Document(s) 6 of 11

Introduction

At one time, the urban poor no longer had to struggle against directly coercive attempts at removal, but evictions were still threatening those living in "free-standing" informal settlements (those located outside the boundaries of formal townships); in backyard shacks (shacks in backyards of formal houses in the townships); inner-city rented apartments; and private housing (with financial linkages mainly to banks). The experience of eviction was common at one time or another to all communities living in the settlements discussed in this paper. These communities were engaged in struggles against attempted removal, threat of demolition, and attack, as well as in struggles for survival, more land, affordable and secure housing, decent services, access to the urban economy, and democratic representation.

State urban policy

After 1986, although state urban policies had changed, many still had profoundly negative consequences for the majority of South Africans. It became increasingly apparent that the state was still using a variety of mechanisms to control the access of black people to the urban areas. These mechanisms included ostensibly nonracial legislation pertaining to health standards, slums, and illegal squatting; more directly, the state used coercive means.

In addition, economic and market forces were used to divide the cities in ways that favoured the interests of the traditional apartheid elites — access to the cities was increasingly being defined in terms of levels of income. The South African state had adopted a policy of privatization of the supply and ownership of housing, thus putting most new housing projects out of the reach of low-income (black) South Africans. Resistance from middle-class white (and sometimes black) property owners, expressed in terms of "standards" and "property values," urban policies, and attitudes within the private sector, in no way contributed to addressing the effects of forced removals over the previous nine decades.

In February 1990, with the legalization of organizations like the African National Congress (ANC), a new era began in South Africa. The concept of orderly urbanization, which was adopted in 1986, began to take on a more central role in policy-making. Urban policy began to focus on creating more efficient cities. For example, the inefficient and highly subsidized transport system took people from marginal formal and informal townships to centres of employment invariably at great distances from residential areas. Recent state-commissioned studies have called for better managed, orderly, and more efficient compact cities.

The state (in the form of the four provincial administrations) was caught between the desire to be seen to deliver something to the homeless, in the event of forthcoming national elections, and to be sympathetic to, and protect the rights of, the propertied classes, predominantly in South Africa's formerly white residential areas. Caught in this dilemma, the state responded to crises by encouraging local negotiations but had no overall planning framework. It seemed unwilling to commit itself to either side. If one followed closely where delivery was taking place, it was in apartheid-designated African areas, many of which were inaccessible to urban opportunity or on the periphery. The effects of this approach included the displacement and marginalization of certain groups of urban residents (particularly the unemployed and homeless), bad living conditions, the fragmentation of existing communities, and the heightening of social, cultural, economic, political, and spatial divisions within and between urban communities.

Legal framework²

The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (ARBLMA), which became law on 30 June 1991, provided for the repeal of most legislation in South Africa that restricted access to land, and hence access to the city, on the basis of racial classification. Included in the laws repealed was the notorious GAA, which set aside areas for exclusive occupation by members of certain racial groups. As a result, racial segregation of South African cities by law no longer applied, and it was legally possible for black South Africans to live in the formerly white areas. However, the ARBLMA provided no enforcement procedures, and many landlords still refused to allow black South Africans to rent accommodation in the formerly white areas. No legal mechanisms existed to challenge this informal racial segregation, and often the result was chronic overcrowding in areas where it was possible to rent. This overcrowding was due to a lack of accommodation, as well as to exploitatively high rents. These were made possible by the gradual phasing out of the Rent Control Act, of 1976, which had previously ensured relatively affordable rents and linked rents to maintenance levels.

Various pieces of legislation, such as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (PISA), of 1951, remained on the statute books and were vigorously enforced to prevent land invasions and the like (the Trespass Act, of 1959, was also used extensively to prevent informal settlements). However, Supreme Court decisions regarding the eviction of squatters helped to lessen the draconian affects of PISA, and it was unusual to hear of a court ordering the removal of squatters unless alternative accommodation or land was available for resettlement.

Before the ARBLMA was passed, diverse legislation governed the development of land in various racially zoned areas. In each of the four provinces, provincial ordinances governed the township-establishment process in white, "coloured," and Indian group areas. By contrast, in African townships the process was set out in the now abolished Black Communities Development Act, of 1984, and regulations were promulgated in terms of that Act.

The procedures in the provincial ordinances were extremely time consuming and could take up to 2 years, sometimes even longer, to complete, so they were accordingly highly inappropriate for the establishment of townships for low-income housing. To address this problem, a new Act was passed, the Less Formal Township Establishment Act (LFTEA), of 1991, which allowed for speedier township-establishment procedures, regardless of the situation of the land.

