Document(s) 21 of 37

The cigarette industry is peddling a deadly weapon. It is dealing in people’s lives for financial gain. . . . The industry we seek to regulate is powerful and resourceful. Each new effort to regulate will bring new ways to evade. . . . Still, we must be equal to the task. For the stakes involved are nothing less than the lives and health of millions all over the world. But this is a battle which can be won . . . I know it is a battle which will be won.

—US Senator Robert Kennedy, [First] World Conference on Smoking and Health, 12 September 1967, New York, NY, USA^{[331, pp. 6, 13]}

Industry survival: the nine D’s

Tobacco companies know they are under siege. Thus, the basic strategy is to hold off the inevitable. The industry undoubtedly realizes that in the long term, many decades from now, there will be almost no smoking in Canada, just as there was almost no cigarette smoking in the mid-1800s. Meanwhile, until the inevitable happens, the industry seeks to reap massive profits. And, as will be talked about in a later chapter, tobacco companies are moving aggressively into developing countries to enhance the industry’s future.

The industry’s survival strategy can be summarized through the nine D’s:

1. Deny the health consequences of smoking.
2. Deceive consumers about the true nature of cigarettes through marketing and PR.
3. Damage the credibility of industry opponents.
4. Direct advertising to women and youth, in addition to men, to maximize sales volume.
5. Defeat attempts to regulate the industry or control smoking.
6. Delay legislation if it can’t be defeated.
7. Destroy legislation once it passes, either by trying to overturn the law in court, by disobeying the law, or by exploiting loopholes.
8. Defend lawsuits filed against the industry.
9. Develop new markets around the world.

Preceding chapters have described industry actions supporting this strategy, including using voluntary restrictions to prevent regulation, creating and promoting products that lessen the impact of high taxes, and supplying products that become contraband. This chapter looks at other industry tactics that deserve to be exposed in greater detail.

The use of front groups

Tobacco companies know that their credibility is widely dismissed, so others make pro-tobacco arguments. Michel Gadbois, the head of ADA, which organized opposition to high tobacco taxes, said,

They [the companies] know that few people will listen when they publicly demand a reduction in taxes. But the average citizen has more sympathy for small retailers, who are selling less cigarettes because taxes are too high. And the manufacturers know this too.[441, p. 9]

If one digs deep enough into a pro-tobacco organization, a link to the industry will almost always be found.

The Smokers’ Freedom Society (SFS) was a classic example of an industry front group. SFS was created and funded by the tobacco industry. It was not possible to become a member of SFS or to vote for the executive. The organization only had “supporters.” Even though a significant proportion of its 8 000 supporters were tobacco farmers or employees of tobacco companies, the organization tried to portray itself as a grass-roots group representing the interests of Canada’s 6 million smokers. SFS actively opposed laws restricting smoking and campaigned for a reduction in tobacco taxes. SFS arguments typically echoed industry viewpoints. After taxes were reduced in 1994, the organization and its telephone number ceased to be operational, a step that would not have been taken so quickly if SFS were truly a grass-roots group.

The use of front groups is a typical industry tactic around the world. In Canada, the industry has been the driving force behind the Coalition Against Crime and Contraband Tobacco and the Committee for Fair Tobacco Taxation. In the United Kingdom, the Freedom Organization for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco (FOREST) has industry links. In the United States, the industry is behind the National Smokers Alliance.

Tobacco manufacturers expand their leverage by joining many associations. In addition to CTMC, tobacco manufacturers have been members of numerous other organizations, including ADA, the Coalition québécoise pour la justice en taxation du tabac (Quebec coalition for fairness in tobacco taxation), the National Association of Tobacco and Confectionery Distributors, the Packaging Association of Canada, the Patent and Trademark Institute, the Canadian Manufacturing Association, the Canadian Advertising Foundation, the Association of Canadian Advertisers, and the Point of Purchase Advertising Institute. All these organizations have raised concerns about, or have opposed, additional regulation or taxation of the industry on one or more occasions. As members, tobacco companies are in a direct position to influence the organizations’ decisions. Of these groups, one of the most visibly pro-tobacco is the National Association of Tobacco and Confectionery Distributors. Its Executive Vice-President, Luc Dumulong, is a former vice-president of SFS.

The wall of flesh

The industry’s virtually unlimited resources permit it to mount a wall of flesh to fight back opponents. The wall typically consists of large numbers of PR specialists, lawyers, and lobbyists.

One of the PR firms retained by the tobacco industry in Canada and elsewhere has been Burson-Marsteller, the largest PR firm in the world. Although tobacco may be one of the ultimate PR challenges, Burson-Marsteller has had its share of difficult clients in the past. The firm was retained to deal with Union Carbide’s 1984 Bhopal disaster, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Dow-Corning breast implants, Argentinian generals, and the Three Mile Island nuclear mishap.^[431]

Tobacco companies use teams of lawyers to vigorously defend any lawsuits brought by smokers for smoking-caused disease or death. Only a few cases have been filed against the industry in Canada, but in the United States hundreds of cases have been initiated. In the famous Cipollone case, which the industry lost in 1988 (the industry had the decision overturned on appeal), as many as three dozen lawyers were on the case. Estimates of industry spending on the case range up to US $75 million.^[339] The industry fights hard to win every case because it knows that if a case is ever lost, a flood of other cases might follow. So far, the industry has never paid damages as a result of losing a case, but in 1996 a US tobacco company, Liggett Group Inc., agreed to an out-of-court settlement for the first time.

