Documento(s) 24 de 37

In late July 1994, some 500 journalists and media technicians gathered in the town of Goma in eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) to cover the influx of an estimated one million Rwandan refugees. They brought with them the technology of instant, 'real time' news: satellite uplinks for transmitting pictures and sound, satellite phones for sending newspaper copy and computer equipment connected to satellite phones to transmit still photographs.

From the point of view of aid workers trying to cope with the needs of refugees, the journalists were in many ways a nuisance. They added to the chaos of clogged roads. They inflated the cost of hiring a car or an interpreter. Nurses resuscitating children with cholera found themselves tripping over tripods and cameramen looking for a better angle.

But aid agency press officers – ever mindful of the hot competition for funds back home – pursued journalists, proffering not only updates and interviews, but free transport and accommodation in return for covering their agency's programme. The aid agencies needed the journalists, and the journalists needed the aid agencies.

In Britain, Newsnight called it 'the largest ever concentration of refugees in recorded history.' The exodus and the subsequent cholera epidemic became a huge story around the world. It led television news bulletins in Europe and North America for two to three weeks and was front-page news in the British tabloids, which rarely cover Africa. Rwanda was on the front page of the New York Times for six weeks in July and August.

But the public did not understand the complex political causes of the exodus to Goma. And they were probably not understood by many of the journalists who covered Goma as a humanitarian story, nor by the dozens of young, inexperienced aid workers for whom Goma was their first mission.

This paper was prepared for the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Study III (1996, vol. 3), and is published here in its entirety for the first time. It was written before the events of November 1996, when the Hutu refugee camps located in eastern Zaire (now the Congo) were cleared and an estimated 700,000 people returned to Rwanda. Much of the information is based on interviews conducted between May and August 1995; the names of interviewees are listed at the end of the paper.

The events that led up to the exodus – the massacre of Rwanda's Tutsi population and moderate Hutu opposition and the war between Rwandan government forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – were given far less space and airtime. In most Western countries, with the exception of the former colonial power, Belgium, coverage was largely restricted to 'serious' newspapers and some radio and television reports. The story was dangerous to cover and difficult to understand. It was a big story, but not a massive one.

This is not a new issue: in the late 1960s, coverage of the war in Biafra had little impact on the public as long as the story was Africans killing Africans. The moment the story became pitiful – skeletal African babies dying of starvation – the imagination and the conscience of the public was engaged and it became a massive story.

Decades after Biafra, a number of new factors are relevant to this study. First, satellite technology means TV reports can be transmitted and broadcast as they happen rather than days or weeks after filming. Second, a proliferation of aid agencies are competing for funds. Third, the international climate has changed since the end of the Cold War, and Western governments have little strategic or political interest in Africa. These factors have implications for the way coverage of humanitarian disasters affects aid policy and practice.

In this paper, I attempt to clarify the role the media played in the humanitarian effort in Rwanda and on its borders in 1994. The first part provides the context of the disaster and pointers about how media influence works. The second part is a chronology of the coverage until the exodus to Goma, with reference to the relation between aid agencies and the media. The third part is an analysis of the impact of media presence and coverage on the aid effort in Goma. It concludes with a number of points for further discussion.

CONTEXT: A FOREIGN POLICY VACUUM

In most Western countries there is a vacuum where there used to be a policy on Africa. The vacuum is filled by aid, much of it directed through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Western countries had no policy to prevent or stop the killing in Rwanda or to contain the flow of refugees. They did not actively back the RPF or the government. The only exception was France, which pursued a complex policy in which a military intervention with several aims was characterized as humanitarian.

Media influence in the foreign policy vacuum

According to Nik Gowing (1995), former diplomatic editor of ITN's Channel Four News and now a BBC World presenter, 'Neither TV journalists nor humanitarian organisations should delude themselves about the impact of their images on the making of foreign policy' (for further detail, see Gowing 1994). Certainly, editorials and pressure from aid agencies failed to persuade the West to intervene when the killing was at its height in April, May and early June 1994.

The high-profile response of governments to the humanitarian crisis in Goma came as thousands of members of the public – voters – gave money to NGOs and demanded that 'something should be done.'

I would argue that dispatching water trucks from California or logisticians from Frankfurt in response to TV pictures of bodies being tipped into the cholera pits of Goma was not a fundamental foreign policy switch designed to end a crisis. It was a knee-jerk, high-profile response, which carried little political risk or cost. It made good television. It also gave the impression of engagement and deep concern at a time when – in President Clinton's case – domestic policies like healthcare reform and gun control had hit the rocks. (Gowing 1995)

Governments failed to come to the aid of the victims of genocide, but provided succour to many of the perpetrators. It was, of course, much easier to provide humanitarian aid than to try to prevent or stop the genocide, and how much outside powers could have done is still arguable. But the relatively light coverage of the genocide and the heavy coverage of the refugee crisis helped governments appear to be responding to the most important aspect of the drama.

It was not the intention of aid agencies or journalists to help Western governments use humanitarian aid as a fig leaf for the lack of policy on genocide. One can cite several examples of in-depth coverage and criticism of the failures of the United Nations (UN) and national governments. But the issue is quantity of coverage. One of the major outcomes of the imbalance in reporting of different aspects of the story was that governments were able to hide behind a humanitarian screen.

Relation between aid workers and journalists

'The media presence changed the perception of the Rwandan crisis in a very damaging way,' said Anne-Marie Huby, who was executive director of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)–UK in the mid-1990s. 'In the general public's memory, the Rwanda crisis was people who die of cholera. I think people forgot the long-lens coverage of genocide. [In Goma,] I remember CNN saying "This is genocide again." We told the reporter that dying of diseases is not genocide.'

The distinction was not as important to CNN as to Huby. 'We see a compelling news story, not whether it's genocide or refugees or whatever,' said Larry Register, senior international editor at the time at CNN's headquarters in Atlanta. 'Rwanda was such a straightforward story – a humanitarian tragedy unfolding daily.'