LFTEA made delivery of serviced, registerable sites possible at reduced costs, but it failed to address various issues affecting access to the cities. For example, it neglected to address the availability or costs of well-located land. The authorities could expropriate land, and LFTEA could be used even within the boundaries of the white towns (where most well-located land was to be found), but such land remained highly priced, and expropriation laws required that full market prices be paid if the state decided to expropriate land for low-income housing developments. As a result, when such developments did occur, they tended to be on the peripheries of the cities.

Furthermore, LFTEA placed no obligation on the authorities to develop land for low-income housing (and especially not the richer white local authorities [WLAs], which had for years failed to address, or even help address, the chronic housing shortage and poor services for Africans in the African townships adjacent to the white towns). Thus, although LFTEA may well have facilitated low-income developments, it did nothing to ensure they were carried out, nor did it create rights to housing for homeless people in and around the cities.

On the whole, the legal system, even though it was then purportedly racially blind, did not promote access to the cities for the poor. This was troubling enough. It was a problem that could only be addressed through a major overhaul of the legislative framework, as well as the common law, to shift the balance of the laws in favour of the poor. But without strong indications that any future Bill of Rights in South Africa would include a right to property, the likelihood of the law facilitating access to the city for the poor seemed remote.

Interests and actors in the Witwatersrand region

Local authorities

Black local authorities (BLAs) were established in 1982 through the Black Communities Development Act. They were subject to tight control exercised by provincial authorities and central government. BLAs were financially unfeasible because they were responsible for low-income dormitory towns with no commercial or industrial tax bases. They were unable to effectively exercise power and were generally unable to deliver municipal services. The situation was exacerbated by the widespread boycott of rent and service charges and by the fact that low-income communities were located outside the major tax bases.

BLAs were targets of popular resistance from their outset. Councillors were not representative of major political parties. Participation in elections was negligible, and many councillors resigned their posts. Those town councils no longer served by councillors were run by state-appointed administrators.

Provincial administrations

Regional services councils

An RSC had all the powers and duties of a local authority, and these came into effect when the provincial administrator declared that a particular local authority was unable to perform a given function. RSCs were also meant to assume responsibility for services and functions deemed to be regional by the administrator. In practice, the most prevalent function of RSCs was the subsidization, rather than substitution, of BLA functions.

The civic movement

Civics represented residents on township issues and organized on a residential basis. Some were based in formal housing, others in the backyard shacks. There are, however, many areas of homeless people, especially in the free-standing shack areas, that were not well organized by any civics. Civics differed in terms of size, strength, capacity, and leadership — ranging from the likes of the Soweto Civic Association or the Alexandra Civic Organization (ACO), which had high-profile leadership and strong links with the national liberation struggle, to the weaker civics in smaller centres, whose concerns might be more focused on local issues.

Between 1986 and 1992, the organizational efforts of the civic movement included mass actions, such as the boycott of rent and service charges, the campaigns against unelected and unmandated BLAs, and local-level negotiations between civics and the state on the question of development. During 1990 and 1991, as the crisis of BLAs intensified, a series of local-level negotiations began, especially in Transvaal province. The Greater Benoni Forum (GBF) and the Alexandra Joint Negotiating Forum (AJNF) were examples of such initiatives. The primary forum for negotiations of the future local government for the central Witwatersrand area was the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber. Through these forums, civics were increasingly linking specific local-government concerns with broader development issues, like inadequate land, housing, and services (Coovadia 1991). Struggles were waged for nonracial democratic local government and urban-development policies that reflected the needs of the cities' poor.

In the 1990s, subregional, regional, and national associations of civics were established. In Johannesburg, the Civic Associations of Johannesburg (CAJ) comprised 11 civics, including the ACO, the Soweto Civic Association, the Action Committee to Stop Evictions (ACTSTOP), Eldorado Park, Lenasia, and Klipspruit. The Civic Associations of the Southern Transvaal was a regional federation of civics in the southern Transvaal and included CAJ. The South African National Civic Organization was launched in March 1992.

Community struggles in the Witwatersrand about housing and evictions were also raising national political issues such as the democratic representation and rights of the homeless, the unpropertied, the unrepresented, the poor, and the unemployed. The urban poor struggled for access to the city and the potential opportunities afforded by some urban areas. The spatial form of the apartheid city ensured that access was skewed in favour of the traditional apartheid elites, thus disadvantaging the poor and working-class communities. Their struggles were to overcome the effects of decades of social, economic, and political peripheralization, including forced removal and eviction under apartheid. Examples are the following:

• The struggle of informal settlers against relocation, such as in the case of Phola Park;
• The struggles of people against eviction for not paying their rent, such as in the Johannesburg inner city;
• The struggles of backyard shack dwellers to maintain a foothold in the urban system, such as in Alexandra;
• The struggles for more land in overcrowded townships, such as Wattville; and
• The struggle for proper democratic consultation in the drafting of new legislation — not public-participation window dressing that looks fair on paper but gives communities no power in legislative decision-making. 

