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The future of the hydrogen economy is still an open question. Given the pressures upon governments, both North and South, to deal with environmental pollution and energy security in the longer term, can developing countries simply wait until a consensus process plays itself out in the North before taking their own decisions? Even more fundamentally, should the pace of change in the North set the trajectory in the South? The latter would be the logical outcome of the view that in developing countries "the introduction of fuel cell technology certainly will occur significantly later than in the industrialized countries because of cost and infrastructure issues" (Office of Technology Policy, 2003: 18). But should it?

Dealing with pollution

There are a number of reasons why developing countries should be brought into the process of making choices and planning their transitions as quickly as possible, and why there will be a need for new sorts of partnerships to help bring this about. From a Northern perspective, perhaps the primary advantage of involving the South now is environmental.

Pollution reduction in the South is a win-win solution. The number of automobile and truck registrations is expected to increase substantially over the next 50 years, reaching 3.5 billion vehicles on the road by 2050, as compared with a 1996 figure of 670 million. Most of this increase will be in developing countries, in which vehicle registrations are estimated to grow from under 100 million at the turn of the millennium to 2.5 billion by 2050 (Office of Technology Policy, 2003: 18). It is thus surprising that so little attention is being paid to opportunities for the development and diffusion of fuel-cell technology in these countries. Perhaps the only major programme currently under way is the testing of fuel-cell buses with the support of the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

Initially envisaged as a programme in five megacities with both serious pollution problems and a strong scientific and engineering base – Shanghai, New Delhi, São Paulo, Mexico City and Cairo – only three of these projects are fully operational today.¹ As chapter 8 pointed out, the high cost of the programme and the possibility of implementing alternative strategies, such as converting buses to CNG, constructing new forms of public transport in urban areas and the development of sustainable fuels such as ethanol and biodiesel, have been a disincentive to participation in this programme. But most developing countries are neither learning through such testing programmes nor are they aware of or able to implement the alternatives discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 13, a point returned to below.

Diversity of needs

Across the South, needs are different and a standardized approach to a transition would hardly be appropriate. For oil producers in the South such as Nigeria, discussed in chapters 7 and 16, choices are framed by the likelihood that the emerging hydrogen economy will spell a significant drop in oil consumption² and revenues, potentially within 20 years. While this allows a period of time in which to develop alternative uses for fossil fuels, such alternatives will have to be identified and the research and production capabilities put in place over the next 10–15 years. Similarly, for developing countries that have become involved in assembling automobiles and producing parts and components, as in the Malaysian case described in chapter 12, the car of the future will require new skills and new knowledge.³ Strengthening the local knowledge base, ensuring its flexibility, engaging more intensively in domestic demand-driven research and creating new sorts of knowledge networks and partnerships will be needed to make the transition less painful.

More broadly still, many developing countries are moving down an older technological path as they continue to build their vehicle-related infrastructure – the auto-repair services, fuel distribution networks, refuelling stations – around the internal-combustion engine and the consumption of gasoline. This is all the more serious as many developing countries have become major importers of used cars, thus creating more incentive to strengthen a fossil-fuel-based system. Were this to continue, North and South would find themselves on divergent paths with an ever-wider technological divide between them. From the perspective of the South, how the North deals with environmental pollution has a strong bearing on its own opportunities for growth. These cannot simply be reduced to accommodate lower levels of pollution worldwide. Instead, that growth must be hitched to the development and diffusion of technologies associated with the hydrogen economy.

Yet the process of catching up in these new-wave technologies is significantly different from traditional, engineering-based industries of the past. In those earlier waves of technological change, catching up depended more upon deepening production capabilities, thereby ensuring that the clones, copies or OEM goods were, at the least, of similar quality and yet initially competitive because they were cheaper. In the initial phase of a catch-up process there was thus little need for domestic R&D. Adaptation and modification that led to productivity increases or capital stretching could largely take place within the firm and through the strengthening of engineering capabilities. The process of catching up in these industries was thus an incremental one, in terms of the kinds of knowledge bases that were needed, the sequential way in which they would be acquired and the gradual building up of the system that enabled the imported technologies to function optimally in their new environment.