There is something ironic about an aid worker telling a journalist that a medical tragedy is not the key event. Aid workers, after all, were a major part of the humanitarian story and Samantha Bolton, then the MSF's regional information officer for East Africa and spokesperson in Goma, was interviewed on British television more than any other aid agency official in Goma during the first week of the crisis (Glasgow Media Group 1994). But MSF–France did have a clear idea of its own limitations – in May it launched a campaign with the slogan 'You can't stop genocide with doctors.'

But the interest of journalists in covering humanitarian aid sometimes overwhelms their responsibility to expose underlying issues. Timothy Weaver of FirstLine News, wrote:

During the emergency period [of a humanitarian disaster] the difference between a humanitarian agency and the media should be at its most marked. The aid agency should be concerned with delivering aid, and the news agency should be reporting what is happening. Yet nowadays the two tend to be blurred. The aid agencies are the news, and the news becomes a charity appeal. Reporters become crusaders, demanding action to be taken, money to be spent, and something to be done (but not by me, because I am off to my next assignment, thank you very much). (Weaver 1995)

In a situation like Goma, where the human tragedy was so desperate and so visual, it is inevitable that some blurring will occur. But reporting on Goma should not be seen in isolation. From Afghanistan to Somalia, wars in what used to be called the Third World are increasingly being reported with an emphasis on the humanitarian over the political or military. This is partly because editors think their viewers and readers have a limited interest in complex political events far away. It is also a reflection of the lack of political or strategic interests of outside powers – the political story is remote because it does not involve us.

Moreover, the aid worker and the journalist are often the only foreigners in a dangerous and threatening situation. They speak the same language and they stick together. Their perspectives merge and it becomes hard to maintain strictly distinct roles.

CHRONOLOGY OF MEDIA COVERAGE OF RWANDA UP TO 1994

October 1990 – RPF invades Rwanda

The story of the first three years of the war and the 1993 Arusha accords was scarcely covered at all in the anglophone press. It received regular attention from BBC World Service radio and TV. The French and Belgian media covered it more because of former colonial and linguistic ties.

September 1993 – attempted coup and refugee crisis in Burundi

The killing of between 50,000 and 100,000 Burundians and the subsequent exodus of 700,000 people to Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire was not big news in Britain or the United States. It was slightly bigger in France and much bigger in Belgium. Aid agencies lobbied for coverage and failed. In the end, Oxfam offered to fly George Alaigiah, then BBC TV developing world correspondent, to Bujumbura. The images Alaigiah came back with were strong and the story compelling, but they did not spark more coverage. After seeing the BBC reports, Sue Inglish, associate editor of Channel Four News, said 'they kicked themselves for not sending a reporter,' but once the BBC had carried the story felt they had missed the boat.

Anglophone aid agencies that were already in the region strengthened their emergency programmes, but most of the aid agencies that went out in response to the emergency were French and Belgian.

It is hard to say definitively why this huge massacre and humanitarian disaster did not capture the attention of the press. At the time, the media were dominated by the Middle East peace agreement – the handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzak Rabin on the White House lawn took place on 13 September. Previous massacres in Burundi – in 1988, for example – had been covered in a similarly limited way in anglophone countries. There was a sense of déjà vu and a lack of interest in the complex political causes of the tragedy.

December 1993 – food for Burundi refugees dries up

The World Food Programme (WFP) failed to get enough food to the Burundi refugees in Rwanda. The WFP said the problem was insufficient resources from donors and inefficiency and corruption within the agencies distributing food. NGOs and donors blamed a weak WFP office in Kigali for incompetence in managing the food pipeline and reducing rations without informing anyone. Thousands of children began to die of diseases related to malnutrition, and MSF used the media to bring pressure on the WFP.

'If we really want to put pressure on the UN or the donors, we'll work out where the weakness is and expose it,' said Samantha Bolton of MSF. 'They generally react to media pressure – they're petrified of bad publicity.' Bolton, who was based in Nairobi, briefed the Nairobi press corps and organized trips to the affected camps. 'It became a huge scandal and there was a lot of interest. Because WFP was so frightened, they started pumping out press releases. It made them much more efficient.'

This use of the media to pressure the UN and donors is typical of MSF. Other NGOs, anxious to maintain good working relations with UN agencies on the ground, are more reluctant to go public and prefer to talk to journalists off the record. One result of Bolton's work was that the WFP scandal brought the forgotten story of the Burundi refugees back into the news.

Whether the WFP in Kigali became more efficient because of direct media pressure is open to question. By March, the food pipeline was being managed more efficiently. Donors, including Echo, had been leaning on the WFP, which had sent senior staff to Kigali to try to sort out the problem. It seems likely that the media pressure did not work directly on WFP in Kigali but on donors and on the WFP in Rome and Nairobi.

January–April 1994 – build up to the crisis

The mounting tension as President Habyarimana delayed implementing the Arusha accords received little coverage in the anglophone press and only slightly more in the francophone. The media were dominated by the violent build-up to the South African elections – at this point, Chief Buthelezi was still boycotting the poll. Rwanda was a very difficult story to report, requiring good contacts and an understanding of Rwandan politics.

6 April 1994 – the plane comes down, the massacres start

When the plane carrying presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira was shot down over Kigali, there were two foreign correspondents in Kigali: Katrin van der Schoot, a freelance Flemish reporter for Belgian radio; and Lindsey Hilsum (the author of this paper), in Rwanda on a temporary contract for UNICEF and normally a freelance reporter for the BBC, Guardian and Observer.

Some Nairobi-based journalists managed to move south from Uganda with the RPF. Others persuaded a WFP official in Entebbe to fly them into Kigali on a plane being used to evacuate foreigners. Others drove up from Burundi. For most of April, there were no more than 10–15 reporters in the country at any time.

After foreign embassies and most aid workers left Rwanda at the end of the second week of April, the only real sources of information in Kigali were these journalists and the UN contingent. Journalists travelling with the RPF were strictly supervised.

