children Affected by AIDS. The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) invited Richter as the editor and co-authors, to present three of the papers from the special edition on 2 October in Washington.

A large number of HIV-positive pregnant women globally do not receive treatment. In fact, in 2012 only 37% of women in low and middle-income countries even received antenatal HIV testing.

This suboptimal coverage of detection and treatment resulted in an estimated 260 000 children acquiring HIV in 2012, adding to the 3.3 million children younger than 15 already living with HIV, indicating ‘the paediatric HIV epidemic is far from over’.

These figures are according to guest editors Professor Linda Richter and Lynne Mofenson in the journal AIDS, the official scientific journal of the International AIDS Society, which is the most highly cited journal in the HIV and AIDS field. A total of 150 authors contributed to this special edition, which includes 16 peer-reviewed articles addressing critical issues for children born into families affected by HIV.

The journal was launched on 18 July 2014 at the Children and HIV Symposium in Melbourne, Australia.

Sketching the background to the edition, Richter, director of the DST-NRF Centre of Excellence, University of the Witwatersrand and distinguished HSRC research fellow, said eight eminent researchers in their field were invited to look at 100 years of evidence and give guidance on the long-term effect on children of nutrition, growth and development, attachment and disruption, parental ill-health, separation and death, parental mental health, violence stigma, resilience, and poverty.

‘The result was an amazing accumulation of evidence in ways HIV affects children,’ Richter said. The immediate and short-term consequences of adult HIV on affected children are well documented, but little research looked at the long-term implications of childhood hardship.

Although findings are not directly transferable across children or the contexts children live in, it was found that regardless of the type of hardship suffered by children affected by HIV and AIDS, the majority of children (60%–80%) showed resilience in overcoming their circumstances and were unlikely to display negative outcomes in the long run. Parental family warmth and acceptance, also from caregivers, act as protection and account for an enormous part of the variation in children’s outcomes.

On the negative side, a significant minority of children suffered not one, but many traumas of which abject poverty was one. ‘If stresses are unrelenting and enduring they accumulate, and in the absence of support and opportunities for recovery, affected are highly likely to suffer enduring results,’ Richter added.

What does this mean? As the summary by Alan Stein et al states: ‘These insights suggest a new strategic approach to interventions for children affected by HIV and AIDS, one that effectively combines a universal lattice of protection with intensive interventions targeted to selected children and families.’

The special edition is available at www.AIDSonline.com

’You can’t teach a hungry child. Most of the children we work with on a day-to-day basis are accustomed to only one meal a day. And this meal may well be two slices of bread with a cup of tea at the start of each day. No school lunches packed. No lunch at home. And certainly no supper,’ says Kathy Maart, educator at Zeekoevlei Primary on the Cape Flats.

This description, according to the HSRC, may well be an accurate reflection of the country’s food insecurity levels, since the prevalence of hunger at the household level has not improved from the levels reported in 2008.

‘Although the Global Hunger Index shows that the severity of hunger in South Africa is substantially lower than in most other African countries, and South Africa has an adequate food supply at national level, this does not guarantee food security at household level.

‘Still, a substantial proportion of black and coloured households in particular remain at risk of hunger or are experiencing hunger,’ comments Professor Demetre Labadarios, head of the Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation programme at the HSRC.

In South Africa, food security at household level measured by the Hunger Scale is classified under three sections: food secure, at risk of hunger, and experiencing hunger. The SA National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (SANHANES-1) revealed in 2012 that while 26% of households in the country experienced hunger, 28.6% were at the risk of being hungry.

According to the 2012 survey, the Eastern Cape followed by Limpopo, had the highest numbers of households experiencing food insecurity.

From The Alchemist PR 2014
**Ms Katie Bates**, a fellow in population studies in the Department of Social Policy at the London School of Economics, has joined the HSRC for three months after being awarded a Researcher Links grant by the British Council. Katie will work under the supervision of Professor Demetre Labadarios, executive director of the Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation programme on child malnutrition, with a special focus on the prevalence of both stunting and overweight among children in South Africa.

**Dr Sizulu Moyo** (MBChB, University of Zimbabwe; PhD in Paediatrics and Child Health, University of Cape Town) has been appointed chief research specialist in the HIV/AIDS, STI and TB programme. Before joining the HSRC, Sizulu was an epidemiologist, focusing on drug-resistant tuberculosis (TB), at the Médecins Sans Frontières project in Cape Town. She has also worked in the areas of health systems research and TB vaccine trials and as a practicing clinician.

**Prof. Daniel Plaatjies** (PhD in Governance, Public Policy and Public Finance, University of the Witwatersrand), visiting Professor at the School of Business Management, University of Free State, and a former head and director of the Graduate School of Public & Development Management (now known as the School of Governance), has been appointed executive director of the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) programme.

**Prof. Vasu Reddy** (PhD in gender studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal), the deputy executive director of the Human and Social Development research programme, has been appointed as executive director to head up the same programme. He taught for 13 years at the University of Natal in the Faculty of Humanities, Social Science and Development and is an honorary associate professor and research fellow at the UKZN.

**Dr Emmanuel Sekyere** (PhD in Economics, University of Pretoria) has been appointed as a senior research specialist in the Economic Performance and Development programme. Before joining the HSRC he was a post-doctoral research fellow and lecturer at the Economics Department, University of Pretoria, and a consultant economist at the Financial Sector Division of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Ghana.

**Dr Tia Linda Zuze** (PhD in Economics, University of Cape Town) has been appointed as a senior research specialist in the Education and Skills Development programme. Before joining the HSRC, she worked as a senior lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand and as a research fellow for UNESCO’s International Institute of Educational Planning in Paris, and held research appointments for educational departments and NGOs in southern Africa.
The high-level research project that assesses the impact of the two highest courts – the constitutional court (CC) and the supreme court of appeal (SCA) – on the lived experiences of all South Africans is now halfway, reports project co-leader, Narnia Bohler-Muller.

The Department of Justice and Correctional Services commissioned the HSRC’s Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme, together with its partner, the Nelson R Mandela School of Law of the University of Fort Hare (UFH) led by Prof. Obeng Mireku, to assess the impact of the two highest courts, the constitutional court (CC) and the supreme court of appeal (SCA), on the lived experiences of South Africans, especially the poor, vulnerable and marginalised.

The focus is on the adjudication and subsequent implementation (or not) of socioeconomic rights within the context of a capable and developmental state, as stated in the 2030 vision of the National Development Plan (NDP).

The desk-top reviews for the project have been completed, and it is now in its second phase, which comprises conducting 130 interviews with key informants who have been involved in court cases dealing with socioeconomic rights since 1994.

In these cases, the courts had to adjudicate on the protection, promotion and fulfilment of socioeconomic rights by the government. The cases dealt with a wide range of topics including the provision of housing, water and electricity, health care, social security and education.

CC part of SA’s social transformation
As part of the interview process, we interviewed two esteemed former constitutional court justices who presided over a number of these cases. They believed the court had a role to play in achieving social transformation, but also felt it was not the role of the judiciary to interfere in the executive’s policy-making processes.

It was agreed the Grootboom case, which led to a change in the government’s emergency housing policy, and the Treatment Action Campaign case, which led to the provision of antiretroviral therapy to HIV-positive pregnant mothers throughout South Africa, were landmark cases that demonstrated the CC’s commitment to its constitutional mandate.

The learned justices also agreed the test the court had applied to adjudicate socioeconomic rights was the best approach to take. This test requires the government to take ‘reasonable’ steps to ensure the ‘progressive realisation’ of socioeconomic rights.

The judges expressed concern about the failure of government departments to adequately implement court orders, stating it was necessary to ensure the rule of law was upheld and that the judiciary should be respected.

The CC has been instrumental in holding the government to task when the latter has not shown proof of the progressive realisation of rights. It has also developed a new remedy that requires the government to meaningfully engage with litigants so as to find solutions that take into account the needs of people and communities.

A constitutional dialogue is necessary to ensure the promises embedded in the constitution do not fall by the wayside.

Each arm of government – executive, legislative and judicial – has a role to play in the transformation of South African society to ensure a better life for all. It is becoming more apparent that a constitutional dialogue is necessary to ensure the promises embedded in the constitution do not fall by the wayside and in so doing, threaten social cohesion and nation-building efforts.

Author: Professor Narnia Bohler-Muller, deputy executive director, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme, HSRC.
Fiscal decentralisation, including delegating responsibilities such as revenue mobilisation, expenditure or borrowing to lower levels of government, has the potential to facilitate greater efficiencies within government and overall, better governance.

The delegation of such responsibility to sub-national levels of government can also ensure more efficient allocation of resources and service delivery. This happens through two key avenues: through the information advantage local governments have over the national government concerning the types of goods and services that match local needs; and the accountability argument, in which local government officials are thought to be under closer scrutiny by their constituencies, leading to a greater incentive to manage fiscal resources in the best interest of the public.

At the same time, contrary views have challenged these supposed advantages. There are three arguments: the first is that the central government can gain the same level of information by assigning its representatives to local offices. The second is that central government can involve local officials in decision-making processes. And the third is that in most developing countries, local officials may not be directly elected but indirectly elected or appointed, weakening the accountability argument, as the local officials in this case might not have the incentive to act in the best interest of the local public. South Africa’s system of decentralisation has recently been categorised as a form of co-operative governance in a unitary state where intergovernmental fiscal relations are determined by its constitution. The system has been subjected to several important reforms since the adoption of the 1996 constitution and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (1997).