In science-based, patent-intensive and systems-embedded new-wave technologies, however, the process of catching up differs from this traditional incremental process and its focus on single enterprises and building basic skills first. Tertiary education and research are needed from the outset, as they permit close monitoring of the changing technological frontier, enable the identification of opportunities for entry into new productive activities and provide the base for a more holistic, systems-oriented approach to policymaking for the transition. These new capabilities will have to be developed, as will the awareness that such a process is even necessary. In the absence of attention to capacity-building processes now, developing countries run the risk of exclusion in the future.

The problem of exclusion⁴

Although most people date the emergence of new-wave technologies to the advent of the semiconductor, in many respects new information and communications technologies (ICTs) were initially a transitional technology, emerging within the paradigm of earlier mechanically based indus­trial revolutions and only later incorporating the genes, proteins and particles at the nano level that are central to new-wave technologies. Their introduction into products and processes was gradual, modular and additive, as components of existing products were progressively transformed from mechanical to digital and new products were created by combining upgraded versions of existing components in novel ways.⁵ They were only a foretaste of what might be in store.

Like mechanically based industries of the past, entry into the electronics industry was still possible at low skill levels, and most manufacturing activities located in the developing world required only semi-skilled labour. Although a conscious effort to learn was required, opportunities for catching up were present when industries matured slowly, product life cycles were longer and competition from lower-wage entrants was not yet intense. The need for domestic R&D in the early phase of the catch-up process in ICTs was also limited, and patent protection was not very important. This encouraged reverse engineering within the firm, and the adaptation and modification of imported technologies that made further learning and innovation possible.⁶

Although this new generic technology brought many benefits, as it transformed traditional information and telecommunications processes, led to the creation of knowledge-based products in a wide variety of different industries and stimulated the development of the internet, there emerged what has become known as the "digital divide". From the outset the digital divide was defined mainly in infrastructure terms – access to telecommunications and computers. This, it was assumed, could be remedied by higher doses of technology transfer from North to South, notably through the extension of electricity generation and telecommunications switching and transmission equipment. The knowledge dimension and the way in which scarce knowledge resources affect the use and diffusion of new technologies were largely ignored. Since developing countries were widely regarded as users and not producers of the new ICTs, state-initiated efforts to master these technologies were criticized as inefficient and market distorting.⁷ The "learning to learn" and the extensive knowledge accumulation and innovative capacities that such efforts could create were simply dismissed, and little attention was paid to the emergence of a "domestic digital divide" (Hibert and Katz, 2003: 63) that progressively excluded large numbers of potential users in education, research and business where reliance on computers and the internet was increasing (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Adeya, 2004; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal, 2006). Had developing countries been regarded not merely as passive technology users but as potential knowledge creators and innovators, and had a systems-oriented approach been taken from the outset, the problems of domestic content, costs and the development of the ancillary educational, research, manufacturing and service activities needed to indigenize a learning and innovation process would probably have been resolved sooner and access widened more quickly. But this was not the case, and the digital divide is still very much with us.

Since the 1990s a second wave of technological change has transformed the development of new products and processes in ICTs and brought about the application of biotechnology to pharmaceuticals and agriculture. In these new-wave technologies, the knowledge dimension is now much more evident in the strong role that the science base plays and the intensity of patenting activity. The belief that development pathways of the past will be those trodden in the future must thus be tempered by this new reality. In a knowledge-based economy, the locus of knowledge creation and the forms through which knowledge is appropriated will increasingly shape opportunities for learning, for innovation and thus for growth and development.