Although most of the journalists were Africa specialists, even they did not understand what was happening at first. With a shooting war in the east and the north and massacres in much of the country, for most of April it was genuinely confusing. The journalists in Kigali depended on the UN for protection. After a while, the UN limited their numbers, saying it could not accommodate more than half a dozen or so. The journalists were mainly British, French and Belgian. Most United States reporters had been ordered to leave by their employers because the situation was too dangerous. A French cameraman was shot and injured in Kigali.

It was extremely difficult to cover the story thoroughly. 'It was a story we wanted to tell but it was appallingly dangerous,' explained Mike Jermey of ITN, which sent a staff correspondent to Rwanda in May. Mark Doyle was in Kigali for most of April and May reporting for the BBC. His reports indicating the progress of the RPF advance and the scale of the civilian slaughter by government forces were frequently broadcast on the BBC World Service. When another BBC reporter, Fergal Keane, was stopped at a checkpoint near Butare in late May, the machete-wielding thugs manning it said that if they ever saw Doyle they would kill him.

There was no 'real time' TV news because it was too risky to send an expensive satellite uplink into Rwanda. Channel Four News had reports from Catherine Bond, who had covered the war since 1990, but these were not 'real time' so their impact was limited. 'There were a number of attempts to get in, but it looked so disastrous and we could not get the pictures out,' said Sue Inglish of Channel Four News. The first satellite uplink was erected in Kigali in late May, after the RPF had secured the airport and most of the massacres were over.

In April and early May, the media had little influence on the aid agencies, but were an important source of information because most agencies had lost touch with their local staff (many of whom were dead, while others were participating in the killing). Agencies distributed goods to a trickle of refugees in neighbouring countries and managed to get some supplies to people in locations guarded by the UN. They stockpiled goods and held anxious meetings in Bujumbura trying to prepare for a likely exodus of refugees. The media coverage of these efforts did not spur aid agency supporters to send money. 'It looked like a bloodbath, a civil war, so sending money wasn't going to help,' said one press officer working with a US-based organization.

Agencies such as Oxfam concentrated on advocating UN intervention to stop the killing. Others tried to publicize small efforts at humanitarian aid.

Benaco and Ngara – the story takes off

The first large wave of refugees crossed into Tanzania on 28 April, the last day of voting in the South African elections.

'For me the world became aware of Rwanda on the 29th April,' said Geoff Lone, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regional delegation for East Africa. 'Suddenly it was a humanitarian problem. The refugee situation translated the crisis into terms which could be understood by the world at large.'

By this time, news editors were aware that something major was going on and they were missing it because it was too dangerous and too complicated. But Benaco was much, much easier. It was safe – neither the journalists nor the expensive satellite equipment were at risk. It was accessible – the Red Cross would fly you direct from Nairobi. The story made sense – refugees fleeing war, being looked after by aid workers. And, for TV, the visual images were very strong but not so offensive that you could not show them.

News organizations started to pull reporters out of South Africa, where the smooth electoral process had made the story less eventful than predicted, and send them to Tanzania.

Of course, the story was not simple – were these people fleeing war or retribution? Were they victims or perpetrators? But the images were simple and recognizable: Africans on the move, living in camps, at the mercy of the generosity of the outside world. The aid agencies, thrilled that at last there was something concrete they could do, flocked to Benaco and eventually had their numbers restricted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As money began to flow in to fundraisers in Europe and the United States, competition for media coverage became acute. One press officer relates how the Red Cross hospital was at the entrance to Benaco, next to the camp where journalists slept. 'It was impossible to get the journalists out of the hands of the Red Cross.'

May – genocide continues while the UN dithers

By May, more journalists were trying to cover the genocide, but it was still very difficult and dangerous to get access except via Uganda under the watchful eyes of the RPF.

Newspaper editorials and opinion pieces ('op-eds') by human rights workers or aid agency officials advocated UN intervention to stop the killing. This had some influence within the UN. Karel Kovanda, Czech ambassador to the UN and a member of the Security Council at the time, pushed hard for the UN Security Council's 17 May Resolution to send 5,500 troops to Rwanda to try to stop the genocide. Kovanda said the turning point was an op-ed by Human Rights Watch, published in The New York Times in mid-April. 'It explained the role of France arming Habyarimana and so on. That article was an eye-opener, a key to understanding Rwanda,' Kovanda said. He contacted the writer, Alison Des Forges, and she provided him and other concerned members of the Security Council with information to supplement (and at times contradict) what they heard through official channels.

Aid agencies and editorials pressured Western countries to back up the 17 May Security Council Resolution. But the United States, bruised by its failure in Somalia, scuppered the plan by quibbling over details and delaying sending equipment that the African peacekeepers were to use.

In the end, it was the RPF that stopped the genocide by winning the war. It is interesting to note that no NGOs and few journalists were advocating that Western countries take a political stance and back the rebels.

Operation Turquoise – the French intervene

There was limited coverage of Rwanda in the French press after the withdrawal of French military trainers and embassy staff from Kigali in mid-April. During May, when the full horror of genocide was emerging, liberal newspapers such as Libération challenged the role France had played in arming the Habyarimana regime.

The French administration was divided about what to do and some parts of the media started to push for action – what kind of action was unclear. 'The military officers who disagreed with the decision on 8 April to withdraw everything used press coverage to say the decision had been racist, because [the government] didn't care about people in Africa,' said Stephen Smith, then Africa editor of Libération. 'They used the media as a tool within the state apparatus, saying the French colonial past was being betrayed. So the media was used in the context of rivalry within the state apparatus, rather than as overall pressure on a coherent, monolithic state.'

MSF–France, with its campaign of 'You can't stop genocide with doctors,' fed into the calls for action, and its campaign – which was purely advocacy – nonetheless brought in significant donations from the public. But when President Mitterand announced in mid-June that he was sending troops unilaterally rather than as part of a UN contingent, MSF–France was against the move because French troops were seen as politically aligned with the government that was committing genocide.