These reforms have increased the quality of the fiscus and improved budgetary planning and control at all levels of government. However, some challenges remain. The constitution sets out the broad guidelines of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (IGFR), but there is no implementation manual that guides the modus operandi of the three spheres of government, the interrelationship between them and the boundaries of their authority.

This has sometimes resulted in inefficient outcomes at lower tiers of government. As a result, South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) further stipulates five main pillars by which its decentralised system of governance can be made more effective:

- improve clarity in the differentiated system of governance;
- address capacity constraints at lower tiers of government;
- ensure a more coherent set of powers for metropolitan municipalities;
- outline a more focused role for provinces; and
- ensure a proactive approach to identifying and resolving problems within the vertical and horizontal linkages of the IGFR mechanism.
Tensions in SA’s fiscal systems

Despite the significant fiscal reforms, there are divergent views as to whether South Africa’s fiscal system is more decentralised or whether there is a greater tendency to return to more centralisation of fiscal policy. The tension arises as a result of the country’s need to balance the redistributive requirement in chapter 13 of the bill of rights to provide mandated basic services as a right, and the other constitutional obligation to ensure equitable and efficient allocations for provinces and municipalities to meet economic development objectives.

This paradox is driven by the need to ensure inclusive and sustainable growth at all levels of society on the one hand, and the efficient distribution of the gains of growth on the other hand.

If fiscal reforms undertaken by South Africa are conducive to efficient allocation of resources and consequently, economic growth, as argued by proponents of fiscal decentralisation, then measures must be taken to enhance the efficiency of intergovernmental fiscal relation systems. On the contrary, if fiscal decentralisation does not improve economic growth, then South Africa would need to evaluate its intergovernmental fiscal relations and implement appropriate measures to mitigate inhibiting factors and enhance its impact on growth.

This study looked into the impact of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth at the provincial level in South Africa. The aim was to further contribute to the policy debate on the fiscal stance in an emerging economy like South Africa, which is grappling with low economic growth, averaging just 3% over the past five years, compared to the African average of 5.3%.

Fiscal decentralisation had a positive but weak impact on provincial-level economic growth.

Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in South Africa

The results of this study showed fiscal decentralisation had a positive but weak impact on provincial-level economic growth (measured as GDP per capita of each province) in South Africa. This was explained by the fact that resource allocation at provincial level was more heavily skewed towards operating expenditure than towards growth-inducing capital expenditure. Consequently, capital expenditure at provincial level was found to have no impact on provincial economic growth.

Evidence shows that industrialisation usually leads to higher levels of economic growth. However, if it is driven by capital-intensive production as opposed to labour-intensive production, it results in high levels of unemployment, which could translate into more social welfare expenditure for the government. This state of affairs places a huge burden on government resources and also has the ability to reduce economic growth.

The more literate or skilled the working population was, the more likely the economy would grow.

The study also found the more literate or skilled the working population was, the more likely it was the economy would grow. A skilled working population should translate into higher levels of productivity, which has a positive impact on economic growth. An additional finding was that if South Africa’s population grew more than its economy, the quality of social welfare and living standards would decline.

Resource allocation at provincial level has been heavily skewed towards operating expenses as opposed to growth-inducing capital expenditure.

Where to from here?

The positive but weak relationship between fiscal decentralisation and provincial-level economic growth is attributable to a number of causes. South Africa’s fiscal decentralisation measures have not really been targeted at achieving economic growth. To date, they have been more focused on ensuring an equitable distribution of growth, bridging income inequality and poverty reduction. Consequently, resource allocation at provincial level in South Africa has been heavily skewed towards operating expenses as opposed to growth-inducing capital expenditure.

On average, operating expenses are five times higher than capital expenditure in the provinces. In addition, restrictions on revenue mobilisation (which is still largely centralised in South Africa) and borrowing further inhibit the ability of provincial governments to raise additional revenue for growth inducing investments.

There is also the perennial challenge of the lack of the requisite capacity at the lower tiers of government in South Africa for effective revenue mobilisation, attracting foreign direct investment and implementing the needed growth enhancing initiatives. The clear regional disparities cannot be ignored either in any policy reform. Indeed, several issues emerged from this study that should inform policymakers’ efforts to improve the growth-enhancing potential of South Africa’s IGFR.

Authors: Professor Margaret Chitiga, executive director, Economic Performance and Development (EPD) research programme, HSRC; Dr Emmanuel Owusu-Sekyere, senior research specialist, EPD, HSRC; Dr Nicholas Ngepah, Oxfam senior regional research adviser, Southern Africa; Dr Jaya Josie, Head, BRICS Research Centre, HSRC.
The Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) commissioned the HSRC to lead and co-ordinate research to inform its efforts to develop a ‘credible institutional mechanism for skills planning’. This is regarded as a critical outcome to better promote the national priority of a skilled and capable workforce that would achieve an inclusive growth path, as agreed between the DHET minister and the presidency.

Industrial priorities must play a more significant role in driving the skills agenda in South Africa.

A consortium consisting of the HSRC, the University of Cape Town’s (UCT) Development Policy Research Unit and Wits University’s Centre for Researching Education and Labour has been established to drive the research agenda, known as the Labour Market Intelligence Partnership (LMIP).

To enhance the connections between research and policy, the LMIP reports monthly on emerging research findings. The monthly report covers two key areas. The first reflects on the research towards designing and implementing a skills planning mechanism. The second highlights key trends and potential implications for skills planning and development, from the research projects.

The contours of the skills planning mechanism

The first step in designing a model to guide the development of a new framework for skills planning and labour market intelligence in South Africa was to review literature on past planning practices in South Africa; how other countries approached skills planning and the production of labour market intelligence, and the White Paper for Post-School Education and Training.

For labour market intelligence, the study investigated how data was collected and analysed and the type of labour market intelligence produced. In building the skills planning mechanism, the study investigated how labour market intelligence was utilised to inform the decision-making process.

In building the skills planning mechanism, the LMIP recommended:

- Emphasis is placed on a demand-driven approach to planning in which the strategies for skills development are linked with those for economic development. Industrial priorities must play a more significant role in driving the skills agenda in South Africa.
- DHET produces valid and recent information regarding skills supply (using data from databases such as the higher education and training information system (HETIS) and the education management information system (EMIS) and others concerning unemployment and work permits), current skills demand (using data from Statistics South Africa, job vacancies and the scarce skills list) and future skills demand (using data from new business and government growth initiatives). LMIP supports the proposal in the White Paper on Post-School Education and Training to establish a central skills planning intelligence unit.
• The mechanism emphasises the relationship between government departments and social partners, and the mediation of the integrated plan for national development with institutional, enterprise and sectoral plans. It was also recommended that the successor to the National Skills Authority plays an important quality assurance role in validating sector skills and enrolment plans and their alignment to national plans and priorities.

How does education and training impact on economic opportunities and growth?
A research paper by UCT’s Development Policy Research Unit entitled Pro-poor growth dynamics and the skills intensity of growth, examined the impact of qualifications on the goal of pro-poor economic growth. In the period 1995–2012, employment for university degree holders outstripped that for further education and training (FET) certificate holders and school leavers. Degree holders enjoyed higher returns to education in the form of higher earnings, followed by certificate holders and then those with only school-level certification.

The possession of an FET certificate had no significant impact on economic growth...
It’s important to focus the skills debate on the quality of FET and schooling provision.

With regard to poverty and welfare effects, there was a pro-poor impact for degree holders that was not matched by certificate holders at lower income percentiles. Perhaps the most important and arguably novel result from the study was that of all the educational levels, only the possession of a higher education degree had a positive and significant impact on economic growth.

To put it another way: the possession of an FET certificate had no significant impact on economic growth for the period under review.

On the basis of the findings that labour market absorption rates were skewed towards university degree holders, it becomes important to focus the skills debate on the quality of FET and schooling provision, and on the nature and relevance of the curricula offered within the FET sector in particular. If expectations of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) are to be achieved – known as ‘massification’ – it is essential DHET ensures a more optimal fiscal return on its massive investment in this part of the higher educational system.

The paper may be downloaded from www.lmip.org.za, along with other LMIP research. To stay up to date with the latest news and events, follow us on Twitter: @LMIP_RSA

VIOLENCE IN KHAYELITSHA: FINDING A WAY OUT

Khayelitsha in the Western Cape remains a violent place, with a murder rate well above the national average. Vanessa Barolsky tries to make sense of how existing, dense social networks and forms of organisation can be applied to overcome violence, inequality and poverty.

The Khayelitsha study forms part of a 32-month international comparative study on the role of social cohesion (or social solidarity) in understanding the link between inequality, poverty and urban violence. It focuses on two cities in the Global South, Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro, and forms part of the Safe and Inclusive Cities programme of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Canada.

Over the next three years, research teams in cities across Latin America, the Caribbean, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa will work to address the knowledge gaps in our understanding of the relationship between violence, inequality and poverty, as well as analyse the effectiveness of violence reduction strategies.