As hydrogen fuel cells emerge as yet another disruptive technology, the role of the South as a "technology user" is becoming even more problematic and raises the spectre of cumulative and path-dependent growth in inequalities between North and South in the future. Catching up in these science-based, patent-intensive technologies, whether as users or producers, will require more attention to the development of tertiary education and public sector research capabilities, not only to widen the range of choice, reduce costs of final products and adapt these new technologies to local needs, but also to provide the basis for more informed policymaking processes.

Strengthening tertiary education and public sector research

The 1980s and 1990s were years in which the contribution of public sector research institutes and universities to innovation, especially in the United States and a number of European countries, came under strong criticism and support for these knowledge-based organizations began to erode. It was no surprise, therefore, that faced with the austerity measures imposed as part of World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programmes in many developing countries, the budgets of these organizations were sharply cut.

In the current context, such strategies need to be rethought. Without a radical rebalancing of current educational practices to strengthen tertiary education and build networks among centres of research and training excellence, closing the knowledge gaps of the future will be even more difficult. While universities and research organizations are once again regarded as potential contributors in dealing with the challenges of growth and development, simply returning to past practices in which reform of the science and technology sector focuses mainly on the supply of researchers and research outputs is not likely to solve the "innovation" problem, where innovation is understood as the application of new knowledge in production.

As research on new-wave technologies in developing countries has shown, pumping up the supply of science and technology outputs alone will not be enough.⁸ The ability to use these new technologies and to adapt and apply them across all productive and service sectors will require not only more attention to the development of tertiary education and public sector research capabilities, but also new stimuli for both producers and users of knowledge – private sector firms, government ministries, innovation intermediaries, environmental services organizations, NGOs, regional and local organizations – to work more closely together.

To conceptualize the set of policies and programmes, the channels for knowledge and information flows and the financing mechanisms that sustain an innovation process, a more systems-oriented approach will be needed from the outset. Only in this way will technological change open opportunities for the development of a robust and competitive SME sector alongside the science- and engineering-based capabilities needed to adapt new-wave technologies to local needs. Thinking about transitions early in the process of a technological revolution thus has the potential to narrow gaps rather than widen them.

Building capacity in hydrogen, fuel cells and HFCVs

A small number of developing countries with strong science and engineering capabilities have created teaching and research programmes in the chemical and electrochemical engineering and natural science bases that underlie the emerging hydrogen economy. These countries are also participating in a variety of networks through which they are able to learn about hydrogen, fuel cells and their applications in both transport and stationary power sectors, and monitor the frontiers of change in these fields. But this is not the case for the majority of developing countries.

What to learn and how to advance the learning process at home and diffuse such knowledge more widely require further reflection. Study tours by science, technology, energy and education ministries from interested developing countries should be organized to visit leading developed and developing country teaching and research institutes, with a view to building the knowledge about critical science and engineering inputs needed to design programmes at home. Study tours such as these also help to create the knowledge networks that enable developing countries to access a continuous flow of new knowledge.

In a small number of developing countries, research programmes are already under way on hydrogen fuel cells for both stationary energy and transport, and on alternatives such as electric vehicles. Brazil, China and India are in the forefront of these activities, but South Africa and Malaysia are moving rapidly in this direction.⁹

While the creation of full-scale training programmes in the developing world will take considerable time, it would be possible now to establish networks of centres of excellence involving universities and research institutes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These could be anchored by established research and training programmes in those countries of the South that have developed strengths in hydrogen, fuel cells and alternatives, and linkages could be established to partner institutes in the North. A number of international organizations are also now able to provide research support and learning and networking opportunities. UNIDO's ICHET, an international centre specialized in hydrogen and fuel cells, has an extensive pilot research programme under way on different methods to produce hydrogen from renewable energy sources such as solar, biomass and wind, as well as the use of hydrogen to power three-wheelers and buses. Argentina, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, India and China are involved in this project.

Collaborative research and testing programmes and the exchange of postgraduate students and confirmed researchers would in only a few years supply core staff for local research and training capabilities and provide support to government monitoring and policymaking activities. They would provide the basis, moreover, for an expansion of the country's absorptive capacity and thus enable local research and production to emerge more quickly.