When [French troops] intervened in the southwest and didn't show independence from the former government, we in other MSF sections were very angry. When one MSF makes a mistake it becomes a problem for all the others. The French prime minister's ratings went through the roof. Antenne 2 was practically writing lines for visiting generals – there was collusion between the press and the army. It was impossible for MSF to raise any dissenting voice. (Anne-Marie Huby, MSF–UK, interview)

The French government had motives too complex to explore in this report, but humanitarianism was the factor they wanted to advertise. They had backed the Hutu government and they wanted to be seen saving Tutsis.

Stephen Smith agrees that the coverage in France of the French army's 'humanitarian mission' was largely positive. 'The broad public opinion is that France was the only nation to care about human suffering. They did something and then got out, but by that time everyone wanted them to stay. Most people would say it was a success.'

When the French press started to criticize MSF for refusing to cooperate with the French army in southwest Rwanda, Samantha Bolton was dispatched to make MSF's case. 'It was a disaster for MSF,' she said. 'There were constant quotes like Colonel Gil saying "medical organizations whose job it is to do medical work refuse to do it. They are letting children die."'

The problem was image rather than money. MSF looked inconsistent because it had called for intervention then didn't like the result.

Bolton had more luck with the anglophone press, but although all major British TV and print media were there, as well as CNN (although not the American networks), June was a low point for coverage in the English-speaking world. This made it hard for NGOs to raise funds, even though they were now active in Tanzania, Burundi and some in the French protection zone. CARE–USA ran an advertisement in the major American newspapers (The New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, etc.) and the response did not even cover its costs. In July after Goma, an almost identical advertisement did phenomenally well.

From April to June, the UN had come under considerable criticism in the media for failing to do anything. The Security Council, Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNAMIR and the specialized agencies were all portrayed as impotent and useless. The French intervention pointed up the UN's failure.

THE IMPACT OF MEDIA PRESENCE AND COVERAGE ON THE AID EFFORT IN GOMA

The impact of the media on the aid effort in Goma is difficult to define or quantify because aid agencies are reluctant to ascribe anything they do to media influence. According to most agency press officers and workers, pandering to the media is something that other agencies do.

For NGOs, the main impact was, of course, on fundraising. The predominant TV image was the dying African child being saved by a foreign (white) nurse. For Mike Jermey of ITN, the most memorable image was Kevin Noone, a young Irish aid worker from GOAL Ireland, who rolled up his sleeves and threw the bodies of dead cholera victims into trucks to clear room for the living.

Media coverage of general humanitarian issues is essential to persuade regular supporters to give money to their chosen NGO. Specific attention raises the profile of an organization and will attract new supporters. In Britain, a threshold is passed when the tabloids cover the story. John Grain, operations room manager for Oxfam, logs credit card donations. He noted that the number of calls and donations mirrored almost exactly the ebbs and flows of TV and tabloid coverage of Rwanda: May, 1,000 calls; June, 134; July, 6,000 (the largest ever response to an appeal in a month); August, 2,500; September, 100.

Did the media influence the decision of agencies and governments to go to Goma and how long to stay? Did it influence what they did while there?

The proliferation of NGOs

'The most important aspect of "the CNN factor" was that it sent dozens of NGOs we didn't want,' said Joel Boutroue, head of the UNHCR sub-delegation in Goma. 'This took an inordinate amount of our time and complicated our job. You cannot coordinate 100 NGOs; it made for a very expensive programme and we're still suffering from it.'

The most extreme example of an agency driven by the media was Operation Blessing, based in Virginia, USA. Operation Blessing was a department within the Christian Broadcasting Network, right-wing evangelist Pat Robertson's own TV network. It existed simply as a function of television. Robertson and his TV crew, plus satellite uplink, flew to Goma very early in the crisis. 'He implied the Hutus were heroes. Maybe he got confused,' said Richard Walden, president of Operation USA, a secular outfit that collects and transports donations in kind to disaster zones.

On his daily TV show 'The 700 Club,' Robertson appealed for doctors to come and save dying Rwandans. 'We sent six medical teams each with 15 people, so a total of 90 people,' said Hanan Kassir, head of international centres for Operation Blessing. Staff rotated every two weeks. For nearly all, it was their first experience in Africa. The 700 Club filmed their work, thus generating more volunteers, more sponsorship and – according to Walden who watches Operation Blessing closely – more general funds for Robertson's political-religious campaign in the US. The teams evangelized as well as treating the refugees. 'Faith is something you cling to,' explained Kassir.

Operation Blessing volunteers believe they were useful. 'We sent 80,000 pounds of medicines and supplies and must have treated 80,000 patients,' said Kassir. Boutroue disagrees. 'Operation Blessing ... tried to cure cholera with the laying on of hands. They are nutcases,' he said. Experienced health workers point out that two-week rotations are expensive and inefficient and that people with no previous experience of Africa could not possibly be useful in such a short time frame.

Operation Blessing pulled out of Goma in February. 'We had no more funds,' said Kassir. 'We can't take from the existing program. We'd had a good appeal and had used it up. We can't just keep on helping everybody all the time.' In other words, Operation Blessing only works in places while it is generating media coverage and thus attracting volunteers and funds.

Boutroue is equally critical of CARE–Germany. 'They came late, 200 Germans at a time rotating every two weeks, a lot of students giving the wrong drugs, creating resistance to diseases and giving inadequate treatment. They were working in total isolation and they created a lot of havoc.' CARE–Germany's refusal to coordinate with other agencies was revealed in the German press. 'There was a decision made by the board not to cooperate with other NGOs ... This showed the competition inside Germany,' said Manuela Rosper, programme manager with CARE–Germany. 'We got an extremely bad press. Once you have a bad press and you are not in a position to defend yourself properly, it does not get any better.' Rosper defends the work their doctors did in the field. 'We were well prepared for the whole thing and continued until the end of the year ... It did not affect our work in the field but affected fundraising at home.' The board of CARE–Germany has since changed.

CARE–Germany's experience reveals the power of the media over some organizations – the agency was in such competition with others, it refused to coordinate with them and, when it got bad press, it could not raise money and left.