High levels of fear of violence
Recent fieldwork in the township of Khayelitsha in the Western Cape revealed some of the complexities relating to violence prevention efforts in deprived urban contexts. Khayelitsha remains a violent place. The murder rate is currently well above the national average of 31 murders per 100 000, people at between 76 and 108 per 100 000 at Khayelitsha’s different police stations.

There are also high levels of fear of violence in all social spheres including many public spaces. As two young schoolgirls explained of the youth gangs that have become a significant problem in the township recently:

You don’t dare scream because the guys are high and they are killers. Even if it’s a young boy who is just an apprentice in the game, he will either finish you to prove a point to the older group that he has a killer instinct or should you try fighting back, the old and more experienced ones will come and finish the job.
The violence in Khayelitsha has to be understood in relation to its history as an apartheid township established in 1983 to ‘consolidate’ all black urban settlement in the Western Cape. Although this vision was later abandoned, like many townships in South Africa, the apartheid government deliberately did not provide adequate services and infrastructure to the township as it sought to limit the number of ‘legal’ black urban residents.

The township is still trying to catch up, with almost half of its population living in shack settlements with very poor services. The township is also characterised by high levels of migration. Approximately 70% of the adults living in the township have come from the Eastern Cape. On the other hand, most young people under 19 were born in the Western Cape.

Friendship and support coexist with exclusion and violence

It is in this context that an understanding of social cohesion in the township needs to be located. Social cohesion is a broad concept that is used to refer to shared values in a community, tolerance and recognition of others, economic inclusion, political participation and the legitimacy of institutions. It has been argued internationally that a lack of social cohesion or weak social cohesion is linked to a lack of social control and violence. However, it has also been asserted that social cohesion can act as a protective factor against violence. In particular it has been argued that it is when neighbours are willing to act on each other’s behalf for the ‘common good’ that crime prevention efforts are likely to be the most effective.

Our research has revealed, however, that there is not a lack or absence of social cohesion in Khayelitsha. Instead, it is characterised by dense social networks and forms of organisation, ranking from stokvels to taxi associations and vigilante groups.

While much Western literature assumes people are highly individualised, in South Africa, as in many African countries, there is a tension between individualism and communitarianism. As one interviewee explained, ‘individualism is in the head, it is not in the blood’.

In many ways social networks have been necessary for South Africans to survive both repression and poverty. However, the networks that exist are complex and can be conduits for friendship and support (stokvels) as well as exclusion and violence (vigilante violence). In this context, concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ social cohesion are inadequate to understand this variety.

The networks are complex and can be conduits for friendship and support, and exclusion and violence.

Youth gangs and displays of power

Youth gangs have emerged as a significant form of social organisation in Khayelitsha. Although these gangs are not organised in the same way as the gangs on the Cape Flats, they are shaping the nature and meaning of public space in places such as parks as well as institutional spaces such as schools. They are highly territorial and shape identity, as young boys in particular areas feel obligated to join their local gang. These gangs have a particular language of violence, which is very much about a public display of power.
As a female trader explained:

*During the gang war days last year, boys who are 16 would walk past carrying machetes or just sharpen them... breathing would be so difficult because you don't know if they will come to you to test if it's working [use the weapons on you].*

**Violence is organised as a public spectacle, with young people participating as an audience.**

The youth gangs also overturn generational hierarchies; most youth gang members are school children. As a young girl watching a gang fight explained, ‘those teachers who don't have cars are in big trouble because they can be attacked easily, whereas even those with cars are not spared because they [gang members] throw stones at their cars.’

Violence is organised as a public spectacle, with young people, both boys and girls, participating as an audience to gang fights. Individual conflicts quickly escalate into confrontation between groups:

*There in the open field were boys probably... 16–14, there were four of them. When I asked the other students who were also looking whilst cheering... they told me that it was rival gangs. A fight had broken in the boys’ bathrooms and knives were drawn... so now the boys who drew knives for each other went to their gangs and now it's no longer one on one but gang versus gang. (Field report)*

On the other hand, older gang members differentiate themselves from these ‘uncircumcised boys’, although their motivations are similar, for example, the need for protection and status. As one former gang member explained:

*It is also wanting to be part of a group of guys who are cool (amajita) because it gives you two things, status and protection. Those who take the other way are seen as baru (someone who is not street wise). No girl wants to be with baru, they all want skollies because they also want access to money and protection.*

Crime is seen as a short cut to ‘success’. As another former gang member explained:

*Everyone in the township wants to live a life that they can’t afford... There are two ways to go about living this life – education or robbing to get your hands on money. Education needs patience and takes longer. Not everybody can afford it or even those who can afford it, very few want to wait that long to succeed, so we choose the short cut. This short cut is also very cool here in township.*

**The formal and informal co-exist in intricate relation to each other.**

Success is linked to conspicuous consumption: ‘If you must drink you don’t want to get a Viceroy brandy but Hennes whiskey, Jameson... if you must wear clothes it must be the best and most expensive labels,’ said a former gang member.

In many ways these young men’s lives are an implicit critique of their structural exclusion from the economy and from society. They refuse to ‘play the game’ of pursuing an education and attempting to find a job.

**Social control violent and collective**

While Khayelitsha is subjected to gang violence, it also evidences a significant number of informal forms of social control, which are also often violent and collective. This is part of a complex historical system of informal social control that developed in townships in the absence of a legitimate state under apartheid. However, in the post-apartheid context, residents continue to have an ambiguous relation to the law, legality and the constitution.

The township, like many other African cities, is characterised by a substantial amount of informality, including informal economic relations. Informal trading is linked to forms of sociality and solidarity, and is culturally and socially embedded. It is often focused on the distribution of resources between family members rather than the ‘rational’ extraction of profit.
The formal and informal co-exist in intricate relation to each other. This is the result of colonialism and apartheid as well as current processes of globalisation and urbanisation. Thus the city is a complex site of creativity as well as conflict and violence. There is no doubt this poses governance challenges for the state, which seeks to create managed spaces over which it can assert its control.

The police perceived the township as an impenetrable space that they could not police.

Defying state authority

While citizens expect the state to deliver services, its authority, particularly in the form of policing, is often contested. On the one hand this may be a response to the failures of policing in the township; however, it is also related to deeper forms of contention of the authority of the state. Evidence provided at the recent Commission of Inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha indicated the police perceived the township as an impenetrable space that they could not police. As a result, they failed to intervene and appeared to police ‘at the margins’ of the community. Therefore, when it does intervene, the state has to engage with pre-existing forms of social organisation that may have more significant social and symbolic resonance than conventional government processes.

The collective violence residents engage in is also organised as a public spectacle, intended to enforce a moral community against an ‘other’. This ‘other’ shifts and may be the foreigner, criminal or other category of person seen to be responsible for social disorder.

In this context, neighbours do act on each other’s behalf, as this field report shows:

In the evening the neighbours gathered and looked for [young boys accused of robbery]. Guns and any object that anyone had were brought in for the search and they were found and were tortured, they were swollen beyond recognition, they had blood and observers were calling for their death.

In another instance, residents gathered to protect a shop assistant who had allegedly been hit by a Chinese shop owner:

It was roughly around lunch time when I saw people amalgamated in front of the Chinese 5 Rand store¹, carrying stones, umbrellas and brooms from the toilets in the mall... People claimed that Chinese treat their workers like that [badly] and they... were singing that they must go back to China. People were incensed by the fact that a foreigner can treat a South African woman in that manner.

In both instances residents were willing to intervene on each other’s behalf, demonstrating the strength of social bonds. However, is this the ‘common good’ that is envisaged in Western literature and that South African policy on social cohesion seeks to achieve?

Residents were willing to intervene on each other’s behalf, demonstrating the strength of social bonds.

Efforts to prevent violence

Violence prevention initiatives in this context face significant challenges. It is important not to ascribe a monolithic, unchanging culture of violence to any South African community, as there are different practices, norms and responses to violence, which change over time and place. These need to be differentiated and understood. However, it is important that violence prevention efforts engage with the complexity of the social environment in many areas experiencing violence. In some contexts violence as a means to achieve social order may be condoned. It is also clear that South African citizens do have close social bonds with each other. The critical challenge then is to develop interventions that build on existing social bonds and facilitate social change while engaging, non-judgementally, with citizen’s social worlds, their own values, norms and practices.

Author: Dr Vanessa Barolsky, chief researcher, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme, HSRC.

¹ Everything in the store costs five rand or less
The HSRC was invited to participate as an independent observer of two social audits in Cape Town, the first trials of their kind to implement this methodology in South Africa. Researchers *Elmé Vivier* and *Diana Sanchez Betancourt* share their insights and reflections on the process.

Meaningful engagement between local governments and communities, especially the poor and most vulnerable, is a fundamental part of good governance. It is encapsulated in the constitution and National Development Plan (NDP), and further defined as a mandate of local government in the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 and Municipal Structures Act of 1998.

The NDP in particular establishes active citizenry as necessary for democracy, accountability and development. Engagement processes should therefore enable and realise citizen agency as an integral component of governance, where citizens are partners in decision-making and service delivery processes.

A number of participatory initiatives that explore new and innovative ways for citizens to engage in local government and service delivery processes are emerging across South Africa. One of these is the social audit.