The development and use of fuel cells for stationary power

Hydrogen fuel cells are a dual-use technology and can be developed for both the transportation and the stationary power sectors. For fuel-cell manufacturers, such as Ballard Power Systems for example, maintaining a foot in both camps has been essential in growing the company. Ebara Ballard was thus there when Japan decided to move towards the development of co-generation plants in Tokyo.

Even though full-scale production of hydrogen fuel-cell cars for most companies will not take place much before 2020, dual-purpose usage of HFCs in stationary power systems and in a variety of fuel-cell vehicles such as forklifts is creating economies that should enable fuel-cell manu­facturers to reach their break-even point of about 300,000 stacks per year without having to produce 300,000 FCVs a year. Economies of scale in the manufacture of automobiles might thus not be as much of a constraint as is currently the view.

Both PAFCs and PEMFCs have been installed widely in the United States, Japan and Europe since the mid-1990s,¹⁰ and more recently in Canada, Korea, India, Brazil and China. This would be an opportune moment for other developing countries to study these technologies and build up a capacity to evaluate the conditions under which they operate well and at affordable costs. By building a more distributed form of energy generation, one that could operate by using biofuels and solar cells, some developing countries might thus avoid the environmentally damaging construction of hydroelectric dams and the high costs of building power grids that transmit energy with decreasing efficiency over long distances. However, leapfrogging over these earlier technologies and into the optimal use of a new-wave technology is not merely a question of "technology transfer" but involves a conscious effort at learning and capacity building across a broad range of scientific, engineering and social science disciplines.

Learning through HFCV testing programmes

Over the past five years testing of newer types of fuel cells and stacks, as well as of a variety of fuel production, distribution and on-board storage systems, has progressed considerably in Europe, North America and Japan. Much of this was supported through public funds or involved public-private collaborations such as the California Fuel Cell Partnership, the Japan Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Park or the EU's CUTE project. Experimental hydrogen refuelling stations have been set up in Japan, Iceland, the European Union¹¹ and California as part of programmes to road-test hydrogen-powered FCVs.¹² By 2005 fuel-cell bus testing, under way for several years in Canada, Europe and the United States, had been extended to a small number of developing countries.

Under the GEF of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), a project to deploy and test fuel-cell buses in five developing countries was adopted. The project, which would test up to 40–50 buses, was anticipated to cost approximately US$130 million. The choice of countries, and within them of specific cities for testing the vehicles, reflects a dual consideration: the large, urban, highly polluting transport systems in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, New Delhi, São Paulo, Mexico City and Cairo; and the strong engineering base needed to undertake these testing programmes and learn from them.

At present, the programme in China is furthest along and the Beijing demonstration project has already been completed. The Tata Energy Research Institute in India is currently testing a Ballard fuel-cell bus, but given the high cost of these buses, New Delhi, which only recently converted its bus fleet to CNG vehicles, has not begun a broader testing programme. The same is true in Cairo and Mexico City, which have adopted alternative programmes for the reduction of urban transport pollution.¹³

To diffuse knowledge across the developing world, countries in both North and South with ongoing fuel-cell bus and car testing facilities and a variety of different types of hydrogen refuelling stations might consider the formation of a consortium for knowledge production and sharing on the lessons learned from testing programmes. This could take a number of forms. Systematic comparative analysis across testing programmes could form the basis for an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of various technologies and the social, economic and environmental conditions under which they work optimally. The lessons learned from testing can be incorporated into training manuals for researchers and policymakers from other developing countries. Such manuals would include information on the operating parameters within which testing is taking place, performance criteria and evaluation, techniques for learning and analysis, adaptive choices and changes in the course of testing programmes, and the impact of lessons learned on policies, programmes and future technological trajectories in countries conducting testing. The consortium could plan a series of training programmes on a country or regional basis to diffuse this information more widely. Consortium members could also open their facilities and programmes to visiting scholars for internship, training and collaborative research work.