There was an opportunity cost in the arrival of inefficient organizations, especially at the beginning of the disaster when thousands of refugees were dying daily. 'For every loony that rolled into the place, 20 kilos of water equipment didn't get onto a plane,' said Nic Stockton, head of Oxfam's emergencies unit.

'Media supply side' NGOs do not impress experienced journalists who have seen this kind of thing before. However, some of the reporters covering Goma were 'firefighters' – gullible novices with little prior experience of Africa or of emergency situations.

Aid agencies that stayed away or left

The fact that so many agencies went to Goma meant that some experienced agencies stayed away, notably Save the Children Fund, United Kingdom (SCF– UK). 'We looked at what was happening with cholera and dysentery and – given the lack of preparation – felt a lot of people were going to die whatever anyone did, and the key to that was the large concentration [of refugees],' said Don Redding, press officer for SCF–UK. 'The problem was so many agencies piling in without coordination.' Rather than add one more agency, SCF–UK decided to concentrate on working inside Rwanda. 'We felt right from the start that refugee cities of that size were not sustainable and very politicised.'

Redding says that not being seen in the media to be active in Goma probably cost SCF money in resources not raised. However, being a member of the Disasters Emergency Committee, which raises money collectively for five major British NGOs, SCF received a share of money anyway, and felt it could afford to ride on the general coverage rather than needing specific reporting of its own activities.

Geoff Lone, head of the ICRC regional delegation in Nairobi, said the media presence took the pressure off his organization, which had some food stockpiled in Goma before the exodus. 'Because the media was there, other humanitarian actors came ... If the media had not been there, we would have had to get stuck in with [UN]HCR just to keep the situation going ... We would have been left doing more.' ICRC puts a lot of energy into liaising with the media these days, but, because of the ubiquitous nature of the Red Cross logo, the organization's long-established reputation and the fact that it gets money more from governments than private donations, it does not have to be seen to be there quite as much as other agencies. The arrival of other agencies gave it freedom to move on and apply more resources in Bukavu, where there were fewer agencies.

Small agencies and individuals

Aid agency managers do not usually read the newspapers or watch television before deciding they must do something about whatever disaster is featured. But they are susceptible to pressure from their supporters for whom the media is the only source of information. Whereas large agencies have stockpiles and the financial security to borrow against expected income, young and small agencies can only respond to a crisis once they have raised funds. This makes them extremely vulnerable to media interest and means they cannot start doing anything before the media get there.

Feed the Children was founded in 1990 to take gifts in kind from Britain to Romania and Bulgaria; its slogan is 'Taking the Aid Direct.' Its awareness of the importance of news coverage for fundraising is shown by newspaper advertisements that are headed 'Report from Bosnia' or 'Report from Rwanda' and imitate the layout and writing style of a news report. Feed the Children had not worked in Africa before. Goma provided the opportunity.

'By July our supporters were calling to say what were we doing?' said Stuart Crocker, deputy director. 'We are responsive to the wishes and intentions of our supporters. We don't want to let them down ... Being so young, we have no underpinning levels so we are constantly working at keeping fundraising up and we have to focus on activities which raise money.' They launched a Rwanda appeal and raised US$ 600,000 in seven weeks.

In mid-July, Feed the Children sent out two people to see what they could do. Interestingly, they decided Goma was too crowded with NGOs and opted to work in the French Protection Zone where they felt they could make more of a contribution. It was, therefore, the general media coverage of human suffering rather than specific coverage of their own activities that was most important. Their supporters are loyal.

Crocker is keen to stress that they do not want to pack up and leave with the journalists. 'If we did that our integrity would be questionable ... We see our operation as a bridgehead, possibly expanding to Burundi and maybe Angola.' But the short attention span of the media is a problem. 'Seven weeks after we started, the media got more interested in political conferences and money dried up immediately. It was like turning off a tap.' Feed the Children is, however, still working in Rwanda.

Between April and July, better established agencies such as MSF and Oxfam were pushing for more coverage of the background to the crisis – the genocide, the failures of the UN, the need for international action on a political front. Crocker has a different perspective. 'We wish the media would focus more on people, the human side ... In Bosnia, for example, as soon as the political and military viewpoint of the story dies, they discontinue interest in the continuing needs of the people.'

Governments

On 28 July, approximately ten days after the Goma media barrage started on US television, President Clinton held a meeting in the White House with representatives of 15 American NGOs. 'The vice-president was there, the secretary of defence, the deputy secretary of state [for foreign affairs], the head of USAID and the joint chief of staff of the US Army,' said Richard Walden of Operation USA, one of the chosen NGOs.

The media was waiting outside. The meeting was a direct result of media pressure and of lobbying by all of us [NGOs] ... They gave us a presentation – the joint chief of staff said they would do what they had done for the Kurds. They said we should look to them for our transport needs and they'd be pulling water tankers out of the Gulf. They said 3,000 Americans would be involved, including those in Frankfurt, Entebbe and so on.

In fact, the US military effort in Goma was already underway, so the meeting underscored and gave further publicity to US efforts.

The Clinton administration had been criticized in the media for holding up the deployment of UN peacekeepers to try to stop the genocide. This was an opportunity to show the US army saving lives, without the risks of Somalia. Some journalists who saw it as a domestic rather than an international story and who had not followed Rwanda before were easily misled. 'In July there was a story "American troops have secured Kigali airport," quoting sources in Washington. But the airport had been secure for two months,' said Mark Doyle of the BBC.

The British government also sent troops for the aid effort and spent approximately US$ 45 million on the Rwandan emergency in 1994–95. 'There was day in, day out pressure from the media. What can you do? You throw money at the problem. I'm sure we gave more money because of that,' said one official. The British did not concentrate on Goma, but worked inside Rwanda as well from July onward. Baroness Chalker, then minister for overseas development, visited Goma as a side-trip from a planned trip to Uganda at the end of July. Her visit was a big story especially in the tabloid press and provided an opportunity to publicize the aid programme and British NGOs, many of which were funded by the ministry.