In an internal memo, an American lawyer for the industry described the litigation strategy of tobacco companies:

The aggressive posture we have taken . . . continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs’ lawyers. . . . To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of [RJR]’s money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all of his.^[321]

In Canada, an example of using the wall of flesh to lobby was the industry’s efforts to oppose implementation of the second round of health warnings in 1993. After draft regulations had been published, the industry sought and obtained a meeting with the government. David Mair, then an assistant to Health Minister Bouchard, recalls that there must have been nearly 40 people in the room, only 4 of whom were from the Department. The other side was represented by industry executives, lawyers, and accountants, CTMC personnel, and packaging-company presidents. The various industry representatives presented all sorts of technical, legal, financial, and employment reasons for not going ahead with an early implementation date or any new warnings at all. In the end, the government went ahead with revised regulations but with a delayed implementation deadline.

Suppression of research

Over the decades, the tobacco industry has done its own health-related research on smoking. Early on, some of that research uncovered previously unknown information about the health consequences of smoking. Not only was that new knowledge concealed from the public, but the industry continued to publicly deny that smoking was harmful.

Although little is known about the research done in the laboratories of Canadian firms, it is known that Canadian tobacco companies have worked closely with their corporate sisters in other countries. For example, Imperial Tobacco participated in annual research conferences with other subsidiaries of BAT.^[549]

Some of what was going on inside US tobacco companies has come to light. In 1956, Philip Morris scientists were writing memos saying that nicotine and carbon monoxide were causing “harm to the circulatory system as a result of smoking.”^{[26, p. 186]} In 1961, a memo to Philip Morris executives from the Research Director identified 15 compounds in cigarette smoke “as carcinogens” and 2 others as cancer promoters.^{[405, p. F2]} A letter from the Philip Morris vice-president for research to his counterpart at a rival company (Lorillard) indicated that the industry had strict internal guidelines on the kind of research it would support. Excluded were “developing new tests for carcinogenicity” and “conduct[ing] experiments to show addictive effects of smoking.”^[406]

A key player in tobacco-industry research has been the US-based Council for Tobacco Research (CTR). Set up in 1954, ostensibly to fund independent scientific research on tobacco, CTR has been a PR and lobbying vehicle for the industry. CTR was largely created

by the PR firm Hill & Knowlton. Indeed, CTR offices were initially located one floor below those of Hill & Knowlton in New York’s Empire State Building. CTR did not try to get to the bottom of smoking and health issues, as it purported to do, but instead created a body of evidence that the industry could use to keep “open” the scientific debate.

In 1964, CTR created the Special Projects division. Directed by lawyers, the division provided funds for particularly touchy projects. The projects were directed by lawyers because legal rules protect the confidentiality of lawyer – client communications. The theory was that any special projects that produced undesirable results could effectively be buried. To date, that theory has been successfully put into practice.

Lawyers had their hands all over CTR work, even research not considered a special project. Lawyers intervened in the drafting of study reports, sometimes attended while work was being conducted in the laboratory, canceled projects that started to show that smoking could cause cancer, and denied future funding to some scientists who would not play ball.^[185] Lawyers were involved in deciding which projects would be funded. Scientific merit was not the driving factor in funding decisions. Project results were used to create positive publicity for the industry and to shift attention away from tobacco as a health risk.^[37]

Documents from Brown and Williamson (Imperial Tobacco’s US-based sister company) further reveal that the company took steps to bring all potentially damaging internal scientific documents under lawyer control, thus making them “privileged” information, unobtainable by those suing the company. Further, the company moved important documents offshore and instructed employees not to make lists or notes of the documents being removed.^[220]

In the following excerpt from the Cipollone case, Marc Edell, the plaintiff’s lawyer, is cross-examining Kinsley vanR. Dey, the President and CEO of Liggett & Myers, a US tobacco company. Note how the witness characterizes the research that had been undertaken.

Q: When you talk about paintings, this was testing with respect to the relationship between cigarette smoking and cancer; is that correct?

A: No.

Q: It wasn’t with respect to tar and nicotine on mice?

A: It was smoke condensate put on the backs of mice.

Q: The purpose of that was to see whether or not they would produce cancer; is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Tumors?

A: Produce tumors, yes.

Q: And Arthur D. Little did a study for you and they found that when you use this palladium catalyst that it significantly reduced the incidence of tumors and carcinomas in mice, didn’t it?

A: Yes.

Q: And that there was some discussion as to using palladium in your cigarettes; isn’t that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Why?

A: Because the mouse painting test done . . . with this particular substance reduced the amounts of tumors on the backs of mice.

Q: In fact, the use of palladium was never incorporated in your cigarettes, is that correct?

A: That is correct.

Q: And originally it was going to be done not for test purposes but because it was felt it was going to be safer. Is that correct?

