Document(s) 9 of 11

Introduction

In the Latin American context, Costa Rica is a front-runner in environmental legislation and policies and the development of institutions responsible for natural resource management. These policies have been especially vigorous with respect to the forest issue; important progress has been made in the past three decades in strengthening reforestation and activities derived from forest use and management, and in designing economic instruments for conservation and sustainable management, among them what is known as the Payment for Environmental Services (PSA) system.

At the same time, however, Costa Rica is one of the region’s most centralized countries, and in the sphere of forest management, this centralization is reflected in the institutional scheme, decision-making and control of earnings generated by the sector. Because strong centralization of all aspects of forest management have not prevented the appearance of the same problems of corruption, lack of efficient controls and shortfall of technical and economic recourses that the majority of countries in the region display, an effort has been made in recent years to find different management initiatives that might reduce these problems.

Decentralization of the state has been totally excluded from the national political agenda. In recent years, important bills have been formulated to decentralize power to the municipal governments, and there is growing awareness of the need to stimulate local participation in natural resource management. In addition, national forest management is going through a period of review in which diverse sectors are pressing for the implementation of legal and institutional changes that permit more efficient management of the forests.

In this context, it is important to understand the current state of forest management in the country and assess the processes that have been implemented to improve municipal participation and to understand the challenges that future decentralization of forest management will face. Although the majority of the municipalities have been largely uninvolved in managing their forest resources, some interesting examples can be found of local governments that have promoted natural resource management initiatives that generally include the forest aspect. These experiences reveal the need for greater participation by municipal governments and local stakeholders in general, even in a very centralized forest management scheme, a need that is being strengthened by diverse factors.

This chapter describes the situation of Costa Rica’s forest resources, the legal and institutional forest management scheme and the role of municipal governments as entities responsible for ensuring the sustainability of the natural resources in the local sphere. A later section describes and analyzes various experiences in which municipal governments have become involved in forest management despite having no direct competencies or the resources required to do so. The diverse elements and incentives that have motivated municipalities to get involved in this issue are analyzed, and the perceptions of diverse stakeholders regarding the municipal governments’ role in forest management are summarized. Conclusions and recommendations that address the accomplishments and challenges of decentralized forest management in the country are presented at the end.

The forest context

SITUATION OF THE RESOURCE

Costa Rica covers an area of 51,100 km², of which 25% (1,284,543 ha) is made up of Protected Woodland Areas (ASP).¹ There are varying levels of protection for the forests in these areas, according to the category of the area. The country’s main primary forests are found within the National Parks and Biological Reserves, which are the categories of absolute protection. They represent 11% of the national territory, for a total of 590,991 ha in which no exploitation or productive activity whatever is permitted (MINAE 1999). Another important percentage of primary forest is found in the indigenous territories, occupying approximately 180,000 ha in the southern and Caribbean areas of the country (Mesa Indígena 2000).

With respect to total forest cover, some data indicate that Costa Rica has succeeded in turning the deforestation rate around considerably. Between the fifties and seventies, the country had an intensive agricultural development policy that increased deforestation and speeded up the loss of forest cover (Camacho et al. 2001). The result was that by the eighties the country registered one of the highest deforestation indices in the world (Camacho et al. 2000); in 1985 it only had a 24% forest cover, with a deforestation rate of 32,000 ha/year (MINAE 2002). By 1997, however, the forest cover had increased to an estimated 40.4% of the national territory², and estimates based on the information updated to 2002 are that it has now reached 45.4%³ (FONAFIFO et al. 2002).

¹ These territories include 132 national parks, biological reserves, wildlife refuges and other ASP categories.

² This study, prepared by the Tropical Scientific Center and University of Costa Rica with financing from the National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO), refers to forest cover, which implies a broader concept than non-intervened primary forest; it includes intervened forest, secondary forest and forest plantations. Some environmentalist groups criticized it, as they felt it did not reflect the true situation of Costa Rica’s primary forests; they noted the existence of much lower figures in studies prepared by other international agencies such as the WWF.

³ This 2002 study, also conducted by the Tropical Scientific Center, this time in coordination with the University of Alberta and FONAFIFO, mentions that the difference in forest cover percentages between 1997 and 2002 is essentially due to differences in cloud cover in the satellite images used in the 1997 study, as well as improvements in detecting dry tropical forest.