**Social audits to monitor public spending**

Social audits are a form of monitoring where communities analyse government spending of public resources and measure and report on service delivery. It is an audit of government contracts, financial records and other relevant documents through physical verification and interviews with service beneficiaries. It culminates in a public meeting where the results of the audit are presented to members of the community as well as to local government representatives and officials.

Social audits have been implemented in various contexts around the world (e.g. Kenya, El Salvador, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and especially in India where they have been successfully scaled up through government support.

Importantly, a social audit is primarily concerned with the people who receive and/or experience services. Carried out by community organisations and volunteers, it is ‘social’ insofar as the people who implement it are also the people who receive or are somehow affected by the services.

Participants learn how local government works... this helps build awareness and share knowledge.
Potential of social audits in South Africa

In the South African context, the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), a community-based organisation in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, has been experimenting with the social audit methodology under a broader campaign for better sanitation in informal settlements.

The first audit, conducted in April 2013, focused on chemical toilets. More than 60 participants inspected 256 chemical toilets and interviewed 270 residents across four informal settlements. A second audit conducted in October 2013 looked at refuse removal services, and the most recent audit (conducted over the week of 13–19 July 2014) monitored janitorial services. Each audit included a public hearing where members of government and relevant service providers were invited to listen to the reports, offer their views on remedial action, and respond to and engage with community members on the issues and concerns that were raised (SJC 2013: 4).

Given the nature and process of the social audit, it offers a methodology to achieve both better citizen engagement and service delivery. Specifically, it has the potential to enhance access to information; empower communities and local agency; facilitate communication and improve service delivery.

Enhancing access to information

The right of access to information is provided for in the South African constitution, which gives every person the right to access information held by the state or private entities that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights. The social audit relies on access to and analysis of detailed government information. This may include relevant budgets, service delivery agreements, invoices, employee contracts and payment records. In this way social audits contribute to building a culture of transparency, as citizens identify, source and engage with relevant information.

Empowering communities and realising local agency

Through accessing and analysing government documents, participants in the social audit learn about how local government works and how a particular service is supposed to be delivered. This helps build awareness and share knowledge. As a result, audit participants and residents in the areas being audited become more informed about their rights and responsibilities, facilitating the realisation of local agency.

Facilitating communication between cities and communities

The provision and management of basic services require interdepartmental co-ordination and communication with citizens. Although social audits focus on a particular service, they enable communities to identify backlogs within the service delivery chain – information that could be fed into processes across political and administrative structures, and across different line departments. Furthermore, communication between government and citizens could be enhanced, as the social audit provides new platforms for knowledge sharing between government officials and citizens and a space to build better informed citizens.

Overall, the examination of micro-processes and individual lived experiences brings to light issues that are often hidden within more formal audits. It assumes that citizens and residents are not merely people with needs but also people with knowledge and resources (Boyle and Harris 2009). It therefore provides a platform for the co-production of knowledge between citizens and government, and an acknowledgement that different forms of knowledge should contribute to the evidence base for urban planning and development.

It brings citizens into the service delivery process as owners and co-producers rather than simply beneficiaries.

Improving service delivery

Through a social audit, auditors are able to identify problems in the service delivery chain and provide practical inputs for making rectifications, thus improving services. It brings citizens into the service delivery process as owners and co-producers rather than simply beneficiaries. This has the further potential of enhancing the sense and exercise of shared responsibility for public utilities, which is essential for the sustainability of projects and services. It encourages residents to take co-ownership and co-responsibility for valuing and safeguarding service delivery infrastructure.

Going forward

There is general agreement among scholars and practitioners that formal participatory processes in South Africa often fall short in achieving meaningful engagement. There is also recognition that the failure of the government to engage citizens and communities could undermine the provision of basic services and urban development processes. This is particularly concerning in a context where the majority of the population already lives in urban areas, the figures for which are expected to increase to nearly 80% by 2050.

The Cities Support Programme (CSP) is an interdepartmental initiative led by the national treasury that recognises the crucial role of municipalities in tackling the challenges of spatial transformation in the context of rapid urbanisation. According to the treasury, the CSP aims ‘to support the spatial transformation of South African cities to create more inclusive, productive and sustainable urban built environments... [with] a special focus on enhancing service delivery, especially to informal settlements.’

Within this urban and institutional context, social audits offer an opportunity to explore and refine a new way to engage with citizens. The goals of the social audit are to improve government transparency and accountability, and ultimately performance. Since an audit enables communities to point out gaps within the delivery chain, through it they can potentially identify practical ways to improve public programmes, projects and processes. It is also an opportunity for the poor and marginalised to become active role-players in the delivery of services, and for citizens and governments to work together to co-produce knowledge towards a common goal of better service delivery.

Authors: Elmé Vivier, researcher, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) programme, HSRC; Diana Sanchez Betancourt, researcher, DGSD, HSRC.
What are the links between development and peace and security, and what potential does this relationship hold for the engagements of the BRICS states? In a seminar hosted by the HSRC, Candice Moore took a closer look at the necessity for co-operation within BRICS on key international security issues, specifically the fight against terrorism.

The BRICS countries share a unique strategic view in their engagement as a grouping at the global level: a commitment to inclusive and sustainable development, and the recognition that there is an inextricable relationship between development, peace and security.

To this end, there is a strong commitment to multilateralism and especially to the UN, the foremost international institution entrusted with ‘bringing hope, peace, order and sustainable development to the world’, as stated in the BRICS declaration.

Peace and security issues involve three domains: the BRICS countries’ stance with respect to terrorism; initiatives in relation to cyber security; and the role BRICS armed forces can play as a tool for international co-operation.

This article looks specifically at terrorism, which has been intensifying on the African continent over the last few years, exposing countries’ stability, economic growth and democracy to ever-increasing risk.

Initiatives to deal with terrorism
As noted in 2005 by Annette Hübischle from the Max Planck Institute, South Africa’s efforts to update its anti-terror legal framework picked up pace in 1998 with the approval of a new official policy on terrorism. These efforts received new momentum after the 2001 9/11 terror attacks on the United States. Subsequently, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which obliged each UN member state to create the prescribed legal framework to co-operate fully with other nations on anti-terrorism measures on a global scale.

This included the criminalisation of the financing and other acts of support for terrorism, the freezing of bank accounts, the introduction of effective border controls and other measures to fast-track the exchange of intelligence information.

In August 2002, a legal opinion on South Africa’s legislative framework for dealing with a terrorist threat was submitted to the justice minister by the South African Law Commission, a statutory advisory body. The opinion found that South Africa had some way to go towards fortifying its anti-terrorism legislation.

South Africa’s existing anti-terror legislation was originally established to manage threats to the state from domestic sources.

South Africa was also found to be ‘largely compliant’ with international anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism measures. To date, the main terrorist threats to South Africa have been from urban terrorism. Since 2005, the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act has been in place.

According to the South African government, the country’s position is that ‘the fight against terrorism requires a multilateral approach and should be conducted with due regard to international human rights law and respect for the sovereignty of states’. Mooted amendments to South Africa’s constitution to respond to the terror threat after 9/11 met with stiff opposition from those who believed such amendments would infringe on personal liberties.
International legal instruments to counter terrorism are fast being outpaced by actual events.

Updated laws needed
There is understandably still no universally agreed definition of terrorism in spite of most states, including the BRICS states, recognising the seriousness of the problem. It is clear the UN legal instruments, to which South Africa has acceded, largely deal sectorally with the terrorist threat.

No fewer than five of the UN's 14 international legal instruments to counter terrorism deal with aviation or aircraft. Recent events such as the Westgate Mall massacre in Kenya and transport terrorism in Russia show these instruments are fast being outpaced by actual events.

Terrorists act in smaller groups and may have far humbler, but more destructive, targets than previously. These changes need to be met with the adaptation of national laws to reflect the mobility and flexibility of this new terrorist threat. This means laws must govern the movement of finances in and out of states as well as the movement across borders of individuals. However, this concern with security must be balanced with the concern to protect the civil liberties of individuals.

Concern with security must be balanced with the concern to protect the civil liberties of individuals.

The BRICS perspective
What is the position of the BRICS states regarding a comprehensive convention against terrorism? The BRICS leaders, after their 2013 summit, ‘strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations’ and stressed that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any acts of terrorism. They affirmed the UN has a central role in co-ordinating international action against terrorism within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with the principles and norms of international law.

They also reiterated a call ‘for concluding negotiations as soon as possible in the UN General Assembly on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and its adoption by all member states and agreed to work together towards this objective.’

The emergence of a clear terrorist threat in Africa could provide added impetus to the actions of the BRICS states. The terror activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria, which is reputed to have links with both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab, could pose challenges across Africa, from Nigeria in the west to Somalia in the east.

While South Africa has not been directly affected by the types of terrorist attacks that have been seen in the US, UK, Russia and China, this does not mean it may not serve as a key location for the planning and preparation of terrorist attacks, or for the harbouring of terrorists.

News that the so-called White Widow British terrorist, Samantha Lewthwaite, had used a South African passport and lived in South Africa with her children in the years preceding the Westgate Mall terror attacks on Kenya at the end of 2013, is a case in point.

