Document(s) 14 of 15

The Inuvialuit are the Inuit (Eskimos) of the Western Arctic Region of the Northwest Territories. Their land claims settlement was legislated under the "Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Claims Settlement Act" in June 1984. Over 3500 Inuvialuit are represented under the IFA, most of them residents of the Western Arctic, living in six communities: Inuvik, Aklavik, Tuktoyaktuk, Paulatuk, Sachs Harbour and Holman (Figure 1).

The Region is approximately 1,300,000 square kilometres (500,000 sq mi) in area, some 90,000 square kilometres (35,000 sq mi) of which are private lands. Inuvialuit harvesting rights apply within the entire Settlement Region.

The implementation of the wildlife provisions of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) is largely an exercise in the co-operative management of resources. There are issues relating to renewable and non-renewable resources, the management of migratory and relatively sedentary wildlife species, institutional structures and paradigms, internal and external conflicts, questions of equity, effectiveness and efficiency, and the enforcement and maintenance of interests and rights.

The IFA created two separate management structures — the Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC) and the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC) — as policy and administrative bodies. The IGC deals with matters that affect wildlife such as renewable resources conservation, management and harvesting. The IRC is a development-oriented body, managing the Inuvialiut private lands and cash compensation. In effect, the IRC is a large firm with business interests and an orientation to increasing the tangible value of the corporation.

Figure 1: Inuvialuit Settlement Region

The relationship between the IRC and the IGC is not explicitly spelled out in the IFA (Robinson and Binder 1991). Rather, there is a deliberate dichotomy created under the IFA, and the means of resolving the conservation and development mandates must be sought internally. This is addressed by the various co-management bodies.

Co-management Systems

Co-operative management systems and institutions emerge when a resource has a number of parties with different interests and rights. Common property is not open-access non-property. It has owners. Communal ownership is that "whereby a community controls access to a resource by excluding outsiders and regulating its use by insiders." The property continuum is, simply portrayed: open-access — state property —common property — communal property — private property. Furthermore, there are "no common property resources, just as there are no private property resources. There are, instead, resources that are managed as private property in one place and as common property in another" (Bromley 1989:871).

We do not attempt to differentiate in our cases between common and communal property; some of the resources in the study area are commonly owned, and others are communally owned. Nor do we attempt to quantify costs and benefits; the co-management systems that we discuss are assumed to seek the most efficient means of addressing issues, subject however to the Inuvialuit tradition of consensus in decision-making, and the transactions costs thereby incurred.

Osherenko (1988) defines a co-management regime as:

an institutional arrangement in which government agencies with jurisdiction over resources and user groups enter into an agreement covering a specific geographic region and spelling out: 1) a system of rights and obligations for those interested in the resource; 2) a collection of rules indicating actions that subjects are expected to take under various circumstances; and 3) procedures for making collective decisions affecting the interests of government actors, user organizations, and individual users.

Pinkerton (1989:5) describes the co-management process:

...by instituting shared decision-making among these actors, co-management systems set up a game in which the payoffs are greater for co-operation than for opposition and/or competition, a game in which the actors can learn to optimize their mutual good and plan co-operatively with long-term horizons.

Pinkerton also outlines seven management functions that a co-management system can perform. If all functions are under the control of the particular system, it is complete; if not, it is an incomplete system. These seven functions are:

1. data gathering and analysis
2. logistical harvesting decisions
3. harvest allocation decisions
4. habitat protection
5. regulations enforcement
6. enhancement and long-term planning
7. broad policy decision-making

Under the IFA, these functions are performed by a variety of co-management bodies under the direction of the Inuvialuit wildlife users, the hunters and trappers in the six Inuvialuit communities, through their Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC).