Evaluating alternatives and making informed choices

There is currently a wide range of alternatives for reducing pollution in the transport sector. Not all of these push the technological frontier forward or bring about more fundamental changes, but many enable countries to undertake changes that reduce pollution without moving them down trajectories that diverge from those at the forefront of the technological change process. However, there are currently no methodologies available that enable developing countries to evaluate these alternatives from a multi-goal, long-term perspective. Most methodologies continue to take a narrow problem-solving approach to pollution, such as simply using end-of-pipe solutions or transferring the centre of the problem from the final user to the source of energy. This may hide it briefly from public view, but does little to change the overall environmental impact or the underlying consumption and production models that are generating the problem. It tends, moreover, to prolong the life cycle of earlier technologies when the moment to invest in newer, potentially more effective, efficient and sustainable technologies may have arrived.

There is also a problem in choosing among alternatives. The criteria that are used can tilt the balance in the choice of technologies to those that either bridge the move towards a technological revolution or become barriers to it. Policies have a particularly important role to play in this respect, as they shape the parameters within which choice-sets are established and criteria selected. In many countries, for example, policies have created incentives for the continued use of fossil fuels such as gasoline and natural gas, albeit with efforts to produce cleaner fuels and towards the development and purchase of hybrid vehicles that reduce overall pollution levels and create marginally greater fuel economies – as opposed to reshaping existing practices in the patterns of consumption and production that currently favour roads and personal vehicles over alternatives in the transport sector. This was the logic implicit in the approach to the choice of alternative fuels presented in a report prepared by Adnan Shihab-Eldin, director of research at OPEC, and presented to the Eighth International Energy Forum in Osaka, Japan, on 21–23 September 2002. The argument begins with the affirmation that world energy demand will continue to grow through 2020, especially in the transport sector, and enquires into the technologies that might be available to meet this demand. Oil and natural gas are finite but still very abundant, and relatively low additional costs would be needed to expand production and infrastructure of these two fuels.¹⁴ These hydrocarbon-based fuels, along with bio-ethanol, also have mature technologies, but increasing output of the latter and of biodiesel, a newer technology available mainly for pilot projects and at high cost, is limited by land. Both, however, can use existing gas stations and conventional ICEs. Natural gas, on the other hand, competes with increasing demand for power plants. The sole difficulty with oil, when compared to the others, is its emissions problems; but cleaner fuels in the transport sector can deal with these. The report thus concludes that "cleaner fossil fuels will continue to dominate the power sector, as well as most other sectors, for decades to come, if not throughout this century" (Shihab-Eldin, 2002: 305).

Most efforts at evaluating alternatives take existing trends as given and inflate the costs or difficulties of reversing them. The preference of consumers for SUVs is one example. Few efforts at evaluation, moreover, place dynamic longer-term goals, such as learning, high up in their list of priorities. Yet for countries in the South learning is the key to future growth and development. Developing countries will need to factor opportunities for learning and capacity building into the evaluation process so that they can widen their choices in the future.

Evaluating alternatives also requires attention to the direction of change. Setting off down a path that diverges over time from what becomes the main technological trajectory of the future can be very costly.¹⁵ How to deal with this problem is of some concern to developing countries. What short-term approach, for example, should be taken to ensure that any natural gas infrastructure which might be built is compatible with hydrogen, and what might be learned by using natural gas-hydrogen blends in the short term in CNG vehicles where access to natural gas is cost-effective?¹⁶

A number of steps can be taken to facilitate the choice process. One is to put in place a system for monitoring the pace of change in fuel-cell technologies and analysing the factors affecting it. Most developing countries cannot afford to undertake such continuous monitoring and evaluation on their own. A small secretariat and extensive networking via the internet can solve the problem of timely data collection, but the analytical problem remains. More work needs to be done to develop methodologies for evaluating change and deriving from them an appreciation of the range of alternatives, the conditions under which they can be effectively implemented and the speed with which new technological trajectories are emerging that might displace these alternatives.