Despite these encouraging figures, however, there is still strong pressure on the primary forests. Various studies mention uncontrolled use in areas where there is a greater presence of primary forest: the north and Caribbean regions (Talamanca) and the Osa Peninsula in the southern area (FONAFIFO et al. 2002, Fundación CECROPIA 1999). One of the main forest management problems is illegal felling; recent data indicate that 35% of the timber extracted is done illegally (MINAE 2002).

PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

Both reforestation and forest management received important economic incentives for two decades. In 1979, Costa Rican forest legislation created tax deduction mechanisms, soft credits and development funds to foster economic activity linked to reforestation and sustainable forest use.

The incentive system for forest activities took a significant turn in 1996 with the promulgation of the current Forestry Law,⁴ which eliminated existing incentives and introduced the Payment for Environmental Services (PSA) system. The PSA establishes payments to owners of forests and forest plantations in recognition of the service that conserving or appropriately managing the forest offers to society as a whole (Watson et al. 1998). According to this law, the services recognized are the mitigation of greenhouse effect gases, the protection of water resources and protection of the biodiversity and scenic beauty.⁵

The Ministry of the Environment and Energy (MINAE) administers the PSA system through the National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO). Funding for the system essentially comes from the transfer of a third of the selective sales tax on fuels and hydrocarbons. Other financing sources are the contracts between FONAFIFO and some private companies interested in conservation plus the funds obtained from carbon sequestration, through the Joint Implementation Mechanism.⁶

One of the main criticisms of the PSA is that the payment allocation has discriminated in practice against small farmers and indigenous peasants, above all those without registered property title deeds (Camacho et al. 2000). Given that only owners of forested land who can show title are eligible for the benefit, many small farmers and peasants end up excluded (Estado de la Nación 2000). In fact, the majority of the 501 PSA beneficiaries in 2001 were large landowners, and the area covered was equivalent to 4.3% of the national territory (Estado de la Nación 2000). The result of this and other problems linked to the system’s operational aspects is inequity in the payment allocations (Camacho et al. 2000).

FOREST-RELATED ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Exploitation of the forest and value-added lumber activities contribute approximately US$141 million to the national economy, which amounts to 0.87% of the Gross Domestic Product.⁷ Close to 8,000 businesses in the country are linked to forest management and generate roughly 18,000 jobs (Barrantes 2002, pers. comm.). Because Costa Rica’s forestry sector has made a major effort to certify its activity’s environmental performance, 65,344 ha of forest and forest plantations now use environmental certification schemes of management (Estado de la Nación 2000).

Eco-tourism is another important forest-related economic activity. The international promotion of Costa Rica as a “green” tourist spot has made the forest a valuable tourist attraction. During the 2000 tourist season, 70.7% of those who visited the country went to some protected area (national parks, wildlife refuges and others). It is no accident that 40% of the 120 private reserves associated with the National Private Reserves Network are dedicated to tourist activity (Red de Reservas 1999).

⁴ Costa Rica has had four forest laws: Law 4465, of 1969; Law 7032, of 1986; Law 7174, of 1990 and Law 7575, of 1996.

⁵ Article 3 of Forest Law 7575.

⁶ FONAFIFO has an important financial contribution obtained by Costa Rica for the Joint Implementation Mechanism created by the Climatic Change Agreement to reduce greenhouse effect gasses. The Costa Rican Joint Implementation Office (OCIC) administers the money coming through this mechanism and transfers a percentage to FONAFIFO. There are also numerous contracts through which public and private companies transfer funds to FONAFIFO to pay forest owners near watersheds or aquifers that need protection in order to function.

⁷ These figures were provided by Alfonso Barrantes, Director of the National Forestry Office, and are part of a soon-to-be published study conducted by ONF (2002). The data include the contribution of the value-added activities related to lumber (felling, transport, industrialization, construction and furniture).

Research on the biodiversity of Costa Rica’s forests is also becoming an economic activity promoted by the National Biodiversity Institute (INBio), the entity responsible for promoting sustainable biodiversity use at a national level. Since 1991, INBio has signed biodiversity research contracts with various transnational corporations and foreign universities valued at over US$2 million.⁸

The economic dynamic generated around forests in Costa Rica has sparked the coming together of numerous social stakeholders to support each other, defend their interests and energize the sector from different perspectives. The following insert presents the main groupings in the national forestry sector.