Inuvialuit Co-Management Bodies

Five renewable resources co-management bodies were created under the IFA to manage specific resource fields under the aegis of the IGC:

1. Environmental Impact Screening Committee (EISC)
2. Environmental Impact Review Board (EIRE)
3. Wildlife Management Advisory Committee for the Northwest Territories (WMAC (NWT))
4. Wildlife Management Advisory Committee - North Slope (WMAC (NS))
5. Fisheries Joint Management Committee (FJMC)

These bodies are charged with specific resource sector issues. The IGC is a policy-making body, referring to advice from both the Hunters and Trappers Committees (HTCs) and the co-management bodies in its deliberations, and reporting back to the communities through the HTCs. In addition to the five co-management bodies and IGC, there is a joint secretariat, which provides technical and administration support to four of the five co-management bodies; WMAC has its own secretariat.

The directors of the IGC are chosen by the HTCs; the directors of the IRC are chosen by the Community Corporations (CCs). The IGC in turn appoints the Inuvialuit members on all joint government/Inuvialuit bodies having an interest in wildlife. Half of the representatives on each of these bodies are appointed by government, with a chairman appointed by government with Inuvialuit approval. The exception to this is the Fisheries Joint Management Committee (FJMC), whose chairman is appointed directly by the committee members.

In this paper we discuss the activities of the WMAC, the FJMC, the HTCs, and the IGC. We review particular examples of co-management agreements, and examine them with respect to species, location and access, and disposition. We look at how the HTC membership provides user observations through the IGC in management and research decision-making.

Cases and Discussion

Table 1 summarizes the data presented in this section.

Bowhead Whales

In September 1991, the hunters of Aklavik fulfilled one long-sought goal: the hunt of a bow-head whale (Balaena mysticetus) for subsistence consumption. This initiative was supported fully by all Inuvialuit bodies, including the IRC and IGC and by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). The co-management bodies provided a means of addressing the request for the quota, and for enabling the hunt itself, but the initiative was clearly an HTC membership effort.

It was the users' own kinship and lifestyle contacts with their Alaskan Inupiat cousins that provided the vital knowledge at all stages of harvest, from achieving the quota to hunting the whale.

Beluga Whales - Domestic

A Beluga Management Plan was developed by Canada and the Inuvialuit in 1991 to manage the stocks of beluga whales (Delphinapterus leucas) that summer in the Beaufort Sea. Prior to the IFA, management was implemented under a variety of federal acts and regulations. After consultations with the HTCs of Inuvialuit communities, the Fisheries Joint Management Committee formulated two goals:

1. to maintain a thriving population of beluga in the Beaufort Sea;
2. to provide for optimal harvest of beluga by Inuvialuit.

The Beaufort Sea Beluga Management Plan addresses the following:

•  determination of sustainable harvest levels;
•  conservation and protection guidelines for development activities;
•  development of bylaws, regulations, and a mechanism for enforcement;
•  guidelines on research and monitoring of public education.

The Inuvialuit harvest of Beluga is about half of the most conservatively estimated total allowable catch. There is no quota; the Inuvialuit traditional management system functions well without it. The FJMC allocates the subsistence quota to the Inuvialuit communities; the HTCs in the communities then allocate these to the beluga hunters. It is the hunters who are the source

Notes:

2/6: DFO regulate non-lnuvialuit; HTC's regulate Inuvialuit.

7/8: Fisheries enforced by GNWT Ren Res (by DFO delegation); marine mammals by DFO

14: Gwich'in involvement is pending Gwich'in Final Agreement ratification/promulgation

15/16: HTC's regulate Inuvialuit in ISR, GNWT Renewable Resources regulate non-lnuvialuit.

FJMC is the only body that directs and conducts research; other bodies advise and monitor its conduct by renewable resource agencies.

(Porcupine): Porcupine Caribou herd.

TAC: Total Allowable Catch

of most of the data. Because they see the value of the information and the need for management, they are critical players in the Plan.

Beluga Whales - International

The Inuvialuit and the Inupiat of Alaska are currently discussing the development of a common management agreement for Beluga. The Alaska Inuvialuit Beluga Whale Committee was formed to discuss the management of the common beluga stock by the Inupiat and the Inuvialuit (FJMC 1991). The close cultural, community and kinship ties between the Inupiat and the Inuvialuit go a long way in simplifying the dialogue and co-operation between the two groups. Here again, the users with their field observations and their traditional knowledge systems are vital to capturing information and enabling the management regime.