South Africa’s successful prosecution of Nigerian terror suspect Henry Okah in January 2013 showed the results of regional co-operation in the fight against terrorism. BRICS has a role to play in engendering the types of regional co-operation that can foster this kind of success in its respective regions, and globally.

The BRICS nations embody the aspiration for an international system predicated on the rule of law, through their own guidelines for interaction, as they seek to manage diversity within the grouping, while still seeking co-operation on key international issues. While their moves towards security co-operation have been incremental and gradual to date, there exist many opportunities for significant co-operation on a variety of international challenges.

Author: Dr Candice Moore, Research Associate, SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg. These opinions represent those of the author and not of any affiliate organisation.
Ubuntu Diplomacy?
Examining Foreign Policy Preferences in South Africa

National policy documents suggest South Africa's international engagements are shaped by a commitment to multilateralism and a desire to build solidarity and co-operation among the Global South countries. But what is the public's attitude towards foreign policy? Steven Gordon, Benjamin Roberts and Jare Struwig take a look at national interests, government's foreign policy evaluation, and foreign policy preferences.

The recent White Paper on Foreign Policy advocates pursuing an active engagement in world affairs, while building African unity and contributing to the economic, political and social renewal of the continent.

The National Development Plan (NDP) regards such an approach essential if the country is to achieve its national interests, which include addressing shared challenges of underdevelopment in the Global South, promoting global equity and social justice, and reforming international institutions.

But does the public support an active engagement of the nation in foreign affairs? What do South Africans believe should be the strategic focus of foreign policy? And do they feel the state is performing well in promoting the country's national interests?

The 2013 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) tried to answer these questions by including a module on foreign policy. SASAS is a nationally representative, annual survey series designed to understand the underlying values of the South African public older than 15 years towards issues of national importance. A total of 2 739 South Africans were interviewed as part of the study.

What is in the national interest?
The results suggested a majority of South Africans rejected isolationism and did not believe the best interests of the nation were served by keeping the affairs of the world at a distance. When asked if they agreed or disagreed whether it was best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs, four-fifths (80%) of the public said yes.

To understand which foreign policy goals South Africans want the government to pursue, respondents were asked to rate nine possible foreign policy goals as very important, somewhat important, or not important at all.

The respondents who stated a goal should be ‘very important’ were then asked to rank the different objectives to determine relative priorities. The goals generally fitted into three broad categories: domestic wellbeing and prosperity; global justice or humanitarian assistance to people in other countries; and security.

South Africans placed a strong emphasis on several goals relating to security of domestic wellbeing.

From the 2014 rankings shown in Figure 1, it was apparent South Africans placed a strong emphasis on several goals relating to security of domestic wellbeing. The top two ranked foreign policy goals were ‘protecting the jobs of South African workers’ (74%) and ‘promoting economic growth’ (68%).

Two-thirds (67%) assigned high importance to ‘controlling and reducing illegal immigration’ – an issue that has domestic as well as security implications.

Slightly lower ratings were offered in relation to altruistic or humanitarian goals focused on assisting people outside the country. In 2013, 63% declared ‘combating world hunger’ as very important, while an equivalent share deemed as critical the mixed altruism-security goal of ‘helping to end conflict in Africa’.

In contrast, only 51% of South Africans said ‘promoting and defending human rights in other countries’ should be a very important goal of the country’s foreign policy, placing this on a lower rank than the largely domestic goal of ‘protecting the interests of South African business in other countries’ (58%).

Far greater doubt was expressed in relation to the military security goal of ‘building superior military power in Africa’ and the multilateral justice item ‘strengthening the United Nations’.
Figure 1: Importance of national goals for foreign policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protecting jobs of South African workers</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting economic growth</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling and reducing illegal immigration</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping to end conflict in Africa</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating world hunger</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the interests of South African business in other countries</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting and defending human rights in other countries</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building superior military power in Africa</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the United Nations</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data is weighted to nationally representative of the adult South African population.
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2013

Figure 2: Foreign policy preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Help other African countries by giving them aid</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close the borders to immigrants and refugees</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take a tougher approach to the political situation in Zimbabwe</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send soldiers to keep the peace in other countries</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade with countries who abuse the human rights of their citizens</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data is weighted to nationally representative of the adult South African population.
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2013
RESULTS FROM THE SA SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY (SASAS)

**Foreign policy preferences**
The survey also included a set of five questions intended to provide insight into the preferences of the mass public to international economic policies, such as trade relations, development assistance and immigration, in addition to views on peacekeeping operations and diplomatic relations with other countries. Responses were captured using a five-point agreement scale, presented in Figure 2.

**The public tended to offer critical evaluations of South Africa’s relations with Zimbabwe.**

**Views on Zimbabwe**
One of the more salient foreign policy issues to confront South Africa in recent years was the response to the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe. While some criticised the South African government, particularly during the Mbeki administration, for its quiet diplomacy stance towards Zimbabwe, others defended this approach as consistent with the promotion of democratic consolidation in Africa through multilateral diplomacy.

The public tended to offer critical evaluations of South Africa’s relations with Zimbabwe, with 53% expressing the view the government should take a tougher approach, whereas a quarter (24%) disagreed with this perspective.

**Views on peacekeeping**
The South African National Defence Force has been involved in peacekeeping operations under United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) command in Sudan, Burundi, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet, peacekeeping in other countries does not find widespread support among all South Africans.

Public opinion was polarised about this form of international engagement, with 39% of the adult population agreeing South Africa should send soldiers to keep the peace in other countries, 41% opposing such action, and 15% voicing neutral views. This might partly be a reaction to the risk facing soldiers involved in such missions, but also a rejection of the use of military force in foreign policy (albeit for altruistic ends).

A significant share of the adult public supported closing the borders to immigrants and refugees.

**Views on immigrants**
South Africa currently hosts an estimated 67 500 refugees, and 233 100 who have applied for asylum. The UN’s Population Division reports there are more than two million international migrants in the country. New restrictions introduced into the country’s immigration legislation highlighted the concern many South Africans feel about immigration. A significant share (64%) of the adult public supported closing the borders to immigrants and refugees.

**Many South Africans supported foreign policies that favoured humanitarian positions.**

**Views on trade relations**
Despite the fact that South Africa currently faces challenges in growing its economy, many South Africans supported foreign policies that favoured humanitarian positions over purely mercantile ones. Around half (49%) of South Africans opposed trading with countries that were known to abuse the human rights of their citizens, with around a third (32%) supporting such trading. Furthermore, despite the economic hardship experienced by many South Africans in recent years, almost two-thirds (66%) supported the provision of development aid to other African countries.

**Social class seemed to underly government foreign policy performance evaluations.**

**Rating government foreign policy performance**
Survey respondents were lastly asked to evaluate the performance of the South African state in meeting its foreign policy goals. Three aspects were examined, focusing on promoting domestic well-being, global justice, and political and economic relations with Africa. In each of these three dimensions, the majority voiced satisfaction, though a sizable minority express discontent.

Slightly more than half of all adult South Africans were satisfied with the role of the government in growing the national economy, promoting democracy and human rights in other countries, as well as building political and economic unity in Africa (50% satisfied in the first instance, and 52% satisfied in the other two cases). Negative assessments of state performance were offered by close to a third of respondents in the case of economic policy (29%), and slightly less than a fifth in relation to promoting democracy and human rights (19%) and fostering closer regional political and economic ties (18%).

Social class seemed to underly government foreign policy performance evaluations. Middle and upper class South Africans tended to be more critical of the government on foreign policy than those in other classes. Analysis showed those who distrusted national government and political leaders were also more likely to express dissatisfaction in
the performance of the government in national affairs. This suggests institutional trust was associated with how the public viewed the nation’s performance on foreign affairs.

Conclusion
This study showed considerable majorities of South Africans placed a high priority on foreign policy goals relating to domestic socioeconomic wellbeing (job security, economic growth and controlling immigration), though notable shares of the adult population also viewed humanitarian objectives as important. Although significant numbers of citizens continue to experience material disadvantage and vulnerability, popular support was found for an outward looking foreign policy in the country, and there were encouraging messages about development aid and fair and ethical trade relations. While concerns about immigration and appropriate diplomatic responses to regional political situations remained, the public was also clearly divided about the role of military peacekeeping operations.

More research is required to investigate differential support for the interventionist (versus isolationist) role that South Africa seeks to adopt. To this end, the HSRC as part of a grant from the Open Society Foundation is currently undertaking a more detailed examination of the results represented in the overview presented in this article.

A FOREIGN CONCEPT:
WHAT SOUTH AFRICANS KNOW ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

How knowledgeable are South Africans about world affairs; and do they care? Benjamin Roberts, Steven Gordon and Jarè Struwig examine new survey evidence on levels of interest and knowledge of foreign policy issues.

There exist relatively few representative studies on the public knowledge of foreign affairs in contemporary South Africa. To address this lack of evidence, the Open Society Foundation’s (OSF) South African Foreign Policy Initiative funded the inclusion of a module on foreign policy in the 2013 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). A representative sample of 2 739 respondents, aged 16 years and older and living in private homes, took part in the survey.