Unlike most black townships in South Africa, Alexandra and Wattville were relatively well located for employment opportunities, urban facilities, transport nodes, etc. Both escaped deproclamation in the heyday of grand apartheid planning. However, the two townships were extremely overcrowded. Berea, Hillbrow, and Joubert Park were reserved for white settlement. In the 1970s, despite racial legislation, black people began moving into these areas of the inner city from the reserved towns on the urban fringe. The inner-city residential buildings were in poor condition, with little or no maintenance or upgrading. Figure 1. The Witwatersrand region informal ("squatter") settlements. Source: Planact (1992).

Phola Park was an informal community that had undergone immeasurable hardship. Shacks had been demolished countless times, and the community had experienced excessive levels of violence. The most basic services were in large part nonexistent.

The form of tenure inside the boundaries of black townships in formal housing units was rental (from the council) or purchase (99-year leasehold or freehold in areas of townships). In most cases, backyard shack dwellers rented from the prime tenant. If the formal house on the stand³ was rented from the council, the backyard shack dwellers had a normal landlord–tenant relationship with the occupier of the house. There was no legal recognition of this kind of tenure. It was an informal-lease arrangement with the person who had occupation. In other cases, less frequently, the backyard shack dweller rented directly from the council. This was the case in Alexandra.

Residents of informal settlements had no legal rights in terms of PISA, unless the area was designated in terms of LFTEA. According to section 6 of PISA, "squatters" could be granted the right to stay in a declared transit camp with the intention of removal at some point. If an informal settlement was declared in terms of section 6A of the same Act (which has mow been abolished in favour of LFTEA), "squatters" could stay and the area would be upgraded. LFTEA allowed a freehold form of tenure, with no form of leasehold or rent. In most shack areas, a landlord–tenant relationship existed, although it was illegal. For example, a farmer might rent out land for people to occupy "informally" — a process known as "shack farming." Sometimes relations developed within the community in which access to sites was controlled by "shack lords" in exchange for political patronage. Sometimes occupation of the site was against the will of the owner.

In the inner-city areas of Johannesburg, most relations between landlord and tenant were private. Some council housing was available, but it had been developed mainly for white occupation.

Wattville⁴

Introduction

Families occupied formal houses, rented rooms, and lived in outbuildings in Wattville. In Tamboville (the site of one of the land invasions to the south of the old township) most households occupied shacks. About 21% of households in Wattville comprised more than 10 people. Some stands were occupied by more than 30 people (Social Surveys 1991).

Of Wattville's economically active population, about 80% worked in nearby Benoni, Boksburg, Germiston, or Wattville. About 20% of Wattville's population could walk to work (Social Surveys 1991). These statistics reflect Wattville's optimal location, especially in comparison with other townships reserved for black settlement.

Throughout its relatively long history, Wattville saw numerous attempts to remove its residents, especially frequent in the period between 1968 and 1985. Efforts were made to move the Wattville population to Daveyton, a township on the metropolitan periphery, in conformity with apartheid social and spatial engineering. In some cases attempts were made to remove the population to the "independent," self-governing homelands.

Residents continuously struggled for more land to alleviate extremely overcrowded living conditions. However, the authorities consistently failed to respond to the needs of the majority of people living in Wattville. The most successful form of delivery was land invasion. Indeed, Wattville itself only came into being through the illegal occupation of some council-built houses in 1941.

Land invasion: a strategy for gaining access

• The land invasion of Tamboville in 1990 successfully forced the Benoni Town Council (BTC) to respond to the crisis of land and housing in Wattville; and
• The land invasion of Enkanini in 1991 led to a court ruling preventing the Wattville Town Council (WTC) from evicting the residents and the allocation of additional land, called Tamboville 2. 

Very little land was vacant or undeveloped in Wattville. Tracts of vacant land within Wattville had been sold to private developers by WTC, despite the need of Wattville's low-income population. WCRC had repeatedly attempted to engage the BLA with its demands. Mass demonstrations were held for more land and housing. Finally, in June 1990, at a mass meeting to discuss the acute housing shortage, the community agreed that people would start erecting shacks on an open site to the south of the township owned by BTC and earmarked by WTC for recreational use or, as the residents feared, for sale to private developers for middle-income housing. The site was named Tamboville, after the former president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, who lived there until he was exiled (see Figure 2). At this stage, WCRC drew up a waiting list of their own, as the council would not permit them to see the official waiting list. An allocation committee was elected, and people living in backyards and overcrowded houses were registered.