Moving towards CNG vehicles as a way to reduce urban pollution in the medium term is but one example. Are the conditions within which this choice can be effectively implemented already in place? CNG, for example, was available in New Delhi when the Supreme Court set the deadlines for conversion of the municipal bus fleet in that city, but the infrastructure was not sufficient to meet demand when so many vehicles were converted at the same time (Singh et al., 2001). From a learning and innovation perspective, the ability to replace imported conversion kits with locally developed and cheaper kits was a plus. In contrast, the pace at which CNG vehicles are being adopted in Tokyo, where refuelling stations are not readily available and CNG vehicles are more expensive than diesel vehicles, is extraordinarily slow (Yarime, 2002).

Going beyond a choice based on a single criterion, it is also important to take a number of other key factors into consideration in choosing among alternatives. Which way to move, how and when? How to make such choices, and how to ensure that they are "evidence-based"? In searching for answers to such questions it is not enough to focus on short-term considerations, like the speed with which a given solution can be implemented, without addressing medium- and long-term equity is­sues. What, for example, will be the economic and social costs of conversion, and who will bear these costs? What kinds of capacities need to be built, and what provisions need to be made to ensure that the capacity-building process does not exclude segments of the population?

Policies, whether tacit or explicit, shape the parameters within which decisions about investment and innovation are taken. They inevitably impact on the direction of technological change. Policy timing and sequencing are crucial, and complementary policies to offset inequalities in the ability of actors to respond to market signals are often needed. Building the channels for a continuous dialogue among domestic stakeholders thus plays a critical role in securing the benefits of science and technology for all people. It is through such dialogues that awareness of a wider range of choices with regard to domestic research and technology trajectories can emerge and research programmes that include sustained innovation in the smallholder agricultural sector¹⁷ and in small and medium-sized manufacturing and service sector firms can be developed. Research is also needed to analyse alternatives in situ, identify possible collaborative partnerships and structure these to ensure that learning and capacity building takes place.

Notes

¹ See chapter 8 in this volume for an analysis of why Egypt has postponed fuel-cell bus demonstrations.

² Some estimates have placed this as high as 40 per cent, and a quick look at oil consumption in the United States, where the transport sector depends on petroleum for 95 per cent of its fuel and transport accounts for 67 per cent of petroleum use, would support such a dramatic drop in oil consumption if gasoline-fuelled FCs do not become the dominant design.

³ These issues are addressed in chapters 6–8, 11 and 12.

⁴ This section is drawn from Mytelka (2004).

⁵ In this the early ICT industry paralleled the technological trajectory that characterized the internal-combustion engine and its application in the auto industry. For details see chapter 1 in this volume.

⁶ Korea and Taiwan illustrated this process. See, for example, Kim (1997, 2004); Ernst, Ganiatsos and Mytelka (1998); Kim and Nelson (2000).

⁷ These criticisms were particularly directed at efforts to develop computers in Brazil and digital switches in Brazil and India. For a discussion of some of these debates see Tigre (1983); Görensson (1993); Mytelka (1999).

⁸ Brain drain is a classic instance of the effect of a single focus on the supply side, as opposed to a dual focus on strengthening both supply capacity and domestic demand for new technologies that builds the linkages between users and producers which stimulate an innovation process.

⁹ See chapters 15 and 17 in this volume.

¹⁰ The Energy Information Administration's Natural Gas Monthly of May 1994 listed the companies that were already operating fuel-cell stationary power systems using PAFCs. There were some 30 power companies in the United States, seven in Europe and several others which now would have had some 10 years' experience in operating such plants.

¹¹ Under the EU's CUTE (Clean Urban Transport for Europe) project, hydrogen fuelling stations are being set up to deliver fuel to 30 fuel-cell buses that will operate in the nine participating European cities: Amsterdam, Barcelona, Hamburg, London, Luxemburg, Madrid, Porto, Stockholm and Stuttgart. DaimlerChrysler will supply the buses.