⁸ For information on this national organization, consult: www.inbio.co.cr

Forest sector-related stakeholders in Costa Rica

Institutionality of Forest Management

This section describes the competencies of the State Forestry Authority (AFE) and its main organ, the National Conservation Areas System (SINAC). It also presents an appraisal of SINAC’s deconcentrated structure and its impact on forest management.

THE STATE FORESTRY AUTHORITY

The State Forestry Authority (AFE) is responsible for directing forest management in Costa Rica. It is made up of three entities: the National Conservation Areas (SINAC) and National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO), both of which answer to MINAE, and the National Forestry office (ONF), which is a participatory body for designing policies, made up of various stakeholders from the private forestry sector and ecological organizations.

The Authority’s main functions are exercised through SINAC and are laid out in the Forestry Law,⁹ which in Article 1 establishes as an essential and priority function of the state:

“To care for the conservation, protection and administration of the natural forests and the production, exploitation, industrialization and promotion of the country’s forest resources destined for this purpose, according to the principle of appropriate and sustainable use of renewable natural resources. In addition, it will see to the generation of employment and an increased living standard for the rural population through their effective incorporation into forestry activities.”

SINAC, the most important forestry administrative body with national coverage, is responsible for administering the State Forestry Patrimony¹⁰ and in fact administers all forests in the country, independent of whether they are found within some category of protected wooded area, are in private hands or belong to the municipalities. It should be clarified that the Forestry Law considers as forest any extension of land of two ha or greater with at least 60 trees per hectare.¹¹ The scope and limitations of SINAC’s administration vary, depending on whether the forest is found within some ASP or is in private hands as well as the kind of use being contemplated.

⁹ The legal framework that establishes SINAC’s competencies regarding forest management and administration is very ample: the Forestry Law (1996), the Biodiversity Law (1998), the Organic Environmental Law (1995), the General Wildlife Law (1993) and the National Parks Law (1977).

¹⁰ This patrimony is made up of forests and the forested lands of the national reserves, areas declared inalienable, farms recorded in their name and those belonging to the municipal governments, autonomous institutions and other public administration agencies (Forestry Law Art. 13).

¹¹ The Forestry Law defines a forest as an autochthonous native ecosystem, intervened or not, regenerated by natural succession or other forestry techniques, occupying a surface of two or more ha, characterized by the presence of mature trees of different ages, species and size, with one or more canopies covering over 70% of this surface and having more than 60 trees/ha of 15 cm or more in diameter (Art .3). This definition of a forest is so broad that a forested plantation could be considered a forest if it fits within the suppositions of the cited article, which is totally feasible. Nonetheless, for purposes of forestry exploitation, plantations only require a Management Plan to be eligible for the Payment for Environmental Services. If the plantation is not within the PSA system, it only needs a “certificate of origin,” which is a document prepared by a forestry regent verifying that the lumber exploited comes from a forested plantation.

Any kind of forestry exploitation requires a Forestry Management Plan that establishes the technical conditions to guarantee its sustainability. This plan must be prepared by a forestry regent contracted by the party interested in the exploitation. The management plans drafted by the regents must be endorsed by SINAC and must respect the official requisites and guides.

Forest exploitation in lands not considered forest also requires SINAC’s authorization. Terrain with forest cover of under two ha requires the presentation of a study called a “forest inventory,” which is less technical than the management plan but must contain minimal sustainability criteria for the exploitation and must also be prepared by a regent.

When terrain for agricultural use without forest is at issue, a “Permit to cut trees in pasture,” issued by the Regional Councils of Conservation Areas, is required. The Forestry Law establishes that the municipal governments should grant this permit, but the competency was later transferred to the Councils, though in practice they are currently granted by SINAC because the Councils have not yet been created.

One of the main criticisms of the current exploitation system is the power it deposits in the forestry regents. The Office of Comptroller General has pointed out that SINAC lacks an efficient system for following up on their work (Estado de la Nación 2000). There are also serious criticisms about compliance with the management plans approved by SINAC, since in practice the exploitation limits and norms stipulated in them are not respected. Another limitation of the system is that the forest regents are contracted by the loggers themselves, which restricts their independence (Fundación CECROPIA 1999).

Another of the weaknesses noted is the effective capacity of MINAE/SINAC. A recent study of the factors that encourage illegal cutting in Costa Rica mentions, among other aspects, AFE/SINAC’s limited ability to supervise and control forest management. Some examples of this are the need to go through bothersome formalities to obtain a cutting permit and inadequate control in managing the guides and license plates for transporting timber. The corruption within AFE/SINAC, the fact that it does not visit the exploitation site after the work has finished and the limited capacity and experience of both AFE officials and forestry regents were also mentioned (MINAE 2002).