A: No.

Q: Just for test purposes?

A: It was done in answer to the Wynder test who tried to reduce the tumors on the backs of mice.

Q: So the purpose for your company’s attempts to use palladium in its cigarettes was to avoid mice developing cancers on their skins when scientists would spread tar and nicotine on them; is that correct?

A: Smoke condensate.

Q: Smoke condensate?

A: Yes.

Q: Is that correct, sir? That was the purpose of this?

A: To try to reduce tumors formed when smoke condenses on the backs of mice, yes.

Q: It had nothing to do with the health and welfare of human beings; is that correct?

A: That’s correct.

Q: Do you know how much that study cost, sir?

A: A lot of money through the years.

Q: How much is a lot? A lot of money is different to different people.

A: . . . I would say it is well over probably . . . $15 million or more.

Q: And this was to save rats, right? Or mice? You spent all this money to save mice the problem of developing tumors; is that correct?

A: I have stated what we did.^{[108, pp. 3.265–3.266]}

One way the industry publicizes research denying the harm of ETS is to hold a symposium. The industry invites sympathetic scientists, many of whom have received industry funding, to present papers at a gathering of many like-minded individuals. Although the papers are not peer reviewed, they end up being cited by the industry as evidence that there is not yet proof that ETS is harmful. One such symposium was held at Montreal’s McGill University in 1989. Although the university did nothing more than allow one of its rooms to be booked, industry spokespeople refer to the McGill Symposium as if it had been some significant scientific assembly. The industry even published its symposium “proceedings” in book form^[159] and ensured that it was distributed to libraries in Canada and elsewhere.

Suppression of freedom of expression

Tobacco companies portray themselves as great defenders of freedom of expression, but they are quick to deny others the same freedom. For example, Imasco and Rothmans have refused to allow distribution of shareholders’ resolutions addressing health issues. Also, when NSRA changed Player’s to Slayer’s in a protest against the Player’s tennis tournament, Imperial Tobacco threatened to take legal action for trademark infringement. In 1988, when SMART members from the University of Toronto law school charged a Shoppers Drug Mart outlet for selling tobacco to a minor, Imperial Tobacco refused to make a donation to the law school’s annual conference. This refusal occurred despite the fact that Imperial had regularly donated in previous years and that the conference organizers had no connection with the students who charged Shoppers. Nonetheless, a spokesperson for Imperial told a conference organizer that the students “were biting the hand that feeds them.”

In 1976, Death in the West — the Marlboro Story, a film for television, was broadcast in Britain. The film showed six real American cowboys, all of whom had been heavy smokers and were now dying from emphysema or cancer. Their doctors were quoted as attributing the diseases to smoking. The film contrasted the cowboy in Marlboro television commercials with the six dying real cowboys. After Death in the West was shown in Britain, the American television program 60 Minutes was interested in bringing the film to the United States. Philip Morris quickly went to court in Britain to get an injunction to prevent the producer, Thames Television, from selling or rebroadcasting the film. Under the terms of an out-of-court settlement, all copies of the film were destroyed except one that was to be locked in a Thames vault. Mysteriously, a copy of the film resurfaced in 1981 in the United States. Over time, Death in the West was widely broadcast.^[582]

Public deception

The terrible reputation of the tobacco industry has not come about by accident. Tobacco companies have earned it. To put it kindly, truth has not been a priority for the industry. For virtually every possible regulatory intervention, the industry denies that the regulations would reduce smoking yet carries on with its lobbying to prevent the regulations from being adopted. Deception also comes in the form of misinformation about the health consequences of smoking, advertising that misleads consumers about the true nature of the product, and misinformation to health departments and parliamentary committees developing public-health policies.

One telling example of deception comes from a Brown and Williamson document, “Smoking and Health Proposal,” which is undated but appears to be from around 1969.

The document discusses a possible aggressive PR campaign on health issues. One of the explicit objectives was

to set aside in the minds of millions the false conviction that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer and other diseases; a conviction based on fanatical assumptions, fallacious rumours, unsupported claims and the unscientific statements and conjectures of publicity-seeking opportunists.^{[52, p. 11]}

The jobs argument

The industry regularly uses the threat of job loss in arguing against tobacco-control measures. But should World War II have been prolonged to protect jobs in the munitions factories? Should drinking and driving be permitted just to protect jobs in bars? Should Canadians be encouraged to smoke to prevent the loss of jobs?

The jobs versus lives argument is without merit. The addictiveness of nicotine means that any decrease in tobacco consumption will be gradual. Decreases in employment can be dealt with principally through attrition (quitting and retirement) instead of layoffs. More important, as less money is spent on tobacco, more money will be spent on other items, thereby increasing jobs in other sectors and offsetting any job loss in the tobacco sector. There is evidence that tobacco results in a net economic loss to society,^[28] such that a decrease in smoking is economically beneficial. This is particularly so in the eight Canadian provinces that have no manufacturing activity and little or no tobacco farming.