¹² These are being carried out by the California Fuel Cell Partnership.

¹³ See chapter 8.

¹⁴ The following comparison is drawn from table 10 in Shihab-Eldin's report and the categories used there to compare these alternative fuels (Shihab-Eldin, 2002: 294).

¹⁵ See, for example, the way in which pressures to reduce potentially toxic mercury effluent within a very short timeframe led to the adoption of an intermediate technology by Japanese firms in the chlor-alkali industry and the reconversion, at high cost, to a more suitable technology when it appeared on the market only a few years later (Yarime, 2003).

¹⁶ See for example, a paper by a researcher from the Université de Québec's Hydrogen Research Institute (Bose, 2004).

¹⁷ See, for example, the choice between ethanol produced from sugar grown on large-scale plantations and biodiesel produced from non-edible oils on smallholder farms in chapter 6 in this volume.

REFERENCES

Bose, Tapan (2004) "Pathways for Transition to Hydrogen in Developing Countries", paper presented at Fifteenth World Hydrogen Energy Conference, Yokohama, 28 June–1 July, unpublished.

Ernst, D., T. Ganiatsos and L. Mytelka, eds (1998) Technological Capabilities and Export Success in Asia, London and New York: Routledge.

Görensson, B. (1993) "Third World Challengers on the International Market for Telecommunications Equipment: A Study of Brazil, India and South Korea", in C. Brundenius and B. Görensson, eds, New Technologies and Global Restructuring: The Third World at a Crossroads, London: Taylor Graham, pp. 2247–2250.

Hibert, M. and J. Katz (2003) Building an Information Society: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective, Santiago: UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL).

Kim, L. (1997) Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea's Technological Learning, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

——— (2004) "The Multifaceted Evolution of Korean Technological Capabilities and its Implications for Contemporary Policy", Oxford Development Studies 32(3): 341–363.

Kim, L. and R. Nelson (2000) Technology, Learning and Innovation, Experiences of Newly Industrializing Economies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mytelka, L. K. (1999) "The Telecommunications Equipment Industry in Brazil and Korea", in Lynn K. Mytelka, ed., Competition, Innovation and Competi­tiveness in Developing Countries, Paris: OECD Development Centre, pp. 115– 162.

——— (2004) "Catching Up in New Wave Technologies", Oxford Development Studies 32(3): 389–405.

Office of Technology Policy (2003) Fuel Cell Vehicles: Race to a New Automotive Future, Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce.

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B. and C. N. Adeya (2004) "Dynamics of Adoption and Usage of ICTs in African Universities: A Study of Kenya and Nigeria", Technovation 24(10): 841–851.

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B. and K. Lal (2006) SMEs and New Technologies: Learning E-Business and Development, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Shihab-Eldin, A. (2002) "New Energy Technologies: Trends in the Development of Clean and Efficient Energy Technologies", OPEC Review, December, pp. 261–307.

Singh, A., N. Sharma, K. Sharma and C. Bhan (2001) "Emission Characteristics of In-Use CNG Vehicles in Delhi", Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi, unpublished paper.

Tigre, P. (1983) Technology and Competition in the Brazilian Computer Industry, London: Francis Pinter.

Yarime, Masaru (2002) "Introducing CNG Vehicles in Tokyo: The Role of Public Actors in Coordinating the Behavior and Expectations of Private Actors", revised version of paper presented at AGS workshop, Breakthroughs in the System of Sustainable Technologies, Actions and Institutions: Understanding and Experimenting the Dynamics of Green Innovation, Urnasch, 24–26 August 2001, unpublished.

——— (2003) "From End-of-Pipe Technology to Clean Technology, Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technological Change in the Chlor-Alkali Industry in Japan and Western Europe", PhD thesis, University of Maastricht.

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