Charr

Within the ISR, there are three separately managed provisional stocks of charr (Salvelinus alpinus/malma). One is near Aklavik, the second near Paulatuk, and the third near Holman. Because of a declining charr population, the Paulatuk HTC requested the commercial quota for that area not be allocated, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans complied. There is also an effort to voluntarily limit charr subsistence harvesting.

In 1986, the community of Aklavik, through the HTC, expressed a concern that fish size was decreasing. Prompted by this concern from the community and DFO, the FJMC requested a complete closure of the river to fishing. The river was closed in 1987 and re-assessments are now under way to monitor the recovery of the stock. These user initiatives bode well for conservation of the charr stocks in the ISR.

Whitefish

There are substantial numbers of whitefish (Subfamily Coregoninae) in the Mackenzie Delta. The Uummarmiut Development Corporation (UDC), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Inuvik Community Corporation, is conducting the third year of a five year commercial test fishery, a project designed to establish commercial quotas for whitefish and the commercial viability of such an enterprise.

Key to the success of the project to date is the coordination of research, employment training of local people, and sustainability and viability objectives by the creation of a steering committee comprised of representatives from all groups and agencies (Fricke, personal communication).

The Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) Department of Economic Development & Tourism (ED&T), DFO, and the Uummarmiut Development Corporation (UDC) jointly co-ordinate the project; biological study is conducted by DFO, project management is provided by UDC, and funding is provided by ED&T and Renewable Resources (GNWT), DFO, FJMC and UDC. The training in fish handling is conducted by UDC, on the job. UDC has been progressively taking over co-ordination and management of the field work in the project.

HTC support was required from the communities of Inuvik and Aklavik, as was HTA support from the Gwich'in communities of Arctic Red River and Fort MacPherson. Thus, although the Gwich'in Final Agreement has not yet been enacted and enabled, the Gwich'in are nevertheless consulted through their HTAs. This is cross-claim co-management in action. Closer co-ordination will be required if commercial fishing is implemented.

Grizzly Bear

The Inuvialuit have exclusive harvesting rights to Grizzly Bear (Ursus arctos horribilis) within their settlement region. In 1987 the Tuktoyaktuk HTC expressed concern about over-harvesting. The organization suggested that a quota be established, and the process of implementation began. The management of the grizzly bears in the Tuktoyaktuk area resulted in the first time that a native organization (and user group) enacted wildlife regulations enforceable under government statutes.

The users' own observations were the trigger for the development of a management plan and regime. Because there is such valuable field observation at the user level, clearly there is strong argument for incorporating traditional ecological knowledge into research and management systems.

Polar Bear

Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) is another migratory species. There are at least two discrete sub-populations in the ISR: one in the Banks Island area, and one that ranges between the Baillie Islands in the N.W.T and Icy Cape in Alaska. The Banks Island Polar Bear sub-population is managed in a manner similar to that for the Grizzly Bear case cited above. The international polar bear sub-population is managed through the Polar Bear Management Agreement for the Southern Beaufort Sea (IGC and NSB, 1988). The Polar Bear Management Agreement is:

an international agreement between the Inuvialuit and the Inupiat of Alaska. It was developed pursuant to Articles 2 and 7 of the International Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears and Their Habitat (1976). As the major users of this resource, the Inupiat and the Inuvialuit recognize their unique position to benefit from its management. With the assistance of the WMAC and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, these two user groups have cooperatively developed the management agreement.

The agreement's primary objective is the maintenance of a healthy and viable population of polar bears in perpetuity. It accomplishes this through:

(a) the enactment of hunting regulations to maximize protection of female bears and cubs.

(b) the collection of data on all polar bear harvests.

Other objectives include the minimization of the detrimental effects of human activities, particularly industrial activities, on polar bear habitat, and the encouragement of the wise use of polar bear products and by-products. Efforts to obtain legislative changes are integral to satisfy these objectives.