Few major industries are as mechanized as the tobacco industry. In 1992, in the Canadian tobacco-manufacturing sector, production per worker stood at an incredible $725 485, an amount that would be even higher if all tobacco taxes were included.^[563] A single machine can produce 14 000 cigarettes per minute. Walking through a factory, one wonders where all of the employees are. RJR – Macdonald President Pierre Brunelle has boasted that from the moment leaf tobacco is cut until the cigarettes are fully made and boxed ready for shipping, no person touches the product.^[421] Total industry sales in 1992 were higher than in 1962, but the number of tobacco-industry employees fell from 9 081 to 4 930 over the same period.^[149,563] This was the direct result of increased automation (which makes more workers redundant) and industry consolidation (corporate takeovers).

A major report by University of British Columbia professor Robert Allen examined jobs in the tobacco industry. Allen concluded that “the choice between ‘lives’ and ‘jobs’ is a false dilemma. Canadians can have a progressive health policy without causing substantial economic dislocation.”^{[13, p. 30]} If all full-time jobs in tobacco growing and manufacturing disappeared overnight, the unemployment rate would not even rise by 0.01%. This does not even take into account the new jobs that would be created by reallocated consumer spending or by productivity improvements from a healthier work force. If manufacturers moved production to the United States, the job loss would be even smaller because most jobs in marketing, sales, warehousing, and distribution would remain in

Canada. Allen concluded that threats of production shifts should be ignored because such shifts are inevitable with more efficient American factories and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Former Imperial Tobacco President Jean-Louis Mercier has said that with free trade the tobacco industry in North America will become continental in scope and that in time the Canadian market will be too small to support the three manufacturers it currently has.^[647]

The perceived economic importance of the tobacco industry was a stronger deterrent to government action in the 1960s and 1970s than it is today. Declines in smoking have not had the major adverse economic impact that was once feared. Nevertheless, the industry continues to advance economic arguments. It is able to do so in part because many of its economic interests are concentrated (in the tobacco-growing belt and in manufacturing centres). Nonsmokers, on the other hand, are geographically diffuse and much harder to organize.

Political connections

Chapter 3 already pointed out some of the industry’s political connections, but a few more should be noted. CTMC President Rob Parker is a former Progressive Conservative MP. CTMC lobbyist Mark Resnick is a former policy director for the Liberal Party of Canada. Jodi White, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Kim Campbell, became Vice-President, Corporate Affairs for Imasco in 1994. In 1994, CTMC hired Marie-Josée Lapointe as Vice-President. Lapointe had been press secretary to Benoît Bouchard when he was Transport Minister and later worked as press secretary to Prime Minister Mulroney. In 1996, Imperial Tobacco hired Mulroney’s former Chief of Staff, Norman Spector, to head the company’s lobbying section.

In the United States, the tobacco industry donates heavily to members of Congress and state legislatures. Studies show that members who receive tobacco money are more likely to vote against tobacco-control measures than members who receive none. In Canada, the industry’s financial contributions to political parties are substantial and seem to be surpassed only by those from the major banks. In 1993 alone, Imasco gave $194 700, including $120 500 to federal and provincial parties, $9 200 to foundations and fundraising events, and $65 000 to leadership campaigns.^[279] During the 1990 federal Liberal leadership race, Imasco contributed to several campaigns, including those of winner Jean Chrétien and runner-up Paul Martin. In its 1993 annual report, Imasco says that it “has never sought, expected, or received any consideration for political donations other than the satisfaction of having contributed to the proper functioning of the democratic political process.”^{[279, p. 16]} In 1992, Rothmans gave $3 833 to the federal Progressive Conservatives and $2 455 to the federal Liberals. From RJR – Macdonald in the same year, each of these parties received $30 000.^[75] Tobacco companies gave no money to the NDP, which has a policy of refusing donations from corporations other than small businesses.

Charitable contributions to enhance public image

Knowing of their beleaguered image, some tobacco companies and executives make contributions to charity. These contributions are over and above event sponsorships, which are really marketing and not charity.

In 1993, Imasco’s Corporate Donations Committee gave more than $3 million to 620 organizations, including hospitals, universities, art galleries, the Girl Guides of Canada, the Boy Scouts of Canada, the Victorian Order of Nurses, the Ontario Pharmacists Association, the Council on Drug Abuse, the Ontario Games for the Physically Disabled, the Pollution Probe Foundation, various YMCAs, and many others. Imasco sponsors the National Imasco Scholarships for Disabled Students through the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada.^[280]

Nicotine manipulation

Despite public assertions by the industry that nicotine is not addictive and that nicotine is only important to smokers in terms of taste, the true, critical role played by nicotine has long been understood inside tobacco companies. The knowledge inside the industry was decades ahead of what was known by the scientific community generally. The industry concealed this knowledge, thus delaying progress in research vital to public health.