SINAC’S DECONCENTRATED STRUCTURE

SINAC, created in 1995 through an executive decree,¹² meant an important change in management of the country’s natural resources, since the Wildlife Department, Forestry Department and Parks Service were unified into a Superior Division of the National System of Conservation Areas. The country was divided into 11 conservation areas, and regional departments and sub-regional offices were set up in each one of them. The management competencies and approval of certain procedures were also transferred, as were regional-level permits and forest control. This regionalized organization is unique within MINAE.¹³

¹² Decree No. 24652-MIRENEM of September 20, 1995.

¹³ This reform, which in principle might seem simple, has taken several years, and many SINAC officials feel it is not yet in its final and best form. The reality is that an attempt was made to bring together in a relatively short period three departments that traditionally worked independently and with different orientations.

It is important to clarify that one can speak of regionalizing but not of decentralizing in SINAC’s case, as the regional offices are not autonomous. Although they have the capacity to make some decisions, they depend on SINAC’s Superior Division, located in San José. In fact, SINAC’s deconcentration process has had practical difficulties in consolidating key aspects of its functioning, such as management autonomy and the handling of funds in the regional departments. Furthermore, a good proportion of the important decisions for the areas continues to be handled in a centralized manner¹⁴ (Ferroukhi et al. 2001).

Despite these limitations, however, the creation and regionalizing of SINAC increased the local presence of officials dedicated to forest management and promoted a more direct relationship among MINAE/SINAC, the municipal governments and other local stakeholders.

In an attempt to promote local participation in managing MINAE/SINAC, certain participation arenas were formalized legally. In 1995, the Organic Law of the Environment created Regional Environmental Councils as maximum deconcentration entities under MINAE with the capacity to make policy recommendations and process denunciations, although without specific competencies on forestry issues. In 1998, the Biodiversity Law created Regional Councils of Conservation Areas, with functions more related to forestry management, such as:

• To recommend to the National Council of Conservation Areas the creation, modification or change of category of protected wooded areas.
• To participate in fighting pests and forest fires.
• To recommend the areas that must receive incentives.
• To authorize the cutting of trees in pastureland.¹⁵
• To issue certificates of origin for the timber extracted from forest plantations.¹⁶

In general, the design and functioning of these councils is not very clear and there are duplicated functions, which has made their implementation difficult. Nor has there been sufficient political interest by MINAE to create and consolidate these arenas. In fact, both have had little impact on SINAC’s structure.¹⁷

¹⁴ SINAC’s structure and autonomy were legally formalized with the approval of the Biodiversity Law in 1998. Nonetheless, the dispositions of this new law did not reflect the position of the incoming government (1998-2002), so MINAE itself promoted an unconstitutionality suit against the articles aimed at legally consolidating SINAC. As this action has not yet been resolved, the challenged articles cannot be applied. In practice, then, SINAC does not yet have definitive legal backing beyond its executive decree.

¹⁵ In view of the difficulties of creating the councils, these competencies have not been exercised, so they have been assumed directly by the administration of each Conservation Area.

¹⁶ The region can also extend this certificate, needed for transporting timber off the farm and for its export. At this moment, the councils do not exercise this power.

¹⁷ Indeed, only two Regional Environmental Councils have been created: that of the Caribbean Friendship Conservation Area (ACLACA). and that of the Pacific Friendship Conservation Area (ACLAP).

The municipal government in forest management

THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: STRUCTURE AND INCOME SOURCES

Costa Rica is politically divided into 7 provinces and 81 cantons, or municipalities; an autonomous, decentralized local government heads each canton and must set development policies and priorities for the canton independent of any other state institution. As established in articles 169 and 170 of the Constitution, it is responsible for administrating local interests and services.

The municipal government is made up of a Municipal Council, the maximum political decision-making body composed of council members and district trustees (síndicos) elected every four years, and a mayor, who manages the municipal work and implements the accords coming out of the Council.¹⁸ To discuss specific issues, the Council creates commissions of councilors and síndicos, as well as individuals who participate as advisers but cannot vote. All municipal governments must name an environmental commission. Each mayor’s office has the autonomy to administratively organize itself as it sees fit, and some, though not obliged to do so, have begun to establish environmental offices.