Interest in the outside world
To gauge general levels of interest in world affairs, respondents were asked how interested they were in ‘news about the relations of South Africa with other countries’. Around a fifth (21%) reported being very interested, 30% were somewhat interested and almost two-fifths (38%) were either hardly interested or not at all interested. The remainder either did not know (4%), or indicated that they did not follow the news (8%).

Studies from other countries tended to show a much higher interest in foreign affairs. For example, a study by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs in 2007 found that, in general, at least two-thirds of the public in 15 countries tended to be somewhat or very interested in their country’s relations with other nations, ranging from countries such as Russia, Poland and India (all around 67%) to highs in countries such as the US (84%) and Australia (92%).
South Africans on average exhibited relatively low levels of interest in international affairs. With only 51% indicating they were somewhat or very interested, South Africans on average exhibited relatively low levels of interest in international affairs, slightly below that of other developing and transition countries. Yet, a notable minority showed a very strong interest in news sources of information

Where did South Africans obtain information about foreign affairs? Mostly from television news on local news channels such as SABC or e.tv (63%), newspapers (40%) and the radio (30%). Only a small proportion obtained foreign affairs news from television news on international news channels such as CNN or BBC (11%) and the internet (12%). Informal discussions with family, friends or colleagues were mentioned in 11% of cases.

Figure 1: Sources of news about foreign policy issues (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge of death of CAR peacekeepers</th>
<th>Knowledge of BRICS member countries</th>
<th>Knowledge of 2013 Egypt protests</th>
<th>Knowledge of Zimbabwe 2013 election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correct (51)</td>
<td>Incorrect (37)</td>
<td>Don’t Know (12)</td>
<td>Don’t Know (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data is weighted to nationally representative of the adult South African population.
Source: HSRC SASAS 2013

Economic status again played a significant role in determining the range of media sources from which the public obtained information on foreign events. While the poor mostly obtained information through radio, more affluent citizens more likely relied on the internet and international news channels.

Quizzing South Africans on foreign policy issues

To assess individual knowledge of foreign affairs, respondents were asked both subjective and objective questions. When asked to rate their own level of knowledge about events in Africa and the world, a quarter (25%) reported that they had no knowledge, nearly a third (30%) that they were not very knowledgeable, while more than two-fifths (44%) responded that they were either somewhat or very knowledgeable.

To test whether participants were good judges of their own knowledge of foreign affairs, a series of objective questions was designed in the form of a quiz. It included four questions on Zimbabwe, peacekeeping in Africa, the political situation in Egypt, and South Africa’s foreign partnerships.

More than 50% of respondents demonstrated knowledge of regional issues, such as the 2013 Zimbabwean elections and peacekeeper fatalities in the Central African Republic. However, barely a third were aware of the protests in Egypt and subsequent removal of President Morsi, or were able to correctly identify BRICS member countries (Figure 2). Combining these results, we found that around a quarter (27%) had none of the correct answers, two-fifths (40%) had between one and two correct, and only a third (33%) had either three or four correct answers. On average, South African adults scored 1.7 out of four in the knowledge quiz.

A relatively strong association existed between the subjective and objective knowledge evaluations. Those South Africans who self-reported high levels of knowledge on the subjective measure also scored well on the objective questions, and vice versa.

With regard to how evenly foreign knowledge was distributed across the adult population, we found strong educational and poverty status differences underlying knowledge, with the better educated, the materially advantaged, the formally employed, and residents in formal urban areas all presenting as relatively more knowledgeable. Men were found to be better informed than women. Remarkably, there was not a significant age-related association with foreign policy knowledge.
We found strong educational and poverty status differences underlying knowledge.

Conclusion
The survey results showed that the South African public was relatively ill-informed about international affairs, a situation being influenced by disinterest in such issues, as well as persisting social inequalities. However, public opinion research over the last 60 years, especially in America, amassed consistent evidence of poor public foreign affairs knowledge.

In recent decades there is growing evidence that citizens base their thinking and views about foreign policy on simple general beliefs and experiences, showing that public opinion on foreign affairs is more rational and stable than conventionally assumed.

Does this hold true in South Africa? While policy-makers and the mass public agree on the clear need for South Africa to play an active international role if the country is to achieve its national interests, remarkably little is known about foreign policy attitudes and the influencing role of knowledge, ideology and other factors.

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) has demonstrated a commitment to inclusive and consultative processes in crafting strategic priorities and plans in relation to foreign policy. Despite this, the share of South Africans who participates in such decision-making is rather restricted. As such, representative surveys that offer a better appreciation of foreign policy interest, knowledge, values and preferences, and how these relationships are changing over time, serve as a potentially important resource in ensuring that mass opinion features more prominently alongside elite opinion in determining the focus and nature of foreign policy in the country.

Authors: Benjamin Roberts and Jarè Struwig are SASAS coordinators and Steven Gordon is a PhD researcher trainee in the HSRC’s Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) research programme.

Acknowledgment: The data presented in this article was supported by Grant 0322 from the Open Society Foundation South Africa (OSF-SA) through its South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of OSF-SA.
COMMUNITY ADVICE OFFICES: STRAINING TO SERVE POOR COMMUNITIES

Paralegal advice offices face numerous challenges, but they provide invaluable services to improve the quality of life in communities, by providing legal advice, consultation, mediation and access with regards to labour disputes and many other services, and deserve support for full or part public funding say Yul Derek Davids and team.

For months Mrs Nomvula Nala*, a 60-year old woman from Langa township outside Cape Town, mulled over the differing advice from neighbours on how she should apply for an old-age grant; how she will get the money to travel there; how long will she wait in line; the food she would need to take along on her journey; and who will help her to fill in forms. Finally she was directed to the Langa Community-based Advice Office (CAO), just around the corner from her. Within weeks her social grant problem was sorted out – swiftly and efficiently.

This is just one of the many interviews recorded during an HSRC study commissioned by the National Alliance for the Development of Community Advice Offices (NADCAO) and the Technical Support and Dialogue Platform with the purpose of conducting a cost-benefit analysis of CAOs in South Africa. A cost-benefit analysis is a systematic process for calculating and comparing benefits and costs of projects. The ongoing study of 20 CAOs also involves a qualitative analysis of the services provided by CAOs. The 20 CAOs are located across five provinces: Western Cape, Gauteng, Free State, Eastern Cape and Limpopo.

CAOs are non-governmental organisations that play a vital role in providing services particularly in rural areas where government institutions and departments are not available, or where government service points are a considerable distance away. It is especially within these rural areas where CAOs not only provide justice-related paralegal services, but also fill the gap of providers of service information and facilitators of access to services provided by, amongst others, private institutions and the Departments of Social Development, Labour, Health and Local Government. CAOs provide a range of services such as welfare, social security issues, human rights, education and community development, as well as legal aid, mediation, labour disputes, unemployment, domestic violence, drug-related problems and water, sanitation and housing.

But it also entails a passionate caring for their communities. In the case of Orange Farm, staff members often use their own income to provide food parcels or cash in cases where there is a desperate and urgent need, which is a threat running through all the CAOs.

CAOs in funding dilemma
CAOs rely on donor funds to survive and this has become increasingly difficult due to factors such as the global economic crisis, decreased development funding flowing to South Africa as a middle-income country and competition from other organisations and priorities.

Consequently, organisations have adopted various accounting practices to demonstrate sustainability as well as accountability, good governance and transparency. Through increased accountability of service deliverables and the use of funds, NGOs are able to make a case for enhanced funding opportunities.

Nevertheless, challenges and limitations are not just addressed for the purposes of proper stewardship of public funds, but also to professionalise service offerings, improve standards and consistency of services and more importantly, have the ability to offer these services free of charge to the poor on a consistent basis.

Findings

Western Cape

The Langa CAO services the Langa, Khayelitsha, Delft and Philippi communities. The Witzenberg Rural and Development Centre is located in the town of Ceres and service six other surrounding communities within the greater Witzenberg.
district. Du Noon, in turn, caters for the local community as well as Parklands, Tableview and people from surrounding farms and informal settlements, such as Jo Slovo.

Du Noon Community Advice Office

The Witzenberg Rural and Development Centre appears to be the most successful in terms of how it is run (operations), its organisational structure, its infrastructure, human resources, funding and salary provision.

The main challenges for all three of these offices are similar in that there is a need to improve their infrastructures, resources and funding. This is especially important if one considers the large communities in which each CAOs are located.

The Langa office consults approximately 6–8 people per day, plus answers a myriad of telephone calls, keeping them busy for the best part of the day. In Ceres the office answers about 12–15 enquiries and open between 8–10 files daily. When the legal clinic is open, the CAO sees approximately 40 clients per day. In Du Noon the staff also indicated that they see a large number of people on a daily basis (often including Saturdays and Sundays).

For the Western Cape, the most common issues presented include labour disputes, unfair dismissals, housing-related queries, unemployment and other social ills such as substance abuse and youth pregnancy.

CAO staff identified needs for funding and training in report writing, proposal writing and finances.

Gauteng

The Orange Farm Human Rights Advice Centre has three permanent staff members (two with paralegal training), one administrative assistant and two full-time volunteers, housed in a single container. Their service area includes part of the Free State, Vereeniging and De Vaal.