However, on the day when residents, led by WCRC, marched to the vacant land to the south of the township to mark out sites, they were blocked by police. Although the Benoni town clerk had apparently given assurance that no arrests would be made, police fired tear gas into the crowd and arrested 34 people for trespassing. Residents gathered in Wattville after the arrests and decided to return to the site, erect more shacks, or hand themselves over to the police. Fearing a march on the police station, BTC suggested to the police that those arrested be released.

At another mass meeting in July, WCRC agreed on a set of demands to be tabled with BTC. BTC agreed to meet with WCRC, provided that no more shacks were erected. To the surprise of the WCRC, BTC granted permission to the residents, represented by WCRC, to remain. The council's decision was historic. Not only had it avoided the familiar town-council response of shack demolition, but it had ignored the legal technicalities — this land was in a white area. The media labelled it "The Benoni Option." The Benoni town clerk appeared on national television, and WCRC and BTC gave a joint press conference.

BTC also resolved to allocate two million ZAR from its capital development fund, for the installation of water and sewerage facilities, which would be recovered from the residents over time, and to develop 659 sites at Tamboville (in 1998, 4.4 rand [ZAR] = 1 United States dollar [USD]). It was agreed that a properly planned township would be laid out in the area, and a joint technical committee (JTC) was set up for this purpose. The JTC, comprising BTC and WCRC, assumed responsibility for the administration of the Tamboville project. The WLA's recognition of a civic, reflected in equal representation on the JTC, was a historic political milestone.

Tamboville 1, 27 ha of land, accommodated about 4 500 people. At this time, WCRC felt that section 6A of PISA was seen by WCRC as the best mechanism for township establishment, although it had always been used to forcibly remove poor people and exclude them from access to the city. The alternatives, either the township ordinance procedure or the Black Communities Development Act, were seen as restrictive means to township establishment. With new legislative procedures, the township was likely to be proclaimed under LFTEA. Although the process was conflict ridden, people living in Tamboville 1 finally acquired for themselves relatively secure tenure on additional land. This sense of security was reflected in the construction of many permanent structures.

Subsequent to the Tamboville invasion, however, no additional land was made available. About 80 of Wattville's homeless families moved onto Enkanini in November 1990 (see Figure 2), despite knowing that the land was geotechnically unsuitable. The land was not invaded to establish permanent settlement but to force a response from WTC. Although the land was meant for new council offices, the BLA intended selling off the land. The new owners, backed by WTC, brought an urgent court application to evict the squatters. In the ensuing legal battle between WTC and WCRC, the court ruled that suitable land had to be found within or near Wattville to accommodate those people living at Enkanini before anyone could be asked to move. The magistrate effectively prevented the forced removal of the settlement while making a provision for the allocation of a physically suitable site.

Accordingly, another piece of land, 3 ha, was made available adjacent to a dried-fruit-packaging plant. The community called it Tamboville 2. The land was owned by BTC, WTC, and the dried-fruit plant and fell under the municipal jurisdiction of WTC. Although BTC consented to having settlement on its portion of the land, the dried-fruit company and WTC were less willing. People were living there, but formal development could not occur at this stage. Money for the development of Tamboville 2 was raised from the Independent Development Trust (IDT). Soon after, 550 people, 82 households, settled on about half the land.

The civic led another invasion onto a piece of land to the southeast of Wattville overlooking a lake within WTC jurisdiction. WTC requested the group of about 30 families to leave immediately. However, Lakeview seemed established (see Figure 2). Households had invested in semipermanent infrastructure. The residents had graded roads and tapped into a water source nearby.

WCRC secured an agreement with BTC to investigate a portion of land adjacent to Wattville for future occupation for low-cost housing. Although the residents who had settled on sites where official approval was still pending had absolutely no intention of leaving (and a good historical record to bear them out), their position remained uncertain. However, in comparison with negotiating for land, the planned land-invasion strategy had proven quick and efficient in Wattville.

The struggle against an illegitimate local authority

In addition to losing rent and service charges, WTC was being squeezed out even more by its absence from negotiations leading to the historic acceptance of the Tamboville settlement. It was further marginalized by the administrative arrangements between WCRC and BTC with regard to Tamboville. Also, in making the land available to the residents of Wattville, Benoni had rescinded an agreement to sell the land to the WTC, which wanted it for residential use. All local authorities were seen by the majority of South Africans as apartheid structures, and the calls for their dissolution were part of the demands made by civics throughout the country in the struggle for access to the city. For WCRC, both BTC and WTC were nonrepresentative and lacked legitimacy. However, WCRC perceived BTC as the real source of power in the city. To access this resource, it was necessary to resist the BLA (examples of such resistance are the Tamboville 1 invasion and the rent boycott).