Municipal governments receive 1.28% of the national budget, distributed through specific budget lines assigned by the Legislative Assembly (Solís 2002, com. per.). These assignations represent a small percentage of the municipal budget, which depends far more on other categories:

• Loans
• Other public sector transfers
• Rates charged for providing public services (street cleaning, garbage collection, etc. )
• Charges for construction permits and functioning of economic activities (patents)
• Land tax charge
• Environmental charges¹⁹

To understand municipal governments’ political role, it is necessary to analyze the nature of their autonomy and decentralization.²⁰ Although the Constitution defines them as decentralized and autonomous entities, the issue of municipal autonomy has been controversial, since Costa Rica is a very centralist country and this is reflected in the central government’s real power with respect to the municipal governments.²¹

¹⁸ As of 2002, mayors will be directly elected by the communities. Up to now, they have been elected by the Municipal Councils, which generated instability, as it made them very susceptible to the internal conflicts among the different political tendencies.

¹⁹ These charges are linked to natural resource management within the municipal territory and are described in a later section.

²⁰ See Constitutional Bench votes 2394 of 1993 and 5445 of 2001.

²¹ In addition to the ministries, there are autonomous institutions that enjoy a functional decentralization with respect to specific themes, such as provision of public services or social or agrarian development policies; these institutions generally act on behalf of national rather than local interests

Municipal autonomy in natural resource management is consequently very limited. In most cases, the competencies of the Ministry of Environment and Energy and other institutions involved in the issue are much broader and more direct than those of the municipalities. Specifically on forest affairs, the balance of power is very negative for the municipal governments.

DESCENTRALIZATION AND MUNICIPAL STRENGTHENING

Unlike in other Latin American countries, social pressure to decentralize decision-making and strengthen the municipalities has been weak in Costa Rica. Despite that, these concerns have had some impact on the political sectors and have been gaining space on the legislative agenda (Rivera 1999). In the past decade, there have been some legal changes to strengthen the municipal governments’ role, particularly increasing their sources of income and reforming the Municipal Code to streamline their management. The following insert lists the main changes geared to strengthening municipal government and decentralization in recent years.

Legal changes to strengthen local government

²² The collecting of this tax implies that the municipal governments have the technical capacity to maintain a registry of all real estate in the canton, their owners and an exact appraisal of the terrain, and have sufficient personnel and an efficient tax collection system, a capacity that does not even exist at the national level. It also requires an important investment in computer equipment, cadastre and terrain appraisal. The task is especially difficult in some cantons that have natural forest such as Osa, in the Southern Zone, because they are rural municipalities with limited budgets and unlimited land tenure problems.

²³ A project to strengthen the cadastre system and thus help municipal governments conduct the tax collection task better to increase their revenue will be financed through an Inter.-American Development Bank (IDB) loan that the Legislative Assembly approved in December 2001.

²⁴ The most important resistance came from the unions of the public institutions, which feared for their labor rights based on the legislation permitting officials to be transferred from the public institutions to the municipal governments. The transfer of competencies was also seen as part of the “dismantling of the state,” and the municipal governments, by their political nature and inefficiency, were viewed as unable to assume these competencies.

MUNICIPAL FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The most important backdrop to the issue of municipal management and forests was the 1996 approval of the current Forestry Law, which gave municipal governments the possibility of granting cutting permits for trees in pastureland. According to that law, municipal governments could grant permits for a maximum of 20 trees for unforested agricultural land, but this competency was eliminated only two years later due to problems that arose in practice and pressure from central and regional MINAE officials, the Chamber of Forestry and the National Forestry Office. It was transferred to the Regional Councils of the Conservation Areas, created by the Biodiversity Law,²⁵ and at the same time, the conditions for getting a cutting permit were changed and the number of trees was reduced.²⁶

²⁵ MINAE currently exercises this competency, since the majority of the councils have not yet been set up.

²⁶ The permit for cutting trees in pastureland is only authorized for a maximum of three trees/ha and a total of no more than ten.

The argument used to eliminate this competency was the municipal governments’ lack of technical capacity, corruption problems that appeared among the foresters assigned and in the methods local political interests used to influence the granting of permits. Effectively, there was a great deal of abuse and several municipal officials were formally accused of corruption (Wo Ching 2002, pers. comm.).