... In recognition of this agreement, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service officially commended the IGC and the North Slope Borough Fish and Game Management Committee and presented them with an award for their efforts. (Carpenter et. al. 1991)

We cannot overstress the vital role played by Inuvialuit hunters and management systems in this case.

Inuvialuit Renewable Resource Conservation and Management Plan

This conservation and management plan is the result of a co-operative effort by the FJMC and the WMAC. It was endorsed by the IGC and the government bodies involved in co-management. It is the blueprint for acting on the requirements and recommendations arising from the IFA and the Report of the Task Force on Northern Conservation (1984).

The plan sets out a long term strategy for renewable resource conservation and management in addition to providing specific direction to the co-management bodies on issues of concern. A priority of the plan is that local community plans will be developed within the overall ISR plan to highlight local goals and priorities. A community plan has already been developed for Paulatuk (WMAC 1990) and another is under way for Tuktoyaktuk. The other four community plans are to be completed soon.

The Inuvialuit believe that this approach will exemplify the philosophy of the Inuvialuit, for whom the fish, wildlife and other renewable resources are so important. The plan's principles and goals are a good example of co-management in action, reinforcing the traditional stewardship of the land but expressing it in contemporary terminology. Traditional ecological knowledge is embedded in the community plans through the participation of community hunters and trappers, and their participation enables management at the community level.

Commercial Utilization of Renewable Resources

Wildlife harvesting is a consumptive use of wildlife, with three categories of use: subsistence, commercial and recreational. But these distinctions are not easy to make, nor do they occur separately. The Inuvialuit trade different game products among individuals, families and communities; sometimes for cash, sometimes for goods (barter), and sometimes for festive reasons. There is a social dimension to forming and maintaining hunting partner arrangements and bartering ties.

Commercial activities include guided sports hunting (for polar bear, muskoxen and caribou), commercial sales of caribou and muskoxen, and, as the north develops, new activities such as the test fisheries in the Mackenzie Delta.

Renewable Resources Development Corporation

As indicated earlier, the IRC and the IGC are distinct and separate structures with different orientations to development and conservation. Commercial, development activities fall under the purview of the IRC. The Renewable Resources Development Corporation (RRDC), a private corporation, was created in early 1990 by the IRC. Its mandate is to develop viable economic ventures based on renewable resources. Its objectives are to:

1. become a medium sized, diversified renewable resource corporation;
2. develop renewable resource based enterprises that would:
• maximize profit
• provide local employment
• create spin off industries;
3. develop national and international markets for renewable resource products from the Western Arctic region;
4. develop locally the management and administrative structure necessary to support the corporation;
5. support the research and management systems necessary to manage the resource.

The sectors that the RRDC proposed to develop were:

• large scale harvesting of wildlife for edible and non-edible products;
• commercial fisheries;
• tourism, (all aspects including lodges, tours, big game hunting and outfitting);
• restaurant business aimed at northern foods.

The RRDC is currently developing the commercial harvesting of muskoxen on Banks Island. For this, it needs to improve herding, slaughter, handling, processing and marketing techniques.

Structural and Development Issues

There are potential problems in the commercial development of a renewable resource: a single-minded corporate objective may end up competing with subsistence and recreational use and conflicting with conservation requirements. This can be mediated by ensuring local participation at all levels of the corporation. The IFA allows for local control by way of quota allocation by the community HTC. The community also has its say in the commercial development side by way of its management role in the IRC via the Community Corporation.

A potential structural problem is an increased polarization of the CCs and the HTCs since the HTCs are so clearly oriented to resource conservation and the IRC so oriented to development. Over time, as new generations of Inuvialuit become more involved in the modern-day commercial economy, will there be an erosion of the wildlife conservation ethic? Will Community Corporations and Hunters and Trappers Committees naturally become polarized camps of the development/conservation dichotomy? Is there a need for a new community institution, perhaps a Council of Elders?