It is important to note that NGOs in Goma were looking to governments for funding as much as to the general public. Press officers say that the messages they put across through the media are directed at donors – who are thinking of political capital at home – as much as the general public.

Did the media influence what agencies did?

Within two weeks of their arrival, journalists were wondering whether the refugees should go back. This was mainly because they were looking for new angles after endless reports of overcrowding and cholera, and those who had not covered Rwanda before were beginning to understand the political complexities and implications of the refugees' continued presence in Zaire. Ray Wilkinson of UNHCR was asked quite aggressive questions about UNHCR's policy on repatriation. His response was confused – an accurate reflection of UNHCR's uncertain policy.

Stockton and several other senior aid workers believe UNHCR was diverted into thinking about repatriation when it should have been concentrating on keeping people alive where they were. The WFP got into the repatriation issue by holding up trucks delivering food to Kibumba camp, so that any refugee who wanted to go home to Rwanda could hop on board for the return journey. Only a handful of refugees took up the offer – but it gave flagging journalists a new angle.

The WFP itself provided a different example to illustrate how they resisted media pressure. 'We were pressured by journalists to distribute food, and from a PR point of view we should have pushed a couple of trucks into a camp, but we didn't,' said Brenda Barton, WFP information officer. She said they also resisted the temptation to airlift food —always a more dramatic media concept than trucking – and gave up air slots to allow more urgently needed water equipment to get in.

Publicity stunts

The US army took a different approach, in what has become a classic example of how a publicity stunt during a disaster can backfire. On 24 July, before the world media, three US army C130s airdropped food parcels in a banana plantation somewhere near Katale camp north of Goma. According to Jenny Matthews, a British photographer who witnessed the drop, the parcels contained dirty clothes, Gruyère cheese (labelled 'perishable, needs refrigeration'), ski-mittens, biscuits (labelled 'do not drop'), chocolate and flour from Sainsbury's.

There was no need for an airdrop – food was coming in by road, and there had been a distribution in Katale that morning. The food was obviously inappropriate. Airdrops are expensive. Worst of all, the Americans persuaded CARE to let them have several Action Aid/Assist trucks that were desperately needed to transport water equipment.

The trucks couldn't reach the place where the food had landed, so a French army fork-lift, which had been used for digging graves, arrived with a crane. Machine guns slung across their shoulders, the French troops 'liberated' the chocolate and cheese. CARE loaded some items onto the trucks to take to a warehouse. They dispelled local Zaireans who – encouraged by journalists – had arrived to help themselves. The airdrop was sharply criticized in the American media.

Americares, an NGO based in Connecticut, flew in 10,000 cases of Gatorade, a soda drink containing electrolites preferred by athletes. It was clearly inappropriate, but according to Richard Walden of Operation USA, Americares nonetheless got a favourable mention for acting quickly from Dr Bob Arnott, the CBS medical correspondent, who flew into Goma on the same flight. It was an example of an agency sacrificing appropriateness to act quickly and get into the media spotlight. The New York Times was critical.

Many agencies decided to help orphans and abandoned children, either in Goma or within Rwanda. This decision was often media-driven – children are the most popular subject for stories about human suffering. By contrast, few NGOs or governments wanted to deal with the urgent need for latrines, the least popular aspect of the story. UNHCR had tremendous trouble persuading anyone, including governments, to work on latrines, even though they said it was the most crucial intervention needed after water.

These examples illustrate that the media did influence how agencies operated in Goma. NGOs with set agendas did what they always do: MSF addressed health problems while CARE did camp management and logistics. But some agencies rushed in without thinking properly about what they had to offer. UN agencies and governments revealed themselves to be as susceptible to media pressure as NGOs, despite the fact that they do not rely on the public for donations. They are afraid of bad publicity, which would challenge their legitimacy.

Visibilty and profile

'To the newly arrived, Goma looks as if it is hosting some kind of competition election,' wrote Richard Dowden in the Independent on Sunday. 'Oxfam, Goal, Care, World Vision: WFP, UNHCR blare out their names and logos like soft drink manufacturers ... Echo stickers have appeared on lamp-posts all over Goma.'

Oxfam's water tanks in Kibumba were the largest structure in the camp, and you knew who donated them by reading the six-foot high black letters an the side. 'I got a sign writer in Goma to write OXFAM on the side of the tanks,' said Oxfam press officer Ian Bray. 'It was a backdrop for TV interviews.' The decision provoked a mixed reaction within the organization. According to Bray, locally recruited workers liked the sign and the Oxfam T-shirt they were given to wear, possibly because it gave them a sense of identity and belonging. 'I was appalled,' said Nic Stockton. 'It doesn't make us friends in the media – it's a turn off. The old image is of the Oxfam water engineer in a scruffy T-shirt doing a good job. I think that's better.'

Stockton is right that branding is a turn-off for serious journalists such as Dowden. But if the aim was to get the logo on TV to raise visibility, Oxfam needed to do more. In the first week of the Goma crisis (15–21 July), the Oxfam logo was featured only once on British TV news compared with twelve appearances of the MSF logo.

Tension between fundraisers pushing for visibility and workers in the field guarding their integrity is nothing new, but with the proliferation of NGOs, the stakes were higher. Many agencies say branding is part of security – MSF workers always wear MSF T-shirts so they can be clearly identified in a crisis. But branding has gone to an extreme. 'MSF is over the top on PR – adhesive bandages, needles sticking into arms had the MSF logo,' said Richard Walden of Operation USA after seeing close-ups of the offending bandages on US television.

Press officers

As agencies feel vulnerable to the power of the media, the job of press officers has become more important. Goma marked a watershed, with large numbers of press officers present, leading to great competition for exposure. The fact that press officers are seen as so important in gaining media coverage and, therefore, raising money means their power within their organizations is increasing.

Over the last few years, under the guidance of former UPI bureau chief Sylvana Foa, UNHCR has appointed journalists as press officers. They are inclined toward openness, in contrast with the UN bureaucrat's traditional instinct for silence and obfuscation. Ray Wilkinson, one of the chief UNHCR spokespeople in Goma, used to be the Newsweek correspondent in East Africa, and knew very well what constitutes a story and what journalists need.