The truth is that the competency was assigned to the municipal governments without providing the minimum conditions to make its application effective. No clear and detailed mechanisms and procedures were designed; the needed training and advice was not provided and the technical and economic resources were not forthcoming. For example, the municipal governments depended on SINAC’s good will for resources and time to receive training, so few got access.

With no directives, each municipal government autonomously set up the internal organization to implement its new responsibility and, with few exceptions, they did not work well. For example, some assigned the same inspectors who granted function permits the task of controlling and granting cutting permits; in the municipality of San Carlos, in the northern area, the Department of Municipal Parking Department got the job of giving the permits.

Due to the lack of resources, each municipality had to get what it needed with its own meager budget. Some did not even have vehicles for the inspections or money for travel expenses, so they had to negotiate the payment of these expenses with the permit applicant (Chávez 2002, com. pers.).

Another strategy was to contract forestry regents as outside consultants, but this practice generated no technical capacity within the municipal government and the consultant was the only beneficiary. Such was the case of Matina and Talamanca, in the Caribbean region, where there is immense forest wealth. In those municipalities, a forestry regent was contracted as an outside consultant to handle all the paperwork for the permits and was even in charge of getting Municipal Council approval. As a result, the municipal governments did not directly manage the granting of the permits or the control and did not even have a record of the permits given out (Mora 1999).

Despite these limitations, however, the provision of this competency mobilized a series of interesting initiatives in some local governments that had very positive effects for forest management and the strengthening of municipal governments as actors in natural resource management. Some of these achievements were:

• Creation of environmental offices and even of forestry units in some municipal governments. In several cases, very positive agreements were approved. For example, the Sarapiquí Municipal Council created an environmental office and opened a salary line for a forestry engineer to assume the competency transferred to the municipal government (Ferroukhi 2001). When it was withdrawn, the post was maintained and the environmental office continued functioning.
• Drafting of joint work agreements with MINAE/SINAC. In San Ramón, such an agreement involved MINAE/SINAC transferring one of its officials to collaborate in the forestry work and natural resource protection. The Environmental Commission and Environmental Office were also created and are functioning with excellent results. Both the agreement and the relation between MINAE/SINAC and the municipal government are still in effect.
• Technical training exchanges between regional SINAC and the municipal governments, which in some cases achieved greater closeness and communication between MINAE and the local governments. In Sarapiquí, the environmental office collaborated fully with MINAE/ SINAC and even coordinated the review of Forestry Management Plans, which were the ministry’s exclusive responsibility.

In general terms, however, the transfer of this competency in the conditions in which it occurred weakened municipal forest management rather than strengthening it. Despite the positive experiences, the errors committed deligitimized the municipal governments with the national stakeholders in forestry management and generated strong resistance to any other attempt to repeat the experience.

CURRENT FOREST COMPETENCIES

To eliminate the direct competency assigned through the Forestry Law, municipal forestry competencies were pared down to general coordination directives with MINAE/SINAC. In general, MINAE/SINAC handled all technical procedures for forestry exploitation and the forest management regulating and controlling in activities its headquarters and regional and sub-regional offices. The following insert summarizes the current municipal forest management competencies.

Summary of the municipal forest management competencies

²⁷ So far there is no example of the creation of a natural monument, only a bill promoted by the Sarapiquí municipal government to declare the Río Sarapiquí basin as one.

Municipal experiences in forest and environmental management

This section describes some experiences of municipal coordination and of participation in natural and forest resource management. Despite the lack of direct incentives, municipal governments have a natural relationship with the forests and with those who have a stake in local forest management. For that reason they are perceived as a necessary referent and both SINAC and the regional producers’ organizations have promoted closer relations with them, despite their having no direct competencies in the issue. In addition, local organizations pressure the municipal governments to intervene in managing the environmental problems.

Experiences in which local governments participate in forest management are specific cases that obey various factors, since the municipalities have very diverse realities. There are municipalities with a large expanse of forested territory and others with strictly urban problems and virtually no forest. In general, the municipalities with forest resources are found in the regions with less economic development and more social problems (southern, Caribbean and northern areas), so their technical and financial resources are minimal. Furthermore, municipal governments tend to get involved in initiatives linked to the environment in general and not with an exclusive aspect such as water or forest.

Some experiences promoted by SINAC to coordinate more closely with the municipal governments are described below, together with the factors that push local governments to get involved in specifically managing their natural and forest resources. At the end are experiences in applying the mechanisms created by the forest management law to attract economic resources.

Document(s) 9 of 11