The IRC/IGC dichotomy may also become more pronounced if the IRC grows along western commercial lines. There are no advisory bodies within the IRC that function quite like the Joint Secretariat, providing general technical management advice and expertise. Individual advisors can thus become powerful forces in influencing corporate management decision-making. Neo-classically minded advisors and consultants may have little time for traditional systems, especially if they are seen to be antithetical to commercial market systems.

Complications Arising from Contiguous Land Claims

Migrating wildlife don't recognize human boundaries. When species are harvested by two or more native groups, their management requires a mechanism that allows for the participation of all concerned groups.

The IFA addresses this need by providing membership on the co-management bodies to non-Inuvialuit native wildlife harvesters with settled land claims. Membership is limited in duration to the resolution of issues of mutual concern, and it is conditional on reciprocity. These groups must provide for equivalent Inuvialuit membership on their wildlife boards.

Because of the potential complexities of three or more parties involved in a co-management issue, the IFA provides for the creation of overlap agreements to specifically define the relationship between native claims groups. The Inuvialuit and the Gwich'in signed an Overlap Agreement in 1984 that deals with wildlife harvesting by Gwich'in within the ISR and by Inuvialuit south of the ISR, until the settlement of the Gwich'in land claim.

An additional item addressed in the Overlap Agreement recognized the Gwich'in claim to the ownership of a block of land within the ISR, and deals in general terms with the principles for mutual consultation in its management and development.

The complication of two land claims being applicable to the same piece of land and the conflicting jurisdictions of the various boards is the topic of a current Overlap Agreement being negotiated between the Inuvialuit and the Gwich'in.

Research

Control by any group or body can seriously hamper the consensus required in co-management. Control can be exercised indirectly, through control of funding. As noted earlier, of the five IFA co-management bodies, only the FJMC can undertake its own research directly. The other bodies only advise on their own research priorities.

The Inuvialuit user orientation to research conflicts with that of academic and government agencies. What the Inuvialuit desire is applied rather than pure research. At the same time, the very existence of Inuvialuit systems seems to create demands from outside the region for more information. Where research, management and regulatory decisions were once made by outside bureaucrats and agencies, these bodies must now consult with the Inuvialuit. It sometimes seems to the Inuvialuit that those outside agencies often demand more information than they used to, and that they expect that Inuvialuit systems should provide this at no cost. The existence of a supplier of information creates demand for information. Students and researchers often seem to expect free and open access to information and time from Inuvialuit bodies.

Conclusion

With reference to to Osherenko's (1988) definition of a co-management regime, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. a system of rights and obligations for those interested in the resource: the Inuvialuit are required to follow conservation principles while holding the rights to subsistence harvest in different species, with protection of these rights under various laws, statutes and regulations.
2. a collection of rules indicating actions that subjects are expected to take under various circumstances: the rules are as clear as can be without being overly rigid and complicated. The IFA is mostly a collection of rules and principles to be followed as issues arise over time.
3. procedures for making collective decisions affecting the interests of government actors, user organizations, and individual users: the processes of consultation are defined in the IFA. Much of the IFA outlines responsibility areas, consultation measures and regimes, and participants in the processes. Each wildlife co-management body makes collective decisions on behalf of the participants and users, with HTCs providing direct input from resource harvesters. Where development/conservation conflicts occur, especially from pressures from outside participants, the EISC and EIRB function as systems for resolution on a more formal basis.

As to Pinkerton's (1989) complete/incomplete systems and the functions of a co-management system:

1. data gathering and analysis: the users themselves, the co-management bodies and the government agencies collect and analyze data for harvest and management purposes.
2. logistical harvesting decisions: these are made at the community HTC level for subsistence hunting, and by the RRDC and the HTCs for commercial harvests.
3. harvest allocation decisions: these are made at the community, the co-management bodies, and the IGC levels, depending on the species and the purpose.
4. habitat protection: this aspect is generally practised at all levels. There is no "tragedy" in the Inuvialuit commons.
5. enforcement of regulations: the HTCs pass their own bylaws and monitor and enforce these internally; the IGC at the general level if required, and the government agencies on a broader level and at the request of the Inuvialuit.
6. enhancement and long-term planning (where to concentrate effort and what future is desired): this is an integrated role among the community HTCs, the co-management bodies and at the IGC/IRC level for the longer term.
7. broad policy decision-making: this is the function of the IGC, with technical advice from the co-management bodies and user advice and input from the communities' HTCs.