They indicated office space, capacity to deal with large volumes of enquiries, and training for paralegal staff (especially among young people) as their greatest needs. The CAO deals with a wide range of issues, such as socio-economic issues including drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, domestic violence, unemployment, service delivery disputes and labour problems.

The office sees about 15 people per day and advises large numbers of people via telephone.

The office would also like to set up satellite offices to service their clients who often travel vast distances.

The Orange Farm CAO is very innovative in terms of generating funding, for example hosting events such as film festivals and youth sport days. They also manage a recycling plant which creates employment and income for both staff of the CAO and members of the community.

The preliminary results from these four CAOs showed that they are faced with numerous challenges which impact on their ability to deliver services. Despite these challenges they are able to help their clients and the communities which they service to improve their quality of life.

The preliminary findings therefore seem to suggest that those CAOs play an important role in servicing their communities. The final report will provide a more comprehensive analysis of the vital role that CAOs play in South Africa. The fieldwork of the present study will be concluded by the end of August 2014 and the project report will be finalised in October 2014.

* Not her real name.

Author: Yul Derek Davids, senior research specialist, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) research programme, with Jenna-Lee Marco and Jakes Dipholo, researchers; Dineo Seabe and Nkululeko Majazi, research interns, all DGSD; Len Verwey, freelance development economist.
WHAT DOES THE PUBLIC KNOW AND FEEL ABOUT SCIENCE?

The Department of Science and Technology (DST) released a draft Science Engagement Framework for comment. But before embarking on a science engagement strategy, it is important to know what the public already knows and feels about aspects of science. Sylvia Hannan, Vijay Reddy and Andrea Juan report on the public’s responses as gleaned from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS).

Since 1994, South Africa has promoted awareness and understanding of science and technology. This is evident in the White Paper on Science and Technology (1996), which emphasises the development of science literacy and promoting awareness of the power of science and technology.

Activities and programmes of public engagement have increased over the last two decades. This is clear from the first South African conference on the public understanding of science, held in December 1996 at the University of the Western Cape; the first science festival in 1997, then called the Sasol SciFest; parliament’s designation of 1998 as the first Year of Science and Technology (YEAST); the first science week in March 2000, directed by the former Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, which led to national science week from 2004 onwards. This was followed in 2006 by the implementation of a Youth into Science Strategy by the Department of Science and Technology.

Within this context it has become increasingly important to measure public awareness, knowledge and attitudes to different aspects of science. Over the years, a number of specialised science-related modules were introduced into the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) to understand the view of the public (Table 1).

Table 1: The science-related modules introduced to SASAS since 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Module</th>
<th>Years included</th>
<th>Focus of the investigation and reports</th>
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2010: Knowledge and the causes of and solutions to environmental problems, people vs environment, responsibility for protecting the environment, costs of environmental protection |
| Biotechnology                               | 2004           | Knowledge of biotechnology, genetic engineering, genetic modification, cloning, new technologies, uses of biotechnology, acceptance of biotechnology |
| Climate change/global warming               | 2007           | Knowledge and concern of climate change, causes and results of climate change, responsibility for prevention, government involvement |
| Indigenous knowledge                        | 2009           | Opinion of indigenous knowledge, government promotion of indigenous knowledge, roles in indigenous knowledge, sources of information |
| Nuclear energy/technology                   | 2011, 2013     | 2011 and 2013: Concerns about and the knowledge, benefits, uses, risks, and role of nuclear energy in South Africa, the role of the government, sources of information |
2013: Electricity, expenditure on energy, energy needs |
| Public relationship with science (including astronomy and the Square Kilometre Array – SKA) | 2010, 2013     | 2010: Promise reservation index, sources of information, science knowledge  
2013: Knowledge of science and scientific research, promise reservation index, science at school and as a career, sources of information, interest in science and technology developments, science centres and museums, attitude to astronomy, knowledge of and attitudes about SKA |

Source:
More than three-quarters said they knew very little about global warming or biotechnology.

The public’s general relationship with science was previously reported on in the HSRC Review (2013). While the government is committed to and invested in these scientific areas and the debate is largely driven by experts, it is important to elicit the views of members of the public, and ensure they are informed and participate in these debates.

In the 2013 SASAS, more than half the respondents indicated they were not informed about science and scientific research. For example, more than three-quarters said they knew very little or nothing about global warming or biotechnology. Biotechnology is the use of biological processes, organisms, or systems to manufacture products intended to improve the quality of human life in areas such as health, agriculture and industry. In 2001, the government published the National Biotechnology Strategy.

In the survey on nuclear energy, only 18% of respondents said they were knowledgeable about these issues. The government has a commitment to the future of nuclear energy in the country, and has stated that nuclear power is necessary and desirable (www.world-nuclear.org).

Figure 1 provides an indication of public interest in different aspects of science and technology.

Figure 1: Public interest in science and technology

![Chart showing public interest in various scientific fields]

Only 8% felt they knew a great deal about the causes of environmental problems.

The environment was another topic about which there appeared to be a lack of knowledge. Only 8% single of participants surveyed felt they knew a great deal about the causes of environmental problems, and 7% felt they knew a great deal about the solutions to these problems.

Climate change is one environmental problem that has received increased media attention in recent years. The government recently published a White Paper on the National Climate Change Response. Consequently, more information on climate change should be communicated to the public. This will enable citizens to gain the necessary knowledge to participate in such discussions, and to understand how they may personally contribute to the protection of the environment.

70% wanted laws for businesses to protect the environment.

The role of the government was also highlighted in the SASAS responses: 70% of respondents indicated the government should put more money into renewable energy and energy-saving devices. Further, around three-quarters of the public advised government needed to spend money on campaigns to encourage people to use less energy.

Two-thirds of participants said the government should spend more on preserving, protecting and supporting indigenous knowledge, while three-quarters of the public indicated government should promote small businesses using indigenous knowledge and support communities and individuals involved in traditional practices (2009).

In 2010, 63% of the public responded that the government should pass laws to make ordinary people protect the environment, and 70% wanted laws for businesses to protect the environment.

41% of respondents thought ‘modern science does more harm than good’.

A disquieting view gleaned from the SASAS was the public’s concerns about the impact of science. In 2008, 41% of respondents thought ‘modern science does more harm than good’. This increased to 49% in 2009. Three-quarters of the public felt that ‘science makes our way of life change too fast’ (2013).

As the country continues to invest in science, technology and innovation for economic and social development, it is equally important that the views of the public are also taken into consideration.

Authors: Sylvia Hannan, junior researcher, Education and Skills Development (ESD) programme, HSRC; Dr Vijay Reddy, executive director, ESD; Andrea Juan, junior researcher, ESD.
The 20th International AIDS Conference (AIDS 2014) started on a sombre note in Melbourne, Australia. Delegates congregated on the evening of 20 July for the conference opening to the painful news of the death of a number of delegates who were on board the Malaysian Airlines plane ML17, writes Alinah Segobye. Among them was the renowned HIV/AIDS champion who was to be remembered, cited and celebrated during the conference, Joep Lange.

The theme of the conference, *Stepping up the pace*, focused attention on the successes made in the last 25 years in the global response to HIV/AIDS. In particular, the hosting of the conference in Australia was significant in drawing attention to new and emerging challenges with respect to ending the fight against AIDS.

Where considerable gains have been made regarding prevention, treatment, care and support, new challenges have emerged, such as new sub-epidemics among key populations previously unaffected. The keynote address by UNAIDS executive director Michel Sidibé, and the common thread for other speakers throughout the conference, highlighted the need to focus on key populations and to ensure ‘no one was left behind’ in the fight against AIDS.

Over the last 25 years, a lot has been achieved in the global fight against AIDS. The Melbourne conference showcased strides in the science informing research into HIV/AIDS and demonstrated unequivocally that investments in research have paid off in the prevention, treatment and care areas of HIV/AIDS.

Many lessons have been learnt about harnessing community action and advocacy; championing local, rational and global responses; and mobilising resources to co-ordinate responses. The continuing burden of disease in sub-Saharan Africa was continually flagged as a major challenge in realising an end to AIDS.

Of note was the success of the prevention programmes of countries like Botswana and South Africa in ostensibly reducing maternal transmission of HIV from more than 90% to fewer than 5% over the last 15 years through prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) programmes. Further, the reduction of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in some of the age groups that were most affected over the last two decades demonstrated the success of combining high-impact prevention initiatives, including safe male circumcision and targeting vulnerable populations.

Universal access to antiretroviral therapy (ART) has led to the championship of ‘treatment as prevention’, a critical message that also emerged from AIDS 2012 in Washington DC and that was again echoed in Melbourne.

The key message of ‘leaving no one behind’ forces us to critically reflect on regional efforts to combat HIV/AIDS.

Tackling HIV/AIDS at a regional level
It is perhaps the key message of ‘leaving no one behind’ that forces us to critically reflect on regional efforts to combat HIV/AIDS. One of the main lessons learnt from Melbourne was the concerted efforts to address the epidemic as it affected key populations in Australia and the Pacific. Sub-epidemics emerging among young, men who have sex with men (MSM) and intravenous drug using (IUD) populations are a cause for concern, and call for more impactful and targeted programmes. This sentiment was echoed throughout the AIDS 2014 presentations.
This message also notably related to challenges faced in sub-Saharan Africa among vulnerable populations, including commercial sex workers, people in incarceration, and refugee and migrant populations. Some of the challenges faced by these populations include lack of access to basic prevention messages, safe sexual reproductive health education resources, condoms and post exposure prophylaxis.