As early as 1945, “Role of Nicotine in the Cigarette Habit,” a study reporting the results of research supported by the American Tobacco Company, concluded that “with some individuals, nicotine becomes a major factor in the cigarette habit.”^[377] In 1962, a document written by Sir Charles Ellis, a scientific adviser to BAT, stated that “nicotine is not only a very fine drug, but the technique of administration by smoking has distinct psychological advantages and a built-in control against excessive absorption” and that “smoking is a habit of addiction.”^[392] A 1963 document written by Addison Yeaman, general counsel to Brown and Williamson, stated, “We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress mechanisms.”^[649] A 1972 internal industry document obtained in a US court case shows a remarkable appreciation of the role nicotine plays:

As with eating and copulating, so it is with smoking. The physiological effect serves as the primary incentive; all other incentives are secondary. . . . Without nicotine, the argument goes, there would be no smoking. Some strong evidence can be marshaled to support this argument: (1) No one has ever become a cigarette smoker by smoking cigarettes without nicotine. (2) Most of the physiological responses to inhaled smoke have been shown to be nicotine-related.

Why then is there not a market for nicotine per se, to be eaten, sucked, drunk, injected, inserted or inhaled as a pure aerosol? The answer, and I feel quite strongly about this, is that the cigarette is in fact among the most awe-inspiring examples of the ingenuity of man. . . .

The cigarette should be conceived not as a product but as a package. The product is nicotine. The cigarette is but one of many package layers. There is the carton, which contains the pack, which contains the cigarette, which contains the smoke. The smoke is the final package. The smoker must strip off all these package layers to get to that which he seeks. . . .

Think of the cigarette pack as a storage container for [a] day’s supply of nicotine. . . . Think of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine. . . . Think of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of nicotine. . . . Smoke is beyond question the most optimized vehicle of nicotine and the cigarette the most optimized dispenser of smoke.^[155]

Another document, written in 1972 and entitled “RJR confidential research planning memorandum on the nature of the tobacco business and the crucial role of nicotine therein,” stated that

in a sense, the tobacco industry may be thought of as being a specialized, highly ritualized, and stylized segment of the pharmaceutical industry. Tobacco products uniquely contain and deliver nicotine, a potent drug with a variety of physiological effects.^[583]

Attempts by the industry to understand nicotine have been far reaching. A 1974 study of the “hyperkinetic child as a prospective smoker” stated that “We wonder whether such children may not eventually become cigarette smokers in their teenage years as they discover the advantage of self-stimulation via nicotine.”^[538] The study tracked school children, starting with Virginia students in the third grade.

In 1983, Philip Morris researchers completed a study showing that nicotine was addictive in rats. The paper was peer reviewed and accepted for publication, but the company had it withdrawn. The company later closed the researchers’ laboratory and eliminated evidence of their work.^{[151, p. 3]} The company did not release findings of the research; it was not until 1994 that the study became public, but without the company’s consent.

The critical role played by nicotine in smoking behaviour was well illustrated in 1992, when BAT was considering whether to purchase a manufacturer of nicotine patches. According to confidential documents, corporate researchers from subsidiaries in different countries compared cigarettes and the patch for their relative merits as nicotine-delivery devices. In Canada, Patrick Dunn, Imperial Tobacco’s Vice-President of Research and Development, wrote in a confidential memo to CEO Mercier that there would be benefits to owning a nicotine-patch manufacturer:

One could make an argument for the industry supporting development of alternative nicotine delivery systems by considering them in the same philosophical light as brand extensions or, in this case, a business extension. . . . An effective quitting aid based on nicotine could have a serious impact on our business and it would be better for us than someone else to profit from it.^{[154, p. 1]}

In the end, BAT rejected the acquisition because of the risk that this would contribute to the US Food and Drug Administration’s regulating nicotine as a drug.^[539]

A 1992 draft report by a senior Philip Morris employee openly describes cigarettes as a “nicotine delivery system,” considers nicotine gum and nicotine patches as competitive rivals to cigarettes, states that the main reason why people smoke is to get nicotine into their bodies, and refers to nicotine as being chemically similar to drugs such as cocaine.^[184]

Just as coffee companies can decaffeinate coffee, tobacco companies have the ability to remove nicotine from cigarettes. Despite this, tobacco companies leave nicotine in cigarettes at levels that create and maintain addiction. In the United States, Philip Morris test marketed a brand of cigarettes, Next, from which nicotine had been removed, but the brand failed in the marketplace and was withdrawn.

Companies have the ability to control nicotine levels in their cigarettes and the ability to adjust cigarette design to affect the amount of nicotine absorbed by the smoker. They can do this in a number of ways, such as selecting certain tobacco blends and adding additives. A 1991 handbook on leaf blending and product development from one US company describes how ammonia can be added to tobacco as an “impact booster” to make it easier for smokers to absorb nicotine.^{[333, pp. 365–366]}

In the United States, numerous methods for manipulating nicotine levels have been patented. There are eight patents to increase nicotine content by adding nicotine to the tobacco rod; five patents to increase nicotine content by adding nicotine to parts of the cigarette, such as the filter; eight patents to extract nicotine from tobacco; and nine patents to develop new chemical variants of nicotine.^[332]

In the 1980s, Brown and Williamson patented Y1, a specially bred variety of flue-cured tobacco with twice the normal level of nicotine. Y1 was grown in Brazil and imported by Brown and Williamson to the United States for use in some brands. In Canada, the federal Department of Agriculture conducted research, funded by tobacco companies, that successfully bred tobacco plants with much higher nicotine levels than was normally found in Canadian crops.^[82] A 1995 study found that the concentration of nicotine in the tobacco in Canadian cigarettes had risen substantially over the period 1968–95.^[488]