The strategy of engagement: the Greater Benoni Forum

WCRC was still calling for the resignation of WTC, represented by the call for "One Town, One Council," which encapsulated the demand for nonracial, liveable urban areas, in which economically functional geographical spaces were united. WCRC's participation in GBF connected this localized response to the illegitimacy of all BLAs. The division between Wattville and Benoni was, as in all apartheid "twin" towns, an artificial distinction, as they constituted one urban reality. Although WCRC continued primarily to articulate demands borne out of the particular conditions of its Wattville constituency, participation in GBF placed its demands in the East Rand metropolitan context.

The forum had representation from two civics in the subregion, WCRC and the Daveyton Interim Committee, the local authorities in the subregion (BTC, Daveyton Town Council, and WTC), and the regional authority (the Transvaal Provincial Administration [TPA]). The issues it dealt with were the provision of services, development, and the establishment of interim administrative arrangements. In this connection, WCRC articulated its call for a single city.

As a result of negotiations in GBF, agreements were entered into in November 1991. With reference to Wattville, BTC would act as agent for WTC in the provision of essential services to Wattville. These agreements were conditional on the BLAs transferring houses to the residents who rented them and writing off arrears rent and service charges. The agency arrangements were negotiated and agreed on. However, negotiations broke down over dissatisfaction with implementation. In 1993, negotiations were close to a deadlock and the forums had been suspended. Only one ad hoc committee was operative, and it was investigating ways to make progress.

The Wattville Concerned Residents Committee

WCRC had a civic executive with portfolios, subcommittees (land, finance and administration, negotiations and technical, unemployment, health, and amenities), and area committees broken down into seven zones. Wattville was therefore noticeable for the absence of organizational forms such as street committees, but area committees had been able to include all those interested in participation. Wattville was not caught up in insurrectionary politics of the period in which many street committees were developed for defence. Wattville consequently never had to face transforming defence committees into structures to advance development issues. WCRC was well resourced. These resources were financial, but they also comprised skills and expertise drawn in from outside the community. Such resources enabled WCRC to increase its capacity and to deliver to the community, for example, a site layout plan for Tamboville 1.

In mid-1989, realizing the futility of attempts to approach WTC about the increases in rent and service charges, WCRC approached lawyers to petition the relevant minister for a Commission of Enquiry into the affairs of WTC. WCRC also approached Planact with a request for research and education on land availability, density, optimal land use, the sale of council houses, rent, service charges, conditions of service provision, and local government finance. Subsequently, WCRC engaged the support of a range of service organizations in the field of education, training, health, and job creation. This support varied, ranging from financial support to advice or skills. Financial resources were secured from BTC, IDT, a French nongovernmental organization, and a variety of other funding agencies, both local and foreign.

WCRC ensured that appropriate community structures were in place to facilitate community-controlled development. For example, a JTC was established during the meetings and negotiations that occurred following the Tamboville invasion. This JTC was to deal with issues of planning, finance, and local government and to be guided by agreed-on terms of reference. A community-development trust (CDT), set up by WCRC, managed, but did not determine, the uses to which funding was put. Finally, a housing association was to be set up by WCRC to recover individuals' rent, and this housing association would come to own the housing stock over time as people sold.

WCRC recognized that a united front was required for the negotiation of social contracts. It acknowledged diverse interests within the Wattville community by evenly distributing the resources it gained. Accordingly, it responded to a range of demands, from tenure to health and from schools to sewerage, by allocating everything from financial support to technical advice. For example, private home owners with postoccupancy problems were brought into the civic - a zone that the civic dubbed "Long Cracking Homes." WCRC leadership had a history of experience with union organization in the metal industry on the East Rand. The democratically organized structures functioned much as a union. In addition, members of the executive had experience as former United Democratic Front organizers. WCRC managed to deliver; it demonstrated its achievements and effectively used capacity and resource inputs to maintain and expand active and latent support. This further averted any potential internal community organizational conflict.

Actors and their interests

• People on the waiting list;
• Those settled in Tamboville;
• New arrivals, subletting backyard space in Tamboville 1;
• Private home owners experiencing postoccupancy problems; and
• Households remaining in the old matchbox houses in Wattville. 

In addition, it was significant that relations between hostel and township dwellers were fairly uncomplicated. Hostels were single-sex barracks developed to house migrant workers (with a homeland base to return to) as temporary residents in urban areas. Many of the hostel dwellers established a community of their own over a long period of return migration. Over time, many hostel dwellers had in fact moved into Wattville. Township residents and hostel dwellers had a long historical relationship borne out of shared production space and organization by the same union. Hostel dwellers had, however, been particularly disadvantaged historically. Their status as migrants in the city meant that they could not include their names on the official waiting lists for housing.