Poverty among many of the developing world’s populations was highlighted as negatively impacting on the capacity of communities to respond effectively to fight HIV/AIDS. In this regard, a strong call was made throughout for increased funding for HIV/AIDS.

Attention was drawn to the overall reduction of funding for HIV/AIDS.

Strategic financing needed
Attention was drawn to the overall reduction of funding for HIV/AIDS. As a result, there was a real danger of efforts falling behind in terms of the gains made so far. Calls were made for funding to be made available to the Global Fund, particularly from developed countries. Presentations highlighted the need for strategic mobilisation of domestic financing to ensure the sustainability of programmes.

Some of the strategic partnerships highlighted included drawing on the private sector as a key partner in fighting HIV/AIDS. A special session on ‘The role of extractive industries in building sustainable health programmes’, co-chaired by former Botswana President Festus Mogae, addressed this subject by highlighting the work being done by mining companies in working with communities.

This subject is relevant in the southern African context, as the mining sector contributes significantly to employment, national revenue and community support. However, it has also been a sector contributing to key drivers of the epidemic in the region through the migrant labour system. Further, the burden of disease has been complicated by the prevalence of TB in mining communities.

In the war against HIV/AIDS a key population left behind was adolescents.

Teens being left behind
Perhaps one of the most arresting messages from Melbourne was the keynote address delivered by UNICEF expert Dr Susan Kasedde. Despite the global success in the war against HIV/AIDS a key population left behind was adolescents. Her presentation highlighted how this group had fallen through the cracks of programming for prevention and treatment, resulting in high mortality rates among young people particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.

The presentation by medical advisor for the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), Shaffiq Essajee, which focused on paediatric HIV, further drew attention to AIDS as it affects children. This presentation highlighted the need for what was coined a ‘doing the right things in the right places at the right time’ approach for the next level of scaled-up activity to end AIDS.

Future focus areas identified
A necessary focus for AIDS 2016 will have to be paediatric, adolescent and youth populations as entries to high-impact prevention programming. So far, the success of PMTCT suggests that significant gains can be made to ending AIDS if efforts are focused in this direction.

HSRC CEO, Olive Shisana, highlighted the need to continue strengthening health systems to ensure their capacity to respond efficiently and effectively to the needs of communities. Coupled with enhanced local, national and global co-ordination, the take-home message from Melbourne was that ending AIDS is within our reach as a global community.

As host country in 2016, South Africa can look forward to building on the lessons of the last three decades and drawing on advances in science, community action and leadership to showcase some of the advances made in the fight against HIV/AIDS.

Author: Professor Alinah Segobye, head of Research Use and Impact Assessment, HSRC.

Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, South African Minister of Health, at AIDS 2014 in Melbourne

Former Botswana president Festus Mogae with UNAIDS executive director Michel Sidibé at AIDS 2014 in Melbourne
SILK FROM MOPANI WORMS: INNOVATION AT WORK

New techniques in harvesting and producing wild silk can yield huge benefits for rural communities. One example is the Ganyesa Wild Silk enterprise in North West. Using this enterprise as a case study, Kgabe Ramoroka and Peter Jacobs illustrate the advantages of rural innovation networks.

The African wild silk moth, scientifically known as Gonometa postica, produces natural silken fibres of exceptional quality. The cocoons of African wild silk moths are abundant in some parts of the North West, Northern Cape and Limpopo provinces of South Africa, as well as in Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

In Ganyesa, a rural town in Kagisano-Molopo in North West, the potential of the lifecycle of the African wild silk moth has been recognised through a community project that harvests and processes the silk produced from the moth’s hatched cocoons. The cocoons are collected, cleaned and degummed to produce yarn. Indigenous methods were found to be inefficient and highly time-consuming, resulting in low yarn productions.

Production methods were improved, output volumes scaled up, new buildings erected and a degumming plant installed. The degumming plant was constructed in a new building, and comprised a series of machines used to perform different tasks, including producing silver web from the silk, spinning single ply yarn (using spinning machines), packaging single ply yarn (using assembler winder) and other functions.

The wild silk innovation network also helped the Ganyesa Wild Silk enterprise employ a management and operation structure. The enterprise further benefited from the training offered to its management personnel as well as to the local people to improve their skills in harvesting the pupal cocoons of the African silk moth.

The network also helped the Ganyesa Wild Silk enterprise employ a management and operation structure. The wild silk local innovation network is composed of various ‘actors’ who play crucial roles in boosting the innovation capabilities of the silk enterprise through providing start-up funding and access to resources, training and enterprise co-ordination and management expertise.

Why a wild silk innovation network? To improve productivity, the Ganyesa Wild Silk enterprise partnered with a local innovation network. As a result, production methods were improved, output volumes were scaled up, new buildings were erected and a degumming plant was installed.
Agency; the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development; the Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati District Municipality and Kagisano-Molopo Local Municipality; local communities, ward councillors and members of ward committees; and the Tlou le Tau and Ba Ga Mariba tribal authorities. Each innovation party has a specific role:

- The Port Elizabeth CSIR’s textile technology division was responsible for the implementation of technologies to harvest, clean and degum the wild silk cocoons. This unit also trained local people in cocoon harvesting. The CSIR was selected as the co-ordinator and lead institution in the operation and management of the project.
- The government departments supported the initial set up of the wild silk enterprise through funding. Other departments offered extension support and necessary advice on production and operation.
- The district and local municipalities contribute in offering basic sanitation services, such as water provision and waste removal.
- The tribal authorities manage and control the fields, and allow the local people to harvest cocoons in the communal fields under their leadership. They also play a role in encouraging the formation of community co-operatives that will be trained in the collection and harvesting of hatched cocoons in the veld, which will then be sold to the Ganyesa Wild Silk enterprise as part of the strategy to scale up the enterprise.
- Communities harvest the cocoons. The Ganyesa Wild Silk enterprise is currently not registered as a legal business, and its silk is only available in small local markets. A proposal was recently put forward to escalate the enterprise’s operations, increase its production output and expand to larger markets to facilitate greater commercialisation in an effort to improve the living standards of local communities.

**Conclusion**

There is growing consensus that formal and informal innovation networks improve the sharing of knowledge and technological and non-technological innovations among local rural enterprises. Innovative capabilities thrive in cohesive innovation networks among public enterprises, private enterprises, non-profit organisations, local authorities and creative individuals in marginalised areas. This wild silk case clearly illustrates how the Ganyesa Wild Silk enterprise benefited from the local network of innovators, with some of the actors coming from outside the boundaries of the district.

**Innovation networks provide a platform for enterprises to exploit the unique competencies and resources of other enterprises in the network.**

Innovation networks provide a platform for enterprises to exploit the unique competencies and resources of other enterprises in the network. They also help members of the network reduce the costs of looking for and accessing information and resources. Perhaps more generally, this example calls for collaboration into local innovation networks as a strategy to improve the capabilities of rural enterprises in innovation.

**Authors:** Kgabo Ramoroka, master’s intern, Economic Performance and Development (EPD) research programme, HSRC; Dr Peter Jacobs, research specialist, EPD, HSRC.

**End note:** The case study forms part of a Department of Science and Technology-funded project for mapping innovation activities in rural areas. In 2012, the HSRC was contracted by DST to design, develop and pilot-test a Rural Innovation Assessment Toolbox (RIAT).
(Post)apartheid Conditions

Author: Derek Hook
Pub month & year: March 2014
Format: 216 x 138 mm
Extent: 252 pages
Price: R270
Rights: South Africa

What the book is about
The author takes as his starting point events that shock us in their extreme violence, such as the burning of the Mozambican man Ernesto Alhabeto Nhamuave and the Marikana shootings. He notes how the language of the commentary on these events evokes a complex continuation of apartheid’s historical legacy. Using both psychoanalytic and social theory, he then proceeds to craft a theoretical framework within which to trace a sustained analysis of the psychic life of power in (post)apartheid South Africa: an awareness of how social structure and psychical or affective forces jointly produce material reality. Power itself has its psychological facets and social formations may themselves exhibit patterns of psychical causality.

About the author
Derek Hook is a Reader in Psychosocial Studies at Birkbeck College, University of London and University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

SA Women as Champions of Change

Authors: Margaret Chitiga-Mabugu, Selma Karuaihe, Vasu Reddy, Shirin Motala, Tracy Morrison, Hannah Botsis, Miracle Ntuli and Ntabiseng Tsoananamatsie
Pub month & year: March 2014
ISBN (soft cover): 978-0-7969-2476-6
Format: 240 x 168 mm
Extent: 236 pp
Price: R120
Rights: World Rights

What the book is about
The publication of this book forms part of a civil society programme of action for the African Women’s Decade, co-ordinated by South African Women in Dialogue (SAWID). It reports on the main issues facing South African women, namely:
1) poverty eradication in the context of gender;
2) early childhood development (ECD) in the context of gender;
3) violence against women; and
4) co-ordination of civil society initiatives. A fifth theme which cuts across all the others is employment creation.