“Evidence of Nicotine Manipulation by the American Tobacco Company,” a 1994 staff report of a US Congressional subcommittee, contained this conclusion:

The ATC documents submitted to the Subcommittee reflect an intense research and commercial interest in nicotine. From 1940 to 1970, ATC funded over 90 studies on the pharmacological and other effects of nicotine. From 1963 to 1980, ATC researchers experimented with numerous methods to increase nicotine levels in cigarettes. On at least one occasion, in Seattle in 1969, nicotine-enriched cigarettes were test-marketed by ATC to the public.^{[377, p. 5]}

In a tobacco-industry trade journal, an ad placed by one industry supplier, LTR Industries (a subsidiary of Kimberley-Clark), talked of the ability to control nicotine. Under the headline, “More or less nicotine,” was the following text:

Nicotine levels are becoming a growing concern to the designers of modern cigarettes, particularly those with lower ‘tar’ deliveries. The Kimberley-Clark tobacco reconstitution process used by LTR Industries permits adjustments of nicotine to your exact requirements. These adjustments will not affect the other important properties of customized reconstituted tobacco produced at LTR Industries: low tar delivery, high filling power, high yield, and the flexibility to convey organoleptic modifications. We can help you control your tobacco.^{[332, p. 153]}

Another supplier, the Contraf Group, described itself in an ad as “The Niche Market Specialists” and listed “Pure Nicotine and other special additives” as available from the company.[151, p. 5]

Despite all their knowledge about the effects of nicotine, the tobacco manufacturers deny that nicotine is addictive or that they manipulate nicotine levels in cigarettes. When the US Surgeon General released his 1988 report on nicotine addiction,^[605] the industry vigorously ridiculed the report’s conclusions, despite the existence of industry-generated knowledge endorsing the Surgeon General’s view.

The “light” cigarette myth

A major response by the industry to health concerns has been the introduction and promotion of so-called light cigarettes. The industry began to lower the tar and nicotine yields in the 1950s, following reports of smoking as a cause of cancer. Tests done for Reader’s Digest found that between 1957 and 1961, tar yields for many Canadian brands fell:

• Export “A” filter, from 30.9 mg to 26.2;
• du Maurier filter, from 22.1 mg to 18.9;
• Matinée filter, from 27.1 mg to 15.7; and
• Craven “A” filter, from 29.8 mg to 13.8.

Many “milder” brands still had extremely high yields. In 1961, Player’s Mild (no filter) had 30.1 mg of tar, and Player’s Medium (no filter) had 27.7 mg.^[481]

Lowered yields continued as a trend in the 1960s. In the mid-1970s, there was a shift toward “ultra light” cigarettes. In 1974, only 0.3% of cigarettes sold had tar yields of 5 mg or less. The comparable market shares for different tar ranges for 1977 and 1989 are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Market shares corresponding to different tar levels, 1977 and 1989.

Source: Imperial Tobacco.^[290]

There is evidence that switching to low-tar cigarettes may reduce the risk of lung cancer, but it has to be emphasized that the reduced risk is extremely modest compared with quitting altogether. For heart disease, one leading study found that lower yield cigarettes did not reduce the risk of disease.^[460] There is no such thing as a safe cigarette. Describing a cigarette as “light” is like describing a poison as “cyanide light” or “arsenic mild.”

Tobacco advertising seeks to portray lower yield cigarettes as safer for health, as these excerpts from marketing documents indicate:

Overall Positioning Objective

The objective for Medallion is to associate the brand with the lowest recognized level of mildness (Ultra-Mildness) and ‘safety’, with as little sacrifice or trade-off on image elements. . . .

Strategies

Positioning

Reinforce Medallion’s lowest tar, ‘safest’, perception [emphasis as in original].

— Imperial Tobacco Ltd, “Medallion,” circa 1982–89^{[301, p. 3]}

Player’s Extra Light continues to be positioned as a milder, therefore healthier, version of Player’s Light. It remains a health oriented alternative for interested Player’s smokers. Its role will continue to be as such.

— Imperial Tobacco Ltd, “Player’s 1988”^{[305, p. 4]}

Opportunities

a) . . . Due to continuing anti-smoking publicity, the public continues to be aware of and concerned with the suggested hazards of cigarette smoking. Matinée is then in an ideal position to take advantage of this situation with its low T & N and ‘safer for health’ propositions.

— Imperial Tobacco Ltd, “1971 Matinée Marketing Plans”^{[292, p. 50]}

VIII. Advertising Plan

2. Copy Strategy

G. Rationale: As consumers shift from full flavour cigarettes to brands with lower ‘tar’ and nicotine levels, they will desire as much flavour and satisfaction as possible while easing their concerns about the smoking/health controversy. Because there are many new and established brands competing in this segment, it will be necessary to aggressively communicate that Export ‘A’ Lights is the only brand that has successfully combined full flavour and lightness in one cigarette [emphasis as in original].