We think that the IFA as a total system, linked as it is with the various levels of government and their agencies, is a complete system. It is a strong system. While the IFA has not created a fully autonomous system, it has in a sense made agency arrangements with government: for the Inuvialuit to perform some of the tasks previously undertaken by government, and for the government to perform some of the Inuvialuit's functions by means of its agencies.

We think the success of co-management in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region is demonstrated by the relatively low public awareness of the cases we have described. There is little in the media, usually a good sign of minimal strife, but also little in the academic record. This is unfortunate since we believe a lot has been accomplished over the past seven years since the signing of the IFA.

Traditional knowledge plays a strong part in the Inuvialuit management systems, from data collection and general wildlife observation, to decision-making, to implementation and enforcement of decisions. Without input of data from the users in the field, there would be less information collected at greater cost.

There is a need for greater co-ordination of research effort. There are still researchers working in the North without consulting residents, and whose work conflicts with wildlife harvesting activities. It is not that the Inuvialuit insist on controlling the thrust of research, but that the North is becoming smaller and all activity needs better co-ordination. In the end, however, the Inuvialuit are the landlords of part of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region and the stewards of all of it. Their approval is required for access to their lands.

The serious test of the co-management regimes will come with increased subsistence and commercial demand for particular resources.

We conclude this paper by making a call for the study of active northern co-management systems by the academic community. There is much that could be learned from closer study of the IFA co-management bodies and their successes in the various fish and wildlife management and harvesting issues, for instance. There will be an ongoing and increasing demand for this information in the implementation of future land claims settlements. Efficient systems will be sought to maximize scarce financial and human resources. In fact, there is likely a danger that co-management systems under other claims will be crippled by insufficient funding. Efficiency decisions made by economists may see a tradeoff of the long-term benefits for short-term economy.

References

Berkes, F., ed. 1989. Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development. London, Belhaven.

Bromley, D.W. 1989. Property Relations and Economic Development: The Other Land Reform in World Development vol.17 no.6.

Carpenter, A., B. Hanbidge and R. Binder. March 1991. Co-management of Wildlife in the Western Arctic — An Inuvialuit Perspective. Proceedings of the 56th North American Wildlife and Renewable Resources Conference, Edmonton.

Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V. and Richard C. Bishop. 1975. Common Property as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy. National Resources Journal 15.

Eggertsson, T. 1990. Economic Behaviour and Institutions. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Fisheries Joint Management Committee. 1991. Beaufort Sea Beluga Management Plan. Inuvik, FJMC.

Fricke, G. Renewable Resource Development Officer, Economic Development & Tourism, Government of Northwest Territories, Inuvik. Personal Communication, September, 1991.

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. 1984. The Western Arctic Claim: The Inuvialuit Final Agreement. Ottawa.

Osherenko, G. March 1988. Sharing Power with Native Users: Co-Management Regimes for Native Wildlife. Ottawa, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.

Pinkerton, E., ed. 1989. Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries. Vancouver, UBC Press.

Quiggin, J. 1988. Private and Common property Rights in the Economics of the Environment. Journal of Economic Issues, Vol XXII no.4.

Robinson, M. and L.N. Binder. 1991. The Inuvialuit Final Agreement and Resource Use Conflicts: Co-management in the Western Arctic and Final Decisions in Ottawa. Calgary. Canadian Institute of Resources Law.

Swaney, J.A. 1990. Common Property, Reciprocity, and Community. Journal of Economic Issues, Vol.XXIV No. 2.

Usher, P. 1986. The Devolution of Wildlife management and the Prospects for Wildlife Conservation in Northwest Territories. Ottawa, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.

WMAC and FJMC. 1988. Inuvialuit Renewable Resource Conservation and Management Plan. Inuvik.

Document(s) 14 of 15