WTC, which came into office on a 16% poll, had effectively been outmanoeuvred by WCRC by means of the land invasions. The invasion of Tamboville in 1990 had altered the nature of interactions. BTC's decision to work with WCRC after the June 1990 invasion of Tamboville marked a break with the past. BTC was dominated by the National Party, whose intentions for housing for low-income communities in South Africa were unclear. This intransigence provided councils like BTC with an opportunity to adopt the cautious approach of "negotiations — wait and see" to local government. However, it had a white constituency to please, and this community's opposition to low-income development "in their backyards" was assured. In subsequent handling of additional land demands, BTC adopted a less innovative and a more cautious approach. In 1993, it finally released a piece of land for further development.

Benoni was surrounded by the Brakpan and Boksburg councils, which were dominated by the Conservative Party and fearful of the white electorate's reaction to land allocation for black development. In response to Tamboville, councillors expressed concern at a likely increase in the crime rate and the serious health hazard that a squatter camp would present to neighbouring suburbs. The Brakpan Town Council erected a wall between Tamboville and its municipal boundary. Local media were split between calling it the "new Berlin Wall" and the "old apartheid wall." However, 3 months after the wall was erected, the surrounding white residents were invited to a community meeting and soon after this adopted a different approach and joined the residents of Tamboville in a historic clean-up operation in the area. A symbolic tree-planting ceremony marked a mood of unity and cooperation that was as surprising as it was rare in a country filled with racial mistrust.

Conclusion

The inner city⁵

Introduction

Residents of the "Seven Buildings" shared living conditions and had a sense of a unified struggle against a single landlord. This led to negotiations about the proposed sale of the buildings and consequently to the emergence of a path-breaking project for social housing in the inner city. The Seven Buildings Project Working Group was formed in late 1991 to develop this project. It comprised representatives of the buildings and technical advisors from service organizations (led by a team of lawyers). This approach was interesting as a method for gaining access to the city.

"Slum clearance" and forced removal under apartheid

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed the systematic removal of people from the inner city in accordance with the GAA, passed by the new National Party government in 1950. Pockets of property in white areas that were still in the hands of black people, including Alexandra and Wattville, were targeted for removal. The GAA was used to remove black, Indian, and coloured people and resettle them on sites at a distance from the city. For example, Indians living in Fordsburg and Pageview were removed to Lenasia (see Figure 1 for the location of Lenasia). Following the establishment of Orlando and other sections of Soweto in the 1930s and 1940s, Sophiatown was finally removed in the 1950s, and many other black people were resettled in Meadowlands in Soweto from about 1955.

Toward the end of the 1960s, black people had been almost entirely removed from the inner city. However, the implementation of the grand apartheid dream failed in some small but significant instances. For example, an urban underclass continued to live in Hillbrow and to work in activities like prostitution and the drug trade. In addition, black people worked as domestic servants for middle- and high-income whites and were usually accommodated in servants' quarters on these properties.

The "greying" of the inner city

Their reasons for moving to the inner city were varied. By this time, a generation of people had been living in townships, and the combination of natural population growth and the government policy of curbing black urbanization (including a dramatic decline in housing provision from the late 1970s) meant that townships were extremely overcrowded. On the other hand, housing stock in the inner city was becoming available as residential suburbanization and the decline of the standards of 1930s-era buildings began to push and pull white residents outward. There was an evolution in the property market as surplus accommodation grew in the white-designated inner city. Both estate agents and property owners were therefore willing to let and sell property to black people, even though it was against the law. Indeed, because the GAA made black residence in the inner city illegal, exploitative rents could be charged and the Rent Control Act could be ignored.

Many residential buildings, mainly in the "flatlands" of Joubert Park and Hillbrow, were illegally occupied by black residents. Between 1976 and 1988, about 55000 black people moved to the central suburbs, reserved for whites. Black people were generally forced to take whatever was available to them: various forms of formal rented accommodation, the basements of tenement blocks, offices, disused servants' rooms on the roofs of buildings, empty warehouses and garages, and abandoned shops and offices on the periphery of the central business district.

It was out of these circumstances that ACTSTOP developed in the 1980s to defend the rights of black tenants in the inner city, in a situation in which, in fact, they had no legal rights. The success of ACTSTOP, assisted by public-interest lawyers, made the spontaneous trend irreversible. Initially, attempts to challenge the principle of eviction were unsuccessful: rulings were handed down, and offenders were prosecuted. Sometimes, challenging every threatened eviction of a black tenant in court assisted simply in delaying evictions. But after the historic Govender ruling, people in violation of the GAA could only be evicted if they had alternative housing. The government became increasingly reluctant to enforce the GAA in the 1980s, claiming that its hands were tied following this ruling. The government sought to enforce the Act (without evicting black tenants) by placing pressure on tenants to leave voluntarily and placing pressure on landlords to evict them.