'The media is your greatest asset in a crisis and you should be as open and frank as possible,' said Wilkinson. 'If the media is talked to as an adult and they believe you, they are very sympathetic.' UNHCR admitted to mistakes in Goma, and this may have increased their credibility because they were seen to be open rather than trying to hide.

Other UN organizations rushed to keep up with UNHCR. The WFP always had two press officers in Goma, even though food was not the focus of the story. UNICEF had an easy time attracting coverage because orphans and abandoned children make natural, heart-rending TV pictures. NGO press officers took the pressure off water engineers and nurses who needed to get on with the job; their main task, on the other hand, was to promote their organization and boost donations.

The 'war of the press officers' has become legendary, and everyone has a story of a press officer (from another agency) who refused to let journalists talk to 'the opposition'.

The same problems apply with press officers as with branding. Press officers who shamelessly plug their organization, exaggerate the issues and know nothing about the context will alienate serious journalists and attract bad publicity in the quality press. Some agencies take the attitude that publicity is publicity, it doesn't matter if it's good or bad because the mere mention of the name raises profile. However, journalists writing tabloid stories may welcome a simple PR approach of the 'white angel saves dying black baby' kind.

The following analysis of TV coverage in the United Kingdom reveals the success of press officers in getting their view into the media. Several reported that their status and influence within their organization has increased since Goma. 'CARE had never had media coverage like that in the UK before,' said Alison Campbell, CARE–UK media liaison officer. 'We raised 1 million pounds in three or four weeks. The perception was that massive media coverage brought in the money.'

Some of the income was credited to Campbell's budget, an acknowledgement of the central role she played. CARE has been criticized by other agencies for courting publicity before their programmes were established, but Campbell's technique was simple. She was always available, she would talk about almost any aspect of the crisis including the politics, she helped journalists with practical problems such as communication and transport and she was not afraid to be controversial.

This caused tension within CARE. Campbell highlighted the issue of killers in the camps and – during an interview on CNN – criticized the US airdrop.

The next day CARE–USA sent out its PR person on a damage limitation exercise,' Campbell said. 'They'd had complaints from Denver, Colorado saying that CARE was unpatriotic. Within an hour of arriving, the PR officer told us not to mention the killers in the camps ... [Afterwards] CARE did an assessment and said the remarks had caused trouble at the time, but were later shown to be true. It helped us push the idea of advocacy within the organization, which is traditionally conservative.

The most prominent press officers were the most proactive. Samantha Bolton of MSF was in Goma before the influx. She described later how she was at the border at dawn on 15 July when the first large wave came across. By this point, Oxfam and MSF had been predicting the influx publicly for more than a week and were frustrated with a lack of response from UNHCR. 'I ran back to the house and rang the Today programme [BBC Radio 4], the World Service and CNN,' Bolton said. Bolton was not promoting MSF in what she said, but the fact that she, as an MSF employee, was savvy enough to know whom to call and how to tell the story meant she became a sought-after interviewee. (For a week afterward, she had a daily slot on the most popular TV morning news programme in the US, Good Morning America.)

What Bolton did next reveals how NGOs can use the media to pressure the UN. 'I took a journalist from Associated Press with me to the UNHCR house to say the refugees were arriving. I said [to the UNHCR representative], "You'd better get down there." He said, "Why don't you tell them to go up beyond the airport?"' According to Bolton, the HCR representative repeated this even after she had pointed out she had a journalist with her. The journalist went off to write the story of how the UN was unprepared for the influx, despite warnings from NGOs.

Fact inflation

In Goma, there was what Richard Dowden of the Independent has called 'fact inflation'. Ray Wilkinson described how it worked at the daily press conference:

I'd say something and I'd be contradicted down the line. In a lot of circumstances it was a deliberate grab for headlines. MSF announced a study of deaths in Katale. Journalists were briefed to ask a follow-up question. I was asked if I could extrapolate to the whole population – MSF had said you could. Whenever I gave death figures I said that this was ballpark – approximately 20,000 dead. If you extrapolated the MSF figures you got 30,000 deaths. Inevitably they got headlines.

'Speculation inflation' was also an occupational hazard of journalists and aid workers in Goma. Both frequently speculated that the exodus to Bukavu was going to be even bigger and more catastrophic. It was a kind of insurance against being caught off guard as they had been over Goma. The noise of collective excitement drowned out more measured interpretation. One correspondent described seeing several thousand people on the roads leading to Bukavu in mid-August. Her newspaper found on the news wire a quote from an aid worker who thought a million were on the way. The aid worker and the reporter had been in exactly the same place at the same time, but the aid worker's estimate prevailed because it fit the mood of the moment. In the end, the reporter was proved right – but that was after the story had been printed.

Another connected issue was the down-playing of long-term health problems in favour of short-term issues. Cholera, with its resonance of medieval plague and its instant horrific impact, was clearly a major story. Dysentery, which health experts say killed more people over a longer time, was scarcely a story at all. It is inevitable that journalists will report what is happening at the time more than what experts predict. The emphasis on the immediate and things that happen quickly is another hazard of 'real time' coverage. The only way to improve understanding of these health issues is for journalists to become better educated, for aid workers to explain the issues clearly and in a more compelling way.

One problem with Goma was that the catastrophe was so enormous and so sudden that it raised the stakes for other emergencies. It became more difficult for journalists to raise editors' interest in long-term humanitarian disasters such as Sudan or Angola. The only exception was Burundi, which – like a watched pot – refused to boil over in the way journalists and aid workers breathlessly anticipated.

The Goma effect was felt by agencies too: 'It's changed our perspective in that region. Before, 10,000 refugees was a lot,' said Samantha Bolton of MSF. 'Now, if there are 10,000 refugees, we say, let another smaller agency do it.'