— RJR – Macdonald Inc., “Canada. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International. 1978 Annual Business Plan. Marketing Plans: Export ‘A’ Lights”^{[492, p. 2126]}

As indicated by this last excerpt, tobacco companies seek to alleviate smokers’ health concerns by providing a light cigarette that still has the taste (nicotine fix) smokers want. In reality, it is impossible to deliver such a contradictory combination, but advertising has created the perception that such a cigarette is available. For example, in 1965, Player’s King Size was launched with the slogan “Come on over to smoothness, with no let down in taste.” In 1972, a Matinée package redesign was accompanied by advertising that included the words “New Matinée gives you more of what you don’t want: more taste, less strength.”

In 1988, an ad for Rothmans Lights had the slogan “The Full-Flavour Lights!” and a package of Rothmans floating among the clouds.

Many smokers believe that low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes are safe alternatives to quitting. Said Imperial’s Donald Brown, “We target at people who are looking for milder brands and we are well aware that the primary reason many of them are looking for milder brands is because they believe a milder brand is better for their health.”^[55] The industry normally does not explicitly claim that light cigarettes are healthier, but cigarette advertising has clearly given this impression to consumers. When pressed, the industry will deny that low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes are less dangerous for health.^[254] For consistency, the industry has to take this position because it denies that any cigarettes are dangerous for health.

The meaning of light varies wildly between brands. Tar yields for light brands range between 4 and 15 mg; for extra light and ultra light brands, between 1 and 12 mg; and for regular brands, between 8 and 21 mg. Thus, there is the highly misleading situation where some extra light brands yield more tar than regular brands.^[420] When roll-your-own products are considered, things get even more confusing: the tar yield of Rothmans Extra Light is 18 mg, that of Player’s Extra Light is 19.7 mg, and so on.

Many light cigarette brands are not light at all; for example, Player’s Light has 13 mg of tar, and Player’s Extra Light has 11 mg. These two brands have a tar level almost as high as the 15 mg maximum allowed in the European Union, a maximum that will fall to 12 mg in 1998. How can Imperial get away with describing a yield of 13 mg as light? According to spokesperson Michel Descôteaux, “ ‘light’ is relative to each brand. There is no strict logic behind it. Ultimately it’s the consumer who decides which cigarette is light for him.”[420, p. 64]

What makes things worse is that the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yields reported on a package represent only an average. The actual yield in an individual cigarette may vary greatly. In the case of Export “A” Ultra Light King Size, with an average tar yield of 9 mg, test results reported to the government and obtained under the Access to Information Act showed that most yields ranged between 6 and 12 mg.^[499] This 6-mg spread is large — normally it’s much less.

In quarterly reports submitted by Imperial Tobacco to Health Canada, the tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yields for all its products are accompanied by a disclaimer (on every page) stating that “the values for the above periods may not necessarily correspond to the mean values on products currently being produced, or the numbers printed on packages currently available for sale.”^[291]

Most people are unaware of just how misleading the reported yields of tar and nicotine can be. These yields are based on machine tests that purport to simulate the smoking behaviour of the average person. A small machine actually smokes a cigarette by taking periodic puffs (for example, every 60 seconds), by puffing for a specified duration (for example, 2 seconds), by inhaling a certain amount of smoke per puff, and by continuing to puff until a specified butt length is reached. The problem, of course, is that not all consumers smoke like the machine.

Many consumers believe that if a package says that the tar yield is 6 mg of tar, then each cigarette will deliver this much tar no matter how a cigarette is smoked. After all, they know that a bottle of beer will contain a certain percentage of alcohol no matter how it is drunk, and a container of yogurt will contain a certain number of calories no matter how it is consumed. In the case of cigarettes, though, the amount of toxic constituents inhaled depends directly on how a cigarette is smoked: an intensely smoked cigarette labeled as yielding 6 mg of tar could actually yield four times that much.

One technique to reduce machine-measured yields is to speed up the burn rate of the cigarette. With such cigarettes, the machine takes fewer puffs and inhales less smoke by the time the specified butt length is reached. Smokers, on the other hand, may adjust to the modified burn rate by reducing the interval between puffs, thus still taking their normal number of puffs per cigarette and inhaling their normal amount of tar and nicotine.

The main technique to reduce machine-measured yields to ultra low levels is to ventilate filters through small air holes. As the smoking machine inhales, it draws air through the holes to mix with the smoke. The machine receives more air and less smoke; consequently, tar and nicotine yields are lower. In 1975, only 0.7% of cigarettes sold in Canada were ventilated; by 1983, 42% were.^[290] Ventilation has become even more widespread in the 1990s, but exact figures are not available.

Some ventilation holes created by lasers are so small they are undetectable by the naked eye. If the holes are covered by the smoker’s lips or fingers, the levels of nicotine and tar inhaled can jump dramatically. Scientists have found that 32%–69% of smokers of low-yield cigarettes block the ventilation holes.^[332]

The critical importance of ventilation is illustrated by the yields from roll-your-own tobacco. The government requires this type of tobacco to be tested in a filtered cigarette tube that has no ventilation. As Table 2 illustrates, there is very little difference in the reported yields from brands of roll-your-own tobacco, but there is a sharp difference among cigarette brands. And when a brand of roll-your-own is compared with the same brand of cigarettes, it may be seen that the roll-your-own product has much higher yields of toxic constituents.