Public resistance at the site of eviction was a common occurrence. Human barricades and the erection of tents on pavements were typical public displays of protest and solidarity. The tactic of using white "nominees" to sign leases on behalf of black people was initially used in the 1960s by black business people who sought to trade in white areas, but later it too became a tool to bypass residential segregation. However, it was significant at the time that black settlement did not provoke substantial white resistance. Although people were harassed in some cases, by and large the desegregation of the inner city was not accompanied by racial tension. Had resistance been more fierce, the government may have attempted to enforce segregation more vigorously.

Breaches of the GAA continued in the 1980s as black people settled illegally in the inner-city flatlands of Johannesburg, especially in places like Hillbrow and Joubert Park. In 1984, the Group Areas Amendment Act allowed commercial-building districts (CBDs) to be open to traders of all races. With the proclamation of 57 CBDs in the country as free-trade areas in 1987, the scene was set for the repeal of the GAA.

Trends in the inner city

An emergent trend in the inner city was to convert residential and industrial property for office use. Land values on the western side of town were rising, with increasing investment in skyscraping office blocks. Vacancies in these office complexes stood at around 12% in 1992, with projections for even greater underutilization of commercial space. Billions of ZAR were invested in such office buildings, with five major companies in control of the bulk of the CBD space. When the building boom was at its peak in the late 1980s, the difference between building cost and yield was eight times higher for office than residential space. Office development was thus more attractive to investors than residential property, and the result was a major increase in evictions as the CBD blossomed. The boom faded, but with land prices still at abnormal levels as a result of the years of CBD speculation, the legacy of evictions and rental increases for poor residents was difficult to undo. Under such conditions, the balance of forces rested against the tenant population.

By 1993, the occasional and uneasy alliance between landlords and black people over GAA violations had unravelled. In the first place, it was always unequal and exploitative but suited black people because of their insecurity in the inner city, given apartheid legislation. Increasingly, battles occurred between landlords and tenants over the conditions of inner city buildings. Collective action to oppose poor conditions took the form of rent boycotts. In the Seven Buildings, owned by a single landlord, a settlement ended the rent boycott (see below). However, rent boycotts continued in numerous buildings in the Hillbrow and Joubert Park areas.

An important implication of the rent boycotts, given the general lack of affordable rents, was the withdrawal of housing stock from the residential market altogether. As the Johannesburg City Council (JCC) increased the rates and service charges, the landlords passed on these increased costs to tenants. In buildings in which tenants were boycotting, landlords were increasingly looking to sell. However, buyers were impossible to find, mainly because of the difficulty in obtaining bonds, which was due to the fact that most of the inner city had been redlined by financial institutions. An increasing number of landlords were boarding up blocks of flats, rather than renting them out.

The recent influx of black people into the inner city was almost certainly affected by current and ongoing violence in shack settlements and townships. The central city was perceived as a relatively safe place to live. In addition, the continuing and deepening housing crisis in many areas continued to draw black people even to slum buildings. Characteristic of the inner city were deteriorating residential units, large investments in office development (with high levels of vacancy), and the financial institutions' redlining. These factors militated against security of tenure for poor people in the inner city. This suggested that the future focus of struggle would be against slumlordism, office development, and perhaps even gentrification.

The Seven Buildings Project

The Seven Buildings Project began in late 1991, with the aim of assuring affordable security of tenure through tenant ownership and control. Various financial models were proposed to meet the demands for secure and affordable tenure. The residents demanded that they own and manage the buildings in which they lived. This well-publicized project would have implications for tenants in Johannesburg and in other South African inner-city centres.

The project was a cooperative housing venture that guaranteed security of tenure without recourse to individual ownership. It was commonly perceived as a test case for social housing for black people in the inner city. The satisfaction of the residents' need for access was premised on the condition that housing be affordable. Frequently, subletting was a prerequisite of affordable housing access. However, this scheme offered housing access within an off-market social-housing framework.

The scheme had the potential to solve the problems of physical decay, overcrowding, ever-rising rents, and landlord­tenant battles. It upheld the following principles:

• Rents would not increase out of proportion to costs;
• Housing would be for families with a modest income;
• Profiteering from land and property speculation would be eliminated; and
• Security of tenure would be the cornerstone of all contracts between the housing organization and individuals who were members of the scheme. 

Purchase and rehabilitation of the Seven Buildings required 10 million ZAR. From the beginning of 1992, consultations to find backing for the scheme were held with a range of public- and private-sector organizations, including the Development Bank of Southern Africa, IDT, and the Urban Foundation.