High- and low-profile agencies

Cholera inevitably turned attention to medical organizations, especially MSF, even though water and sanitation were in some ways more important in stemming the disease. This is partly because Western culture values medical science over environmental issues. 'Medical aid is sexy – it's like [the TV programme] ER,' said Anne-Marie Huby of MSF. 'And everyone in MSF can talk, even the truck drivers. You don't have to ask Geneva [for permission]. Our people are volunteers. They're very flexible and very young. And we have so many nationalities, we can talk to every journalist in his or her mother tongue.'

Journalists have been criticized for speaking only to foreigners and not to Africans when covering stores like Goma. The criticism is valid, but the pressures of 'real time' reporting mean the problem is likely to get worse, not better. A nurse or doctor working for MSF is familiar with the language of television and knows more or less what the journalist wants. It's a quick and relatively easy exchange. Interviewing African players in the drama is much more time-consuming and complicated. You have to find out who exactly the person is as well as engaging an interpreter. Otherwise, you don't know what question to ask or how to interpret the answer.

Aftermath

In 1995, journalists continued to visit Goma, but obviously in much smaller numbers. Boutroue believes the wide publicity given to the internal UNHCR report by Robert Gersony – which alleged widespread atrocities by the RPF against Hutus – slowed the return of refugees to Rwanda. One can argue that the return was slowed because the report was right (that is, refugees had experienced atrocities so wouldn't return) or because UNHCR commissioned the report (that is, information about the report would have circulated in the camps whether the foreign media got hold of it or not). The impact of media coverage in slowing the return cannot be clearly established.

Despite the debate within aid agencies about the morality of continuing to work in Goma given the presence of killers in the camps, most aid workers there appeared unconcerned about the question. The moral issue of giving succour to killers has not affected the image of aid agencies very much. Although press officers, such as Alison Campbell and Samantha Bolton, spoke openly about the issue from the start, only a few reporters challenged the agencies and negative publicity was minimal. MSF got some publicity when their French and Belgian chapters withdrew, citing moral issues as the reason (actually they withdrew at about the time MSF normally withdraws from emergencies), but the Dutch chapter remained, taking much of the sting out of the tail of their decision.

CONCLUSIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The proliferation of NGOs was a direct result of media coverage. Only when media coverage started in earnest could NGOs raise funds. Goma, with its massive media coverage, thus became an opportunity for smaller, less experienced agencies. This lowered standards and complicated coordination.
   
   
2. Better-established agencies, seeing the influx of new actors, felt they had to guard their market share by promoting their agencies more aggressively. They did not, on the whole, change their programmes, but they used their logo and name as extensively as possible and employed more press officers.
   
   
3. UN agencies are very afraid of bad publicity. UN press officers tried to use the media to improve the efficiency and increase openness in the UN bureaucracy. There are divergent views on whether this succeeded.
   
   
4. NGOs, especially MSF, used the media to pressure UNHCR and other UN agencies to be more responsive and efficient. This had varied results.
   
   
5. Governments responded to the crisis in Goma by sending soldiers. They were 'flying the flag' and tried high-profile interventions that were at times expensive and inappropriate.
   
   
6. In Goma, journalists added to the general sense of chaos but did not significantly disrupt the relief effort.
   
   
7. Because the media were so important in Goma, the power of press officers within organizations increased. Many press officers pushed for agencies to speak out on political issues.
   
   
8. The suddenness and gravity of the Goma crisis, combined with the massive media attention, has dwarfed other emergencies and relief efforts in Africa, with implications for fundraising and continued aid agency interest.
   
   
9. The massive media and aid agency attention paid to Goma helped governments promote their humanitarian aid programme and hide their lack of policy on genocide.
   
   
10. The media coverage of Rwanda hugely increased the public's awareness of aid agencies, but did virtually nothing to increase knowledge of what caused the exodus to Goma or of what happened to Rwanda's Tutsi people and members of the Hutu opposition.

INTERVIEWEES

Interviews were conducted between May and August 1995.

Sue Adams, head of external affairs, Action Aid.

Andy Babcock, head of emergencies, ODA.

Brenda Barton, regional public information officer, World Food Programme, Nairobi.

Chris Beer, chief executive, Helpage International.

Samantha Bolton, regional information officer, Médecins sans Frontières, Nairobi.

Joel Boutroue, head of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees sub-delegation, Goma.

Ian Bray, press officer, Oxfam.

Alison Campbell, media liaison officer, CARE, London.

Stuart Crocker, deputy director, Feed the Children.

Mark Doyle, East Africa correspondent, BBC.

John Grain, head of operations room, Oxfam.

Anne-Marie Huby, executive director, Médecins sans Frontières–United Kingdom.

Sue Inglish, associate editor, Channel Four News,

London. Mike Jermey, head of ITN programming on ITV.

Hanan Kassir, head of international centres,

Operation Blessing. Mike Kiernen, media director, Interaction, Washington.

Geoff Lone, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Regional Delegation for East Africa, Nairobi.

Jenny Matthews, photographer, Network, London.

Colin McCullum, chief press officer, British Red Cross,

Don Redding, press officer, Save the Children Fund, United Kindom.

Larry Register, senior international editor, CNN, Atlanta.

Manuela Rosper, programme officer, CARE–Germany.

Stephen Smith, Africa editor, Libération, Paris.

Nic Stockton, head of emergencies unit, Oxfam.

Nigel Twose, director of international division, Action Aid.

Richard Walden, president, Operation USA, Los Angeles.

Ray Wilkinson, public information officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, London.

REFERENCES

Glasgow Media Group. 1994. British television news and the Rwanda crisis, 15–21 July (part 4). Glasgow Media Group, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.

Gowing, N. 1994. Real-Time Television coverage of armed conflicts and diplomatic crises: does it pressure or distort foreign policy decisions? Joan Shorenstein Barone Centre on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA. Working paper 94–1.

—— 1995. 'Television and Foreign Policy'. In Crosslines Global Report 14–15, April/May. Crosslines, Geneva, Switzerland.

Weaver, T. 1995. 'Prostituting the Facts: Aid and the Media'. In Crosslines Global Report 14 –15, April/May. Crosslines, Geneva, Switzerland.

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