As noted, smokers of low-yield cigarettes often change the way they smoke to compensate for the nicotine they are missing. Compared with the standard machine-test method, smokers might take more puffs, take longer puffs, smoke a cigarette closer to the butt, smoke more cigarettes, or even cover the ventilation holes in the filter. Thus, the reported quantities of tar and nicotine may be meaningless. Here is what the tobacco industry told the Isabelle Committee in 1969 while opposing a proposal to list tar and nicotine yields on packages:

Human smokers differ greatly in the frequency and intensity of their puffing and the amount of each cigarette they smoke. Thus there may be little relation between the figures reported from the machine and the actual exposure of any given smoker with any given cigarette.^{[4, p. 1652]}

Table 2. Comparison of tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yields for selected brands of cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco.

Source: Imperial Tobacco;^[291] RJR – Macdonald;^[498,499] and Rothmans, Benson & Hedges.^[510,511]

Note: T, tar; N, nicotine; CO, carbon monoxide. Reported yields of tar and carbon monoxide for some brands have been rounded. The roll-your-own version of Export “A” is sold with the brand name Export. All cigarettes are regular size except for Rothmans and Rothmans Extra Light, which are only sold in king size.

Some smokers of low-yield cigarettes may inhale more strongly than necessary to compensate for what they are missing. This means that a smoker may actually draw in more toxic constituents with light brands, thereby making light cigarettes more hazardous to health. For some potential smokers, including teenage girls, low-yield cigarettes may make it easier to start smoking.

Internal Imperial Tobacco research in 1975 found that smokers change their smoking techniques to get the nicotine they want: “[a smoker] adjusts his smoking habits when smoking cigarettes with low nicotine and [tar] to duplicate his normal cigarette nicotine intake.”^[51] Minutes from BAT’s 1974 Group Research and Development Conference state that “whatever the characteristics of cigarettes as determined by smoking machines, the smoker adjusts his pattern to deliver his own nicotine requirements.”^[214] Research has shown that there is little correlation between machine-reported nicotine levels and the total amount of nicotine actually in cigarettes or found in the bloodstream of smokers.^[35] Despite this knowledge of smoker compensation, the tobacco industry has never advised smokers that different smoking techniques can result in yields far higher than reported on the package.

Manufacturers can adjust the pH (acidic) level of tobacco so that the amount of nicotine absorbed by the body increases. Thus, two cigarette brands, each with the same nicotine yield according to machine tests and each smoked in identical fashion by the smoker, may actually deliver different quantities of nicotine to the blood.

The most distressing aspect of the emergence of low-yield cigarettes is how this has inhibited smokers from quitting, as indicated by the following excerpts from tobacco-industry marketing documents:

We have evidence of virtually no quitting among smokers of those brands [of under 6 mg of tar], and there are indications that the advent of ultra low tar cigarettes has actually retained some potential quitters in the cigarette market by offering them a viable alternative.

— Imperial Tobacco Ltd, “Response of the Market and of Imperial Tobacco to the Smoking and Health Environment,” 1978^{[287, p. 2]}

The third objective [of Project Plus/Minus] was to explore brand selection patterns and the perceptions of light brands. The latter was approached in particular as regards the view of light brands as potential substitutes for quitting.

— Kwechansky Marketing Research Inc., “Project Plus/Minus,” prepared for Imperial Tobacco Ltd, 1982^{[344, p. 2]}

Perceptions of Low-Tar Brands

LTNs [low tar and nicotine] allow consumers to smoke under social duress. As a category, the low-tar brands are seen as a means to yield to health considerations, social pressures and personal guilt feelings [emphasis as in original].

— Marketing Systems Inc., “Project Eli Focus Groups Final Report,” prepared for Imperial Tobacco Ltd, 1982^{[382, p. 21]}

The desire to quit smoking altogether and the rationalization offered by many consumers that their going down in tar and nicotine brings them closer to the inevitable step of giving up smoking may actually increase the market considerably.

— Marketing Systems Inc., “Project Eli Focus Groups Final Report,” prepared for Imperial Tobacco Ltd, 1982^{[382, pp. 45–46]}

Hence, Quitters may be discouraged from quitting, or at least kept in the market longer, by either of the two product opportunities noted before. A less irritating cigarette is one route. (Indeed, the practice of switching to lower tar cigarettes and sometimes menthol in the quitting process tacitly recognizes this.) The safe cigarette would have wide appeal, limited mainly by the social pressures to quit. . . .

Strategically, it would seem that reducing quitting is the most viable approach. But it would also seem that a product solution may not be sufficient on its own. An advocacy thrust may be necessary; disaffected smokers do need some reassurance that they are not social pariahs.

— The Creative Research Group Ltd, “Project Viking,” Volume III: Product Issues, prepared for Imperial Tobacco Ltd, 1986^{[126, p. 8]}

The tobacco manufacturers, the masters of manipulation, have a lengthy record of misbehaviour, but the marketing of low-yield cigarettes is one of their most deplorable offensives, exceeded only by the marketing of cigarettes to young people.

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