The demands for access to secure and affordable housing in a transitional environment ushered in the politics of negotiations. A working group was set up to negotiate with some of the major inner-city development players. The strategy of negotiations entailed a shift from an orientation of resistance and defence to one that essentially entailed the struggle for development. It became a struggle for development, rather than a struggle against evictions. The tenants were involved in three sets of negotiations:

• Negotiations between the tenants and the landlord — In October 1991, the owner served notice on the tenants in the Seven Buildings, with a view to emptying the buildings to sell them on the open market. By November 1991, the tenants had not vacated, and Gorfil instituted legal proceedings in two of the buildings. In 1991, an Agreement of Settlement was reached between David Gorfil (the property owner) and ACTSTOP (working on behalf of the residents in six of the buildings). This settlement covered the payment of rent in arrears, the signing of jointly worked out lease agreements, and the execution of maintenance for damages suffered during an attack. Total arrears at the time of the agreement (that is, rent and electricity charges) were 253 785.29 ZAR. It was agreed that the owner would postpone legal action until March 1992, to allow tenants to raise the money needed to purchase the property. This deadline was subsequently postponed indefinitely. The landlord then rejected the offer made to him by the Seven Buildings Project Working Group. He wanted a "fair market value" for his property.
• Negotiations between JCC and the tenants — The tenants were negotiating the following strategic demands: bridge financing for the initial purchase of the buildings, which the tenants would take over after a set period; a grant to upgrade the buildings; financing for subsidies; a revision of the rating system, as residential and commercial rates for electricity and water differed; and consideration of zoning and town-planning policies to encourage investors to be involved in residential-property development (incentives and disincentives). By 1993, the negotiations with the JCC had led to no concrete financial backing or assistance, although apparently such support was under consideration. This was to be considered by the Management Committee of JCC, which would decide the contribution that JCC would make.
• Negotiations between the tenants and the banks — The tenants were negotiating for the banks to bring down the interest rate, which in 1993 stood at around 18% — beyond the reach of the cities' poor. In addition, negotiations concerned the practice, on the part of financial institutions, of redlining certain areas. 

The Action Committee to Stop Evictions

Regular tenants' meetings brought this community together, despite its being scattered over a wide geographic area. The level of organization was not uniform across the city. The Seven Buildings Project was the best organized, with floor committees in each building, although their operation was erratic. ACTSTOP had two people at its head office — a familiar capacity problem experienced by most civic organizations in the country, which made servicing the community difficult.

After the GAA was repealed, ACTSTOP was increasingly concerned with the struggle against, and resistance to, market-related evictions and with the struggle for development. It left its relationship with the Seven Buildings Project undefined but in general took up the demands of black tenants for secure tenure, affordable accommodation, and control and management of the buildings.

Actors and their interests

JCC was still profoundly affected by the residues of apartheid. The all-white JCC had a generally uneasy relationship with the new black constituency. However, JCC was extremely concerned about the flight of business to the suburbs and the resultant erosion of its tax base — yet, it appeared to be immobilized when it came to actually halting the process.

JCC's redevelopment-project proposals were aimed at the east end, where land prices were disproportionately high, relative to the value of the buildings. The plan envisaged aesthetic improvements and upgraded services, facilities, and amenities. Large corporations were expected to purchase these buildings, restore them, and sell them to their employees (many of whom were middle- and upper-income earners, mostly employed in the high-rise banking complexes in the central city). This scheme was expected to result in the movement of formally employed blacks into the inner city and to intensify the spatial marginalization of the seasonally employed and unemployed. JCC and business interests coalesced in opposition to the decay of the inner-city environment. These shared anxieties gave impetus to the formation of the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) in late 1991. The involvement of some high-profile members of the community gave the stamp of legitimacy to the venture.

CJP, a few months old in 1993, was a forum in which significant inner-city players came together to negotiate inner-city development. The forum had representation from the public sector (that is, JCC), the black community (that is, ACTSTOP and CAJ), and the private sector (that is, big business interests, especially property developers and banks). CJP aimed to raise money through debentures and other shares and generate its own funds primarily in the CBD. The precise nature of the partnership was unclear, but the interests of private property (Anglo American Properties in particular) seemed to dominate.

In 1993, CJP had received much publicity but had delivered very little. Some leading business people proposed a 1% tax on all CBD property owned by members, which reflected the dire conditions forecast for the inner city. This would generate 28 million ZAR a year. The precise use to be made of this money was unclear but was understood to include cleaning, security services, and promotion of Johannesburg in international tourism and convention circuits.

Landlords in the inner city generally let the housing stock decline through lack of maintenance. However, they were unable to sell buildings because potential buyers were unable to obtain bonds. Many landlords were unwilling to enter into negotiations with tenants to tackle the rent boycott. In 1993, the quality of buildings was continuing to decline or they were left vacant. In the process, potential housing for the cities' poor